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Why Insider 'Skin in the Game' May Beat the S&P 500
Episode • Bonus Episode • 17th August 2026 • Views from 6,230 • Ryan Nauman
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On the Adjusted for Risk podcast, host Ryan Nauman interviews Haren Bhakta, founder and CEO of the Inside Ownership Index, who explains how the S&P 500’s free-float weighting effectively underweights shares held by controlling insiders and can end up buying more of founder-led companies after key leaders die.

Bhakta describes manually compiling 20 years of S&P 500 proxy filings to aggregate insider-ownership data and creating a passive index that weights companies by insider ownership as a “skin in the game” approach. He argues high ownership aligns management with shareholders, supports long-term innovation, and avoids value-destroying incentives, citing ownership patterns among 100-baggers and major S&P value destroyers. He also warns that proxy voting power concentrated in large asset managers entrenches mediocre leadership.

Connect with Ryan Nauman:

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Learn more about Inside Ownership Index:

Related:Russell’s Rebalance Is a Healthy Pruning Amidst an Epic Small-Cap Run

00:00 Welcome and Guest Intro

01:08 Origin of the Index

02:04 Free Float Problem

03:17 Building the Dataset

08:02 Why Ownership Matters

11:50 Power Law Leaders

14:37 Hundred Bagger Evidence

18:00 Long Term Culture Edge

27:24 Downside Protection

33:57 Passive Voting Risks

38:27 How Advisors Use OWN

40:25 Where to Learn More

41:29 Closing and Subscribe

Transcripts

Speaker:

Ryan Nauman Host Adjusted for Risk:

Welcome everyone to Adjusted for Risk

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podcast from the shores of Lake Tahoe.

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Over the years, many investment

professionals have spent many days and

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years researching the different factors

and drivers of equity performance

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to try and uncover signals that can

give them a competitive advantage.

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My m- next guest has launched

a strategy that he feels can

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help find top performing stocks.

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All right, enough from me.

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I've already talked enough.

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Let's go ahead and bring

on the star of the show.

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I'd like to give a very warm

welcome to Hiren Bhakta.

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Hiren is the founder and

CEO Inside Ownership Index.

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Hiren, thank you so much

for coming on the show.

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Really looking forward

to this conversation.

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Love all the research you've done.

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Wanna dig deep into that,

so looking forward to it.

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It's an honor to have you on.

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Can you please tell us a little bit more

about yourself and Inside Ownership Index?

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Haren Bhakta Founder & CEO Inside Ownership Index:

Sure.

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A little about myself.

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I started out in the investment

industry in 2010 at Merrill Lynch, going

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through the wealth management program.

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Went to Morgan Stanley after about

two and a half years in 2000- in 2012.

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Spent about five and a half

years at Morgan Stanley.

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In 2017, I left Morgan Stanley to

start my own investment practice,

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and I've been doing that since.

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In 2024, I created the Inside

Ownership Index, and I, I think

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I created the idea while sitting

at the Berkshire annual meeting.

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So I'm a huge Warren Buffett fan.

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I bought a lot of Berkshire for myself

and for my clients because of that

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belief and trust in Warren Buffett.

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So I've read everything he's put out,

listened to everything he's ever said.

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And I was sitting at

the meeting in 2024, in

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the back of my mind, afraid of what am

I gonna do with Berkshire when he dies.

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And this was the first meeting Charlie

Munger wasn't there because he had passed

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away about six, five months earlier.

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And so I'm sitting there afraid,

and at some point in the meeting

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it hit me that the S&P 500 will

actually be buying more Berkshire

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Hathaway when Warren Buffett dies.

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A lot of people don't know that.

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And the, the reason for that is

the S&P is what's called free

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float adjusted market cap weighted.

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So they don't count his shares because

he's a controlling shareholder.

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When he dies, he's not gonna be a

con-controlling shareholder anymore.

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Those shares become free floating.

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So I just thought, "Who would want more

Berkshire Hathaway without Warren Buffett?

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Who would want more

Tesla without Elon Musk?"

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'Cause they don't count the

20% of Tesla that he owns.

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And, same thing with Meta.

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Who wants more Meta

without Mark Zuckerberg?

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And I just thought, "Who…

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why is the S&P on the opposite side of the

table of these super value-creating CEOs?"

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We should wanna be on the

same side of the table.

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So I came home from Omaha and launched…

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figured out how to get this ownership

data first, and nobody had it.

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Nobody had CapIQ, Bloomberg FactSet.

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None of these data

providers had the ownership.

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So I had to go manually through all,

every single proxy filing of the S&P

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500 constituents going back 20 years.

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So I'm talking about 20,000, more than

20,000 different proxy filings manually.

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And the, the proxy filings are quite

complicated in a sense that AI can't

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easily just pull out the numbers.

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At least it couldn't in 2024.

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So I'm currently the only one

with, with the data aggregated.

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The data's there in the proxies,

it's just n- nobody has it.

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So essentially, the Inside Ownership Index

is a, a passive index that tracks the

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performance of shares owned by insiders

versus the S&P is the reverse of that.

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It's, the S&P is what's called the

free float adjusted market cap.

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So it's counting all the shares

that's essentially not held by

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controlling shareholders, and I'm

counting the shares that are actually

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held by controlling shareholders.

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It's essentially, as my

T-shirt says, skin in the game.

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Says, it's the skin in the game index

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Ryan: Love that, Heron.

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And that's fantastic.

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I don't…

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Like you said, I don't think a

lot of people realize that about

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the S&P and being free float.

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And yet I'm, doing research here before

we jumped on, it is really interesting.

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Yeah when, Warren passes along, it's

inter- S&P is gonna be buying up

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Berkshire, but then at the same time,

it's do you really wanna own it?

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There's so much uncertainty.

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Yes, they have a succession plan in place,

but still a lot of uncertainty there.

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So it's interesting.

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Yes,

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Haren Bhakta: Right

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Ryan: will go along with the S&P and,

buy whatever they're adding to the

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index, but it raises questions, and

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Haren Bhakta: Yeah.

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What I find in my research is that a

brilliant CEO, I think about half the

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time they could find a good replacement.

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And one, one example of that is Apple.

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So Steve Jobs found a good

replacement in Tim Cook.

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But what I've…

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I can't find a single scenario where the

replacement could find a good replacement.

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And because by then the, the company

gets bureaucratic, and to rise up the

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ranks in an organization, it becomes

very political, very suit-wearing type

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person, and they're good at maybe sales

or talking, but they're not good at

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innovation, which is what re- what's

really requi- required in a technology

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company to take the company to the next

level, especially in a changing world.

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And we have an extremely fast-paced

changing world right now with AI, right?

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So you…

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We don't see Apple participating

at all in this next future.

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And, when the cellphone changes, and

it hasn't changed in, in, 20 years or

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almost 20 years now, s- but when the

world does change, y- I don't see Apple

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participating 'cause they're not investing

any capital into the future at all.

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And I…

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and it's probably the right decision

because they don't have the talent.

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Now, we have a Mark Zuckerberg

at Meta making huge bets.

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We have Amazon with Jeff Bezos.

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Jeff Bezos is not the CEO,

but he is the chairman.

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He is overseeing strategy.

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When you have people capable of making

these big bets you want them to.

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And in, in Apple's case,

you don't have that.

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My research finds that the world

going back, 1,000 years has always

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changed by the m- minority few.

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And to capture more of that by using an

inside ownership weighted index you get

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a more concentrated version of the S&P

and bigger bets on the biggest innovators

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Ryan: Yeah, I'm a firm

believer in that too, Harry.

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If you are committed to something,

conviction in it, right?

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Go all in versus…

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in some cases for investors,

maybe going all in on Bitcoin

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maybe is not the best thing to do.

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But there's a lot of things.

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If you are convicted, you have conviction

in a certain strategy, investment

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thesis or something go all in on it and

show that you're committed to it, and

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that, so it's interesting that you're

talking about on the corporate side.

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So it.

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Great start here.

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So why does inside ownership

and really shareholder alignment

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matter when it comes to investing?

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Haren Bhakta: Shareholder

alignment is huge.

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What you want is leaders of the

organization to think like shareholders

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and to be aligned with shareholders.

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Otherwise, you get scenarios where

insiders have perverse incentives, right?

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Where they are not aligned with

shareholders, they become agents for

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the corporation and, more concerned

with their own base salaries and/or

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board fees versus, versus actual-

actually creating shareholder value.

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One example I have that, of

that right now, playing out

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right now is eBay and GameStop.

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So Ryan Cohen, the CEO of GameStop, has

placed a bid, a takeover bid for eBay.

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Now, I'm not an eBay shareholder,

so I can't tell you whether

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it's a good deal for eBay.

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But what I can tell you is that

eBay's board cannot objectively decide

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whether it's good for shareholders.

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You know what I mean?

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Because they're not shareholders.

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They're getting $300,000 in board fees

every year, and the CEO is getting

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$30 million in compensation who's

never purchased any stock himself.

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So you have essentially people protecting

their own job deciding whether a deal

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is good for shareholders or not, and

it is just creating a skin in the game

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problem where you get these corporations

with no share ownership themselves

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deciding what's good for owners

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Ryan: Yeah, that's really interesting.

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And I like to think too, Heron, on

the investment side, very rarely…

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stock picking's really hard.

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I'm not very good at it, so

I focus on the professionals.

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I'll pay, points or whatever, how much it

is to have professionals manage the money.

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But when I'm doing that, one

of my criteria is I want these

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managers, portfolio managers,

to eat their own cooking or have

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their skin in the game, as you

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would say.

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I want their own skin in the game.

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I don't want to invest in a

portfolio manager who doesn't

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invest in their own strategy,

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Haren Bhakta: Exactly.

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Yeah.

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Yeah very exactly similar and my,

one of my favorite investors is

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named Nick Sleep out of the UK.

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He's very underrated.

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A lot of people don't know about him.

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He created enormous wealth for investors,

and he eventually shut down his fund

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because he made so much money and he

told his investors that, "Hey, you

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don't need to pay me fees anymore.

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Just buy these three stocks.

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That's what I'm gonna do."

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So he had this fabulous

run and he said, "Hey…"

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I think he shut down in 2014, and he

said, "Hey, just buy these three stocks

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'cause that's what I'm gonna own."

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He bought Costco, Amazon,

and Berkshire Hathaway.

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And he- his line is that the best

investors are not investors at all.

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They're entrepreneurs that

never sold, which is true.

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Now we l- look at the best investors.

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You got Jeff Bezos, Mark

Zuckerberg Warren Buffett.

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These aren't investors.

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Essentially, they're entrepreneurs

that never sold their stock.

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So what we should be doing is

outsourcing our investing to these

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greatest investors, and by doing that

an inside ownership w- index basically

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does that for you in a systematic way

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Ryan: Yeah, exactly.

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I, yeah, I think it's very important

to invest in people that, like you

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said, they have skin in the game too.

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You wanna invest

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Haren Bhakta: Yeah.

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Sa- Sam Hinkie, s- the old GM of 76ers

he had a line that the people are power

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law, and the best ones change everything.

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And the, and society has

always worked that way.

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The best people are power law, and

the best ones do change everything.

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Look at the last 2,000 years.

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We've…

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Society has moved by the f- the, the

small number of individuals have created

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enormous value or y- m- maybe more than

1,000 years ago is more about armies.

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But today, you can classify a

organization or corporation as a,

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a, as its own little army, right?

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And, it's always been the individual who

has taken, who people have rallied around

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that individual and created enormous value

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Ryan: Yeah, a- and speaking of

power law, I'm glad you brought that

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up, Erin, because I've done some

research, h- and it's clear power law

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is very evident in today's market.

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For not only for recent years with

the Mag Seven stocks, and even go

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back in time, power law, it's where

very few names, 10 names, drive the

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performance of the overall market.

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So same with people too

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Haren Bhakta: Absolutely.

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There was this s- study done by a

Arizona State University professor who

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looked at all US stocks over 100 years.

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So we're talking about a century of data,

looking at every single stock in America.

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What he discovered was 4% of all stocks

delivered all the wealth creation, while

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the other 96% matched US Treasury bills.

220

00:13:43,867 --> 00:13:46,927

So it's not even just a recent phenomenon.

221

00:13:47,477 --> 00:13:53,847

The stock market has always been a

small number of stocks carrying the

222

00:13:53,847 --> 00:13:56,107

entire performance of the indices.

223

00:13:56,577 --> 00:13:58,527

So it's always been power law driven.

224

00:13:58,797 --> 00:14:05,217

But what, where academia got it half

right is that the leaders of organizations

225

00:14:05,227 --> 00:14:07,867

have exhibit even bigger power laws.

226

00:14:08,377 --> 00:14:12,847

There's a small number of leaders

that create enormous wealth, and

227

00:14:12,877 --> 00:14:17,297

we can look at that today with

Elon Musk and Jensen and Jeff Bezos

228

00:14:17,307 --> 00:14:18,957

and Z- and Mark Zuckerberg, right?

229

00:14:19,217 --> 00:14:25,037

So these few exceptional leaders create

enormous value while most of society

230

00:14:25,037 --> 00:14:30,777

and m- most of these companies don't

deliver enormous shareholder wealth.

231

00:14:31,347 --> 00:14:37,669

And so by investing in these exceptional

leaders you could raise your performance.

232

00:14:37,669 --> 00:14:41,579

And I looked at every

hundred bagger I could find.

233

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A hundred bagger is a stock that

delivers 100 times your money.

234

00:14:46,599 --> 00:14:49,329

So you put in $10,000, it

turns into over a million.

235

00:14:49,759 --> 00:14:51,299

Between the years 2000 to 2025,

236

00:14:53,479 --> 00:14:59,179

I found about 21, and only two exceptions.

237

00:14:59,509 --> 00:15:07,699

Every single one of those 21 except for

two, Apple and FICO Isaac, had ownership

238

00:15:07,949 --> 00:15:14,839

above 5% at the start before it went on

that, that hundred bagger return journey.

239

00:15:15,109 --> 00:15:19,079

So Apple surprisingly

is kind of an asterisk.

240

00:15:19,079 --> 00:15:26,529

So Steve Jobs didn't own a huge part

of Apple despite being a founder, and

241

00:15:26,549 --> 00:15:29,579

is-- the reason for that is he got

kicked out of Apple and then came back.

242

00:15:29,819 --> 00:15:34,079

So he had sold out of Apple I, I believe

two times throughout his career, he

243

00:15:34,079 --> 00:15:36,369

had sold out of Apple and got back in.

244

00:15:36,999 --> 00:15:40,389

The f- the s- the last time is

because he was kicked out, so he,

245

00:15:40,549 --> 00:15:42,369

sold his whole entire stake of Apple.

246

00:15:42,959 --> 00:15:46,929

And so and the other exception

was FICO Isaac, but all the other

247

00:15:46,929 --> 00:15:52,259

ones had ownership above 5%,

and very often more than that.

248

00:15:52,609 --> 00:15:55,349

And there was no other

commonality I could find.

249

00:15:55,349 --> 00:15:57,469

They were all in diverse

different industries.

250

00:15:57,809 --> 00:16:01,009

It wasn't necessarily the CEO

that, that owned the stock.

251

00:16:01,329 --> 00:16:03,259

It wasn't necessarily a founder.

252

00:16:03,829 --> 00:16:08,599

Tractor Supply was one company that,

that achieved that hundred bagger

253

00:16:08,619 --> 00:16:10,789

return, and that was an old company.

254

00:16:10,879 --> 00:16:13,679

Didn't have a founder

but it had ownership.

255

00:16:14,249 --> 00:16:19,879

Monster Beverage, again, that

wasn't founder-led, but it was

256

00:16:19,899 --> 00:16:21,069

people with skin in the game.

257

00:16:21,679 --> 00:16:23,599

So it doesn't have to be

a founder, essentially.

258

00:16:23,809 --> 00:16:26,419

Warren Buffett is not the

technically the founder of Berkshire.

259

00:16:26,679 --> 00:16:30,899

Howard Schultz was not

the founder of Starbucks.

260

00:16:31,419 --> 00:16:32,009

Yeah.

261

00:16:32,379 --> 00:16:37,489

And, even surprisingly, Elon Musk is

technically not the founder of Tesla.

262

00:16:39,259 --> 00:16:40,489

Yeah, a lot of people don't know that.

263

00:16:40,489 --> 00:16:47,619

So he a- he acquired Tesla or made a

huge investment into Tesla early on.

264

00:16:47,639 --> 00:16:51,039

Yeah, he was early on, but he's

technically not the founder, although

265

00:16:51,039 --> 00:16:54,769

he's probably labeled the founder, just

like Warren Buffett is now labeled the

266

00:16:54,769 --> 00:16:59,049

founder of Berkshire, and rightfully

they, he created the value of modern

267

00:16:59,049 --> 00:17:05,439

day Berkshire, but technically speaking,

he's not the original idea or he

268

00:17:05,439 --> 00:17:08,529

didn't create the, the entity Berkshire

269

00:17:10,137 --> 00:17:11,907

Ryan: Yeah, that's interesting

because I didn't know that.

270

00:17:11,907 --> 00:17:15,578

I just assumed that Musk was a

founder, and same with Warren.

271

00:17:15,578 --> 00:17:18,818

So interesting there.

272

00:17:19,108 --> 00:17:26,938

Also, who would've thought if you

said, asked somebody 2,100 baggers

273

00:17:26,938 --> 00:17:30,758

over the past, 20 years or so when

you started this, who would've

274

00:17:30,758 --> 00:17:34,038

thought Tractor Supply would've

named Tractor Supply as one of them?

275

00:17:34,833 --> 00:17:35,483

Haren Bhakta: Yeah, yeah.

276

00:17:35,483 --> 00:17:40,493

Tractor Supply, Universal, w- a

company called Universal Insurance.

277

00:17:40,993 --> 00:17:42,113

Yeah, again, 21 of them.

278

00:17:42,113 --> 00:17:45,323

Netflix, Nvidia, Apple g-

279

00:17:45,488 --> 00:17:47,528

Ryan: I think people would've gone there.

280

00:17:47,923 --> 00:17:48,413

Haren Bhakta: Yeah.

281

00:17:48,868 --> 00:17:51,128

Ryan: Supply I don't think would've

282

00:17:51,213 --> 00:17:53,723

Haren Bhakta: O'Reilly's another

one, the auto parts store.

283

00:17:53,783 --> 00:17:55,253

O'Reilly's, another hundred bagger.

284

00:17:55,643 --> 00:18:00,023

Again, O'Reilly's wasn't founder led I

don't believe, but it was family operated.

285

00:18:00,703 --> 00:18:07,883

So what I find is that w- it takes an

owner/operator to have that extreme

286

00:18:07,903 --> 00:18:12,183

outlier type returns, and the reason

for that is it's a cultural thing.

287

00:18:12,373 --> 00:18:16,873

So if you d- have no ownership

on a board or at the executive

288

00:18:16,873 --> 00:18:20,163

level, you are judged quarterly.

289

00:18:20,673 --> 00:18:25,693

And when you're judged quarterly,

you're gonna think quarterly, and to

290

00:18:25,763 --> 00:18:31,103

have these extreme returns, you have

to do things that make your company

291

00:18:31,103 --> 00:18:37,113

look less profitable now in order

to achieve these enormous returns.

292

00:18:37,313 --> 00:18:44,933

So for example Walmart and Costco,

they purposely suppressed margins.

293

00:18:44,973 --> 00:18:49,413

They wanna offer, and Amazon is too,

they wanna offer low prices, right?

294

00:18:50,293 --> 00:18:54,803

They could raise prices and probably

increase profits over the next

295

00:18:54,803 --> 00:18:59,003

quarter or year, but that would

damage the long-term aspect of their

296

00:18:59,003 --> 00:19:02,143

business in, in providing low prices.

297

00:19:02,683 --> 00:19:08,403

So when you have no ownership

and you reward CEOs for

298

00:19:08,433 --> 00:19:14,333

quarterly performance, they get

incentivized to perform quarterly.

299

00:19:14,563 --> 00:19:17,503

But to create these enormous

returns you can't think quarterly.

300

00:19:17,513 --> 00:19:19,433

Jeff Bezos thought in decades, right?

301

00:19:19,853 --> 00:19:27,593

He was perfectly fine failing in

small projects that had maybe a

302

00:19:27,593 --> 00:19:32,423

high chance of failure, but if

successful, had these enormous runways.

303

00:19:32,433 --> 00:19:36,223

So one example, a couple examples

is he failed with the Fire Phone,

304

00:19:36,653 --> 00:19:41,473

but through, through trial and

error, they came up with AWS, right?

305

00:19:41,583 --> 00:19:44,483

Huge a world-class company now.

306

00:19:44,803 --> 00:19:49,933

Jeff Bezos created essentially

not just one world-class company,

307

00:19:49,933 --> 00:19:55,743

he created two, Amazon retail

store, or web store, and AWS.

308

00:19:56,343 --> 00:20:01,453

These individuals are able

to create enormous value.

309

00:20:01,453 --> 00:20:06,683

We should want to essentially ride

their coattails, and when they're

310

00:20:06,683 --> 00:20:12,563

gone not be invested in those

companies as much, or if at all.

311

00:20:12,768 --> 00:20:15,908

Ryan: And e- exactly like you said

too, they're thinking long-term.

312

00:20:15,908 --> 00:20:20,518

They're not just thinking, "Oh, we gotta

meet our objectives quarter to quarter."

313

00:20:20,838 --> 00:20:24,618

They're thinking long-term, just

like I keep, going back to if I'm

314

00:20:24,618 --> 00:20:31,108

going to invest in a portfolio

manager, three quar- three months?

315

00:20:31,148 --> 00:20:32,938

Yeah, that doesn't really do it for me.

316

00:20:33,188 --> 00:20:40,498

I want a portfolio manager that has been

very successful over 10 years, right?

317

00:20:40,553 --> 00:20:41,183

Haren Bhakta: Exactly.

318

00:20:41,263 --> 00:20:41,933

Exactly.

319

00:20:42,323 --> 00:20:42,683

Yeah.

320

00:20:42,723 --> 00:20:46,263

And so the, the other importance

of skin in the game is, like Jeff

321

00:20:46,283 --> 00:20:52,143

Bezos said, basically, if you

want to be successful, you have

322

00:20:52,143 --> 00:20:55,573

to be willing to be misunderstood.

323

00:20:56,603 --> 00:21:02,933

And if you're a CEO or board with

no ownership, they don't have

324

00:21:02,933 --> 00:21:04,913

the luxury to be misunderstood.

325

00:21:05,533 --> 00:21:12,323

They don't have the luxury of doing

things now that are unexplainable

326

00:21:12,813 --> 00:21:18,563

or, people or shareholders or Wall

Street doesn't understand now.

327

00:21:18,803 --> 00:21:21,253

So they don't have the luxury

of doing things where they

328

00:21:21,253 --> 00:21:22,623

can be proven right later.

329

00:21:23,043 --> 00:21:28,173

They have to essentially innovate

by consensus, and consensus

330

00:21:28,203 --> 00:21:30,863

and committees do not innovate

331

00:21:33,396 --> 00:21:34,726

Ryan: Yeah, that's a very good point.

332

00:21:34,946 --> 00:21:39,216

So during your research, when you looked

at all these 100 bag- baggers, the

333

00:21:39,236 --> 00:21:44,396

21 of them from, over the past, that

time period that you were looking at,

334

00:21:44,466 --> 00:21:48,346

was there a cutoff, like a percentage

when you're talking about ownership?

335

00:21:48,346 --> 00:21:51,436

Was it like 10% ownership, 20%?

336

00:21:51,475 --> 00:21:57,875

Haren Bhakta: Well, 5% was, 5% was

the cutoff that I looked at, and

337

00:21:57,875 --> 00:22:06,293

19 of those 21 had at least 5%, and

very often more Right at the start.

338

00:22:06,303 --> 00:22:08,253

So they didn't all finish

with that kind of ownership.

339

00:22:08,253 --> 00:22:11,553

So for example, NVIDIA now the…

340

00:22:11,553 --> 00:22:18,333

What you find is a lot of the founders

or owners do sell along the way, and

341

00:22:18,333 --> 00:22:20,823

it's not because that they're bearish.

342

00:22:21,193 --> 00:22:26,863

It's because that their 99% of their

net worth is often tied to this company,

343

00:22:27,303 --> 00:22:30,413

and they're going to bed thinking

about it, waking up thinking about it.

344

00:22:30,693 --> 00:22:32,743

So they're taking liquidity along the way.

345

00:22:33,483 --> 00:22:34,393

So rightfully so the…

346

00:22:34,443 --> 00:22:34,763

Yeah.

347

00:22:34,933 --> 00:22:38,673

So what-- Jeff Bezos has been selling

Amazon for 20 years, but that,

348

00:22:38,693 --> 00:22:40,113

that's not because he's bearish.

349

00:22:40,123 --> 00:22:42,413

He's, all his net worth is

tied up into the company.

350

00:22:43,043 --> 00:22:47,493

And which actually brings me

to my favorite analogy is that

351

00:22:47,563 --> 00:22:53,633

what I call a hired CEO, I call

I call a hired CEO a zoo animal.

352

00:22:54,373 --> 00:22:56,893

Now, a zoo animal gets

fed every day, whether it

353

00:22:56,913 --> 00:22:58,533

successfully hunts or not, right?

354

00:22:58,953 --> 00:23:04,313

A zoo animal or a hired CEO gets

their base salary, quarterly bonus

355

00:23:04,313 --> 00:23:06,173

and very often a golden parachute.

356

00:23:06,763 --> 00:23:10,043

I like to call a

owner/operator a wild lion.

357

00:23:10,293 --> 00:23:11,763

A wild lion is trained to survive.

358

00:23:11,773 --> 00:23:16,693

These CEOs have already proven

their ability to create value in the

359

00:23:16,693 --> 00:23:20,573

world, so they're trained to survive.

360

00:23:21,123 --> 00:23:25,343

And when they don't successfully

hunt, they feel the pain, and that's

361

00:23:25,343 --> 00:23:26,593

what you're looking for in a CEO.

362

00:23:26,763 --> 00:23:32,063

You want them to feel the pain of

failure, and you want their net

363

00:23:32,063 --> 00:23:34,233

worth to be directly exposed to that.

364

00:23:34,693 --> 00:23:38,073

And very often, these owner/operators

are taking the lowest salaries.

365

00:23:38,383 --> 00:23:43,453

It's the hired CEOs that are taking

the large base salaries, right?

366

00:23:43,843 --> 00:23:45,793

So they don't often feel that pain.

367

00:23:46,163 --> 00:23:52,933

And innovation comes from feedback

loops, trial and error, and it's--

368

00:23:53,673 --> 00:23:56,813

This is exactly why it's very hard

to innovate through committee.

369

00:23:56,813 --> 00:24:00,773

You don't get those feedback

loops, and they don't feel the

370

00:24:00,773 --> 00:24:02,933

pain of mistakes initially.

371

00:24:03,283 --> 00:24:04,183

It's suppressed.

372

00:24:05,223 --> 00:24:06,843

And yeah, the, the…

373

00:24:06,913 --> 00:24:10,703

One of my favorite books is How

Innovation Works and by Matt Ridley.

374

00:24:10,703 --> 00:24:14,413

He talks a lot about how innovation

really works, and it works it through

375

00:24:14,703 --> 00:24:20,623

trial and error and not through

decentralized decision-making.

376

00:24:20,713 --> 00:24:23,263

Or I'm sorry, not through

centralized decision-making.

377

00:24:23,263 --> 00:24:30,233

It comes from des- decentralization, where

the people working on the problem have

378

00:24:30,783 --> 00:24:33,433

actual decision-making power to to pivot.

379

00:24:33,783 --> 00:24:38,843

And what you get in non-skin in the

game companies is centralization

380

00:24:38,853 --> 00:24:41,023

of decision-making from the top.

381

00:24:41,563 --> 00:24:43,673

And that's not how innovation works

382

00:24:45,412 --> 00:24:47,212

Ryan: And he goes right

back to skin in the game.

383

00:24:47,903 --> 00:24:50,333

And it's a care factor too.

384

00:24:50,883 --> 00:24:56,403

Like you said, that, zoo lion, yeah,

they probably, they, the care factor

385

00:24:56,403 --> 00:24:58,703

is not there as a hired CEO more.

386

00:24:58,713 --> 00:25:04,423

Maybe they just have more of a

figurehead CEO versus that, lion, that

387

00:25:04,423 --> 00:25:06,483

wild lion who's got that care factor.

388

00:25:06,483 --> 00:25:09,433

They really care that they're gonna

eat, and they gotta go hunt, and

389

00:25:09,896 --> 00:25:11,916

A very important part is caring,

390

00:25:12,459 --> 00:25:13,199

Haren Bhakta: Exactly.

391

00:25:13,229 --> 00:25:13,599

Yeah.

392

00:25:13,829 --> 00:25:18,249

So I did, so I, you heard me talk

about the 21 100 baggers, which,

393

00:25:18,269 --> 00:25:19,909

19 of them all had ownership.

394

00:25:20,539 --> 00:25:27,809

I also studied the five largest

value destroyers of the S&P over

395

00:25:27,809 --> 00:25:34,339

the last five years, and all

five had very low ownership.

396

00:25:34,489 --> 00:25:39,339

So not only are we getting more

outlier returns from high ownership

397

00:25:39,339 --> 00:25:43,569

companies, we're also getting the

biggest value destroyers of the S&P

398

00:25:44,769 --> 00:25:47,699

having no or very low ownership.

399

00:25:47,899 --> 00:25:54,139

So number one was PayPal, the biggest

value destroyer between 2001 and 2026.

400

00:25:54,139 --> 00:25:57,799

The second biggest value

destroyer destroyer was Adobe.

401

00:25:58,039 --> 00:25:59,099

Again, no ownership.

402

00:25:59,659 --> 00:26:00,949

Haren Bhakta Inside Ownership Index:

Disney was number three.

403

00:26:01,299 --> 00:26:05,069

Comcast I believe Nike was number

five or number six, I can't remember.

404

00:26:05,069 --> 00:26:07,839

But the, the point is that every

single one had low ownership.

405

00:26:07,839 --> 00:26:12,749

Nike, founded by Phil Knight,

world-class brand, right?

406

00:26:13,819 --> 00:26:17,259

Down 70% over the last five years.

407

00:26:17,899 --> 00:26:22,629

We're talking about a world-class

brand of Nike and the biggest bull

408

00:26:22,629 --> 00:26:27,869

market in stock market history,

and yet the stock is down 70%.

409

00:26:27,929 --> 00:26:30,409

This is because Phil Knight is

no longer part of the company.

410

00:26:31,569 --> 00:26:37,949

It's remove from a company who made it

great and you removed what made it great

411

00:26:39,738 --> 00:26:39,918

Ryan: Yeah.

412

00:26:40,148 --> 00:26:45,068

That's interesting because,

with Nike you do think that…

413

00:26:45,088 --> 00:26:48,388

nike's all over the place,

but it doesn't mean that it's

414

00:26:48,408 --> 00:26:50,018

performing well or it's stock.

415

00:26:50,028 --> 00:26:50,128

And

416

00:26:50,189 --> 00:26:50,829

Haren Bhakta: Exactly.

417

00:26:50,868 --> 00:26:52,138

Ryan: Knight is

418

00:26:52,149 --> 00:26:54,079

Haren Bhakta: 70% down in the

biggest bull market in history.

419

00:26:54,118 --> 00:26:54,988

Ryan: that care factor

420

00:26:55,599 --> 00:26:56,349

Haren Bhakta: Exactly.

421

00:26:56,479 --> 00:26:56,879

Yeah.

422

00:26:57,109 --> 00:27:00,419

Someone going to bed thinking

about the company, waking up

423

00:27:00,419 --> 00:27:01,499

thinking about the company.

424

00:27:01,679 --> 00:27:05,019

And the co- it's not a fast-moving

thing when these founders retire.

425

00:27:05,379 --> 00:27:08,019

It's that the culture slowly erodes

426

00:27:10,687 --> 00:27:14,137

And they start thinking about the

wrong things, and that's what it is

427

00:27:15,164 --> 00:27:15,854

Ryan: It's interesting.

428

00:27:15,864 --> 00:27:20,154

So there is a high correlation or a

correlation between high ownership

429

00:27:20,154 --> 00:27:21,984

companies and strong culture then

430

00:27:23,017 --> 00:27:24,137

Haren Bhakta: Absolutely.

431

00:27:24,227 --> 00:27:28,347

And, that actually brings me to

the, the title of your show, Zephyr.

432

00:27:28,347 --> 00:27:29,727

We went back 20 years.

433

00:27:29,737 --> 00:27:32,227

So the index itself has

been live for two years now.

434

00:27:32,227 --> 00:27:36,747

The ETF that tracks the index only

launched about a month and a half ago.

435

00:27:37,027 --> 00:27:40,987

But the index itself, and we've been

managing portfolios according to

436

00:27:40,987 --> 00:27:42,917

the index for almost two years now.

437

00:27:43,437 --> 00:27:49,897

But what we looked at is how it's

performed in volatility periods.

438

00:27:50,157 --> 00:27:52,557

So we went back 20 years.

439

00:27:52,557 --> 00:27:58,267

What we found is it is more concentrated,

so it, it does have more volatility.

440

00:27:58,867 --> 00:28:06,597

However, in 2008 and 2020, the

two global catastrophic events

441

00:28:06,597 --> 00:28:08,057

we've had over the last 20 years.

442

00:28:08,257 --> 00:28:14,167

So these were not just volatility

periods like 2022 or 2025 or 2018.

443

00:28:14,417 --> 00:28:17,037

These were actual global

catastrophic events.

444

00:28:18,287 --> 00:28:24,817

And S&P 500 went down more than these

high ownership companies collectively.

445

00:28:25,627 --> 00:28:33,677

So while we could use academic risk models

to say, one is more volatile than the

446

00:28:33,677 --> 00:28:39,347

other, but when you needed a safety the

most in these two global catastrophic

447

00:28:39,347 --> 00:28:47,555

events, what we found was that the S&P

fared worse And that's because high

448

00:28:47,565 --> 00:28:50,305

ownership companies are better run.

449

00:28:50,655 --> 00:28:53,785

They have better management,

they have better balance

450

00:28:53,795 --> 00:28:55,765

sheets, they are less levered.

451

00:28:56,135 --> 00:29:02,445

They also have access to

capital when nobody else does.

452

00:29:03,065 --> 00:29:07,075

So they have access to more capital

when the world is going through its

453

00:29:07,085 --> 00:29:09,155

l-liquidity crunch, like in 2008.

454

00:29:09,675 --> 00:29:15,255

We could, again, we could use

volatility as a measure, but what I

455

00:29:15,265 --> 00:29:21,605

find is the Warren Buffett principle

is, what gives you a, a chance of

456

00:29:21,605 --> 00:29:26,685

losing actual capital or permanent

capital, permanent loss of capital

457

00:29:26,695 --> 00:29:29,175

versus just gyrations in the market.

458

00:29:29,825 --> 00:29:32,645

And investing in these high

ownership companies I, you, I

459

00:29:32,645 --> 00:29:36,865

believe you, you have less chance

of losing permanent loss of capital.

460

00:29:37,175 --> 00:29:40,170

And the best example I have

is Silicon Valley Bank.

461

00:29:41,550 --> 00:29:47,160

Silicon Valley Bank was in the S&P 500,

so if you owned the S&P 500 in 2023,

462

00:29:47,520 --> 00:29:50,550

you had exposure to Silicon Valley Bank.

463

00:29:50,560 --> 00:29:57,000

And if you look at the proxy filing,

which I did in 2023 ownership was so low

464

00:29:57,700 --> 00:29:59,650

that it was represented by an asterisk.

465

00:30:00,910 --> 00:30:02,540

So insiders own nothing.

466

00:30:02,730 --> 00:30:08,740

So what you get is a company that

will leverage up the company to hit

467

00:30:08,740 --> 00:30:14,910

quarterly bonuses without thinking

about the exposure of failure.

468

00:30:15,320 --> 00:30:20,440

And when you have a true owner,

they're thinking about failure or

469

00:30:20,530 --> 00:30:27,640

catastrophic loss first, and then

optimi- optimizing performance secondary.

470

00:30:28,270 --> 00:30:33,890

But, when you have a company like Silicon

Valley Bank with no owners, they thought,

471

00:30:34,330 --> 00:30:39,540

"Let's hit it out of the park first,"

and, not worrying about surviving first

472

00:30:41,231 --> 00:30:42,431

Ryan: Yeah, that's fantastic.

473

00:30:42,431 --> 00:30:45,701

I love that you brought up about

just losing money, and one of

474

00:30:45,701 --> 00:30:50,071

my favorite quotes from Warren

is, I believe, r- his rules.

475

00:30:50,131 --> 00:30:51,341

Number one, don't lose

476

00:30:51,462 --> 00:30:52,632

Haren Bhakta: Don't lose my number two.

477

00:30:52,632 --> 00:30:53,942

Don't forget rule number one.

478

00:30:54,122 --> 00:30:54,912

Exactly.

479

00:30:55,021 --> 00:30:55,371

Ryan: that.

480

00:30:55,582 --> 00:30:55,902

Find…

481

00:30:55,932 --> 00:30:57,562

You brought up volatility.

482

00:30:58,302 --> 00:31:02,942

often find in investing we, we focus

on standard deviation and volatility.

483

00:31:03,242 --> 00:31:09,162

In recent years, it's shifted now in terms

of risk to just capital preservation.

484

00:31:09,292 --> 00:31:12,402

To me, that's the real

risk, Erin, is losing money,

485

00:31:12,857 --> 00:31:13,597

Haren Bhakta: Exactly

486

00:31:13,642 --> 00:31:16,542

Ryan: the upside volatility you want,

and it goes back to what Warren was

487

00:31:16,542 --> 00:31:17,812

saying, what you were just saying.

488

00:31:18,172 --> 00:31:22,812

Losing value, losing money is really

the risk that you want to mitigate,

489

00:31:23,737 --> 00:31:24,487

Haren Bhakta: Exactly.

490

00:31:24,977 --> 00:31:30,687

As Nassim Taleb says, "Never cross a

river that's on average four feet deep."

491

00:31:31,107 --> 00:31:35,917

So in order to achieve these

average returns, which, can be

492

00:31:35,917 --> 00:31:38,027

high, you must first survive.

493

00:31:38,397 --> 00:31:44,847

So that part of the, the S&P that was

in Silicon Valley Bank, that, that part

494

00:31:44,847 --> 00:31:47,897

of the money will never earn the average

ra- return because it went to zero.

495

00:31:48,287 --> 00:31:50,927

So what you want is to avoid losses.

496

00:31:51,027 --> 00:31:56,217

And like I mentioned the S&P's

biggest value destroyers were these no

497

00:31:56,217 --> 00:32:00,337

ownership companies, and the biggest

outliers were high ownership companies.

498

00:32:00,987 --> 00:32:05,667

And that's because these, when you have

leaders that own meaningful stakes,

499

00:32:05,687 --> 00:32:07,427

they do treat the company better

500

00:32:09,618 --> 00:32:09,868

Ryan: Yeah.

501

00:32:10,068 --> 00:32:14,378

And it goes back to while you're

talking it brings me back to trust too.

502

00:32:14,388 --> 00:32:19,688

You talked about these high ownership

companies, they're able to access capital

503

00:32:19,688 --> 00:32:23,118

markets even when capital markets are dry

504

00:32:23,481 --> 00:32:24,151

Haren Bhakta: Exactly

505

00:32:24,618 --> 00:32:25,668

Ryan: lending money.

506

00:32:26,618 --> 00:32:27,408

it trust?

507

00:32:27,408 --> 00:32:29,928

This industry's built huge on trust.

508

00:32:29,928 --> 00:32:32,018

If there wasn't trust in

wealth management, there

509

00:32:32,018 --> 00:32:33,478

wouldn't be wealth management.

510

00:32:34,558 --> 00:32:38,908

do you think that's wh- even though you

have Elon Musk and these big names that

511

00:32:38,908 --> 00:32:41,218

are very eccentric, they're out there.

512

00:32:41,648 --> 00:32:48,128

Is it because the capital markets

trust these, the owners and they're

513

00:32:48,163 --> 00:32:48,513

Haren Bhakta: Yeah.

514

00:32:48,638 --> 00:32:49,688

Ryan: We trust them, let them go"?

515

00:32:50,033 --> 00:32:52,843

Haren Bhakta: they're

proven successful leader.

516

00:32:52,853 --> 00:32:57,123

They're proven to be able to

create value in this world, right?

517

00:32:57,123 --> 00:33:01,013

So yeah, they're more

highly trusted, right?

518

00:33:01,013 --> 00:33:07,963

W- you would rather give capital to

Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, Warren Buffett

519

00:33:08,293 --> 00:33:11,173

than some guy you never heard of, right?

520

00:33:11,203 --> 00:33:14,593

Can you really name the CEO of Micron?

521

00:33:14,653 --> 00:33:17,623

Yeah, Micron is a trillion-dollar

company today, but who is the CEO?

522

00:33:17,673 --> 00:33:18,763

I have no idea.

523

00:33:19,073 --> 00:33:20,303

I don't think most people do.

524

00:33:21,303 --> 00:33:26,443

Right now, ExxonMobil is a

top 10 company in the S&P 500.

525

00:33:26,663 --> 00:33:28,233

Can you name the CEO?

526

00:33:28,703 --> 00:33:31,193

I have no idea who that is, right?

527

00:33:31,473 --> 00:33:37,313

In the Inside Ownership Index, you can

name every CEO in the top 10 of the index.

528

00:33:37,413 --> 00:33:44,203

But, m- you get these people who have

really no ownership, no significant

529

00:33:44,263 --> 00:33:49,423

past performance controlling these

enormous trillion-dollar companies who

530

00:33:49,423 --> 00:33:52,033

are essentially people we don't know.

531

00:33:53,403 --> 00:33:54,113

So it, you know-

532

00:33:56,018 --> 00:33:57,718

Ryan: That, that's a really good point.

533

00:33:57,728 --> 00:33:59,738

So let's talk to you.

534

00:33:59,838 --> 00:34:03,748

As a shareholder, you brought it

up, you get the chance to vote

535

00:34:04,208 --> 00:34:09,898

on corporate, whether it's CEO

or, whatever through ownership.

536

00:34:10,598 --> 00:34:15,918

But now you have these huge asset

managers, BlackRock, Vanguard, these

537

00:34:15,938 --> 00:34:23,588

passive market cap-weighted index funds

that control the voting through proxies.

538

00:34:23,928 --> 00:34:27,717

Is that gonna be an issue there

when you have these huge passive

539

00:34:28,078 --> 00:34:29,838

market cap-weighted index funds?

540

00:34:29,838 --> 00:34:31,467

Is that a hidden problem?

541

00:34:31,887 --> 00:34:32,917

Haren Bhakta: Yes, absolutely.

542

00:34:32,917 --> 00:34:36,067

I see that as a huge systemic

skin in the game problem.

543

00:34:36,837 --> 00:34:41,077

You have more and more of these

trillion-dollar companies or hundred

544

00:34:41,487 --> 00:34:47,097

billion dollar companies controlled by

a board and executives that maybe own no

545

00:34:47,097 --> 00:34:49,347

shares or purchase no shares themselves.

546

00:34:49,817 --> 00:34:54,056

So what you get is

perverse incentives, right?

547

00:34:54,306 --> 00:35:01,447

You get non-owners deciding what's

good for owners, and they have

548

00:35:01,447 --> 00:35:06,947

these enormous balance sheets

to fund their own lifestyle.

549

00:35:07,477 --> 00:35:09,567

And, it, it's a huge problem.

550

00:35:09,567 --> 00:35:13,297

So I think I mentioned this

earlier with Ryan Cohen and eBay.

551

00:35:13,707 --> 00:35:21,447

I think that's a, a big problem in

that in the past, if management was

552

00:35:21,447 --> 00:35:27,567

terrible or mediocre, they could be voted

out, and that's not the case anymore.

553

00:35:27,567 --> 00:35:30,227

So Warren Buffett actually talked

a lot about this, the biggest value

554

00:35:30,227 --> 00:35:32,957

destroyers in Warren Buffett's eyes.

555

00:35:33,037 --> 00:35:39,647

He said this in 1997, that the biggest

value destroyers are mediocre CEOs because

556

00:35:39,647 --> 00:35:46,097

a terrible CEO could be will be changed,

but a mediocre CEO will stay in a very

557

00:35:46,097 --> 00:35:50,687

long time and just destroy value over,

over the course of maybe a decade or two.

558

00:35:51,317 --> 00:35:52,127

Today

559

00:35:54,161 --> 00:35:58,441

Terrible CEOs can be locked

in because there's no longer

560

00:35:58,461 --> 00:36:00,361

a mechanism to remove them.

561

00:36:00,811 --> 00:36:06,401

Like I said, in the past, we could vote o-

vote out terrible management and replace

562

00:36:06,881 --> 00:36:11,431

m- terrible management with a CEO that

maybe shareholders think more highly of.

563

00:36:11,631 --> 00:36:16,891

But today, with BlackRock, Vanguard,

and State Street controlling all of

564

00:36:16,891 --> 00:36:22,621

corporate America, who automatically

essentially vote for incumbents, there's

565

00:36:22,621 --> 00:36:25,381

no longer a mechanism to remove them.

566

00:36:26,131 --> 00:36:30,611

And pretty soon, as they continue to

take market share we're gonna see…

567

00:36:30,611 --> 00:36:34,391

right now they're already the largest

shareholder in America, but pretty soon

568

00:36:34,401 --> 00:36:38,441

they're gonna be larger than all other

shareholders combined, and that's a

569

00:36:38,441 --> 00:36:45,201

scary thought where if they own more

than all other shareholders combined,

570

00:36:45,751 --> 00:36:55,091

this will entrench management, and

they will control, even being terrible,

571

00:36:55,871 --> 00:36:59,751

they will control that company with

no mechanism to have them removed.

572

00:36:59,981 --> 00:37:00,921

That's a scary thought

573

00:37:02,610 --> 00:37:05,150

Ryan: And do you even feel some

of these large asset managers

574

00:37:05,180 --> 00:37:07,070

even complete the proxy votes?

575

00:37:07,510 --> 00:37:08,630

Just are gonna

576

00:37:08,640 --> 00:37:08,870

shove

577

00:37:08,877 --> 00:37:11,677

Haren Bhakta: outsource it

to ISS and, things like that.

578

00:37:11,677 --> 00:37:14,937

So it's like they're automatically

essentially voting for incumbents.

579

00:37:15,107 --> 00:37:18,127

It's very hard for them to

get them to vote for a change.

580

00:37:18,607 --> 00:37:25,307

And w- if we, if you get a terrible

board, they're essentially locked in,

581

00:37:25,817 --> 00:37:28,747

and they're g- and that's becoming

more and more the case where these

582

00:37:28,747 --> 00:37:32,657

terrible boards are locked in with

no mechanism to have them removed.

583

00:37:32,937 --> 00:37:35,197

In the past, we would vote them out.

584

00:37:35,587 --> 00:37:40,217

Now no one's vote counts anymore except

for BlackRock, Vanguard, and State

585

00:37:40,217 --> 00:37:41,967

Street and they're not really voting

586

00:37:43,812 --> 00:37:47,742

Ryan: It's one of those risks

like you-- that hidden, right?

587

00:37:47,742 --> 00:37:53,212

It's a hidden r- people don't think about,

and as they just keep getting bigger and

588

00:37:53,212 --> 00:37:57,212

bigger, reduces our power as shareholder

589

00:37:57,325 --> 00:37:58,735

Haren Bhakta: absolutely, yeah.

590

00:37:59,585 --> 00:38:03,285

And you get these forced buyers,

so they're blindly throwing money

591

00:38:03,515 --> 00:38:06,795

at these companies, at these CEOs

that may not deserve it simply

592

00:38:06,795 --> 00:38:08,555

because of their market cap size.

593

00:38:08,885 --> 00:38:13,575

But the insiders own nothing, and blindly

the S&P just throws money at them.

594

00:38:14,255 --> 00:38:16,275

And I believe we created

a solution for that.

595

00:38:16,325 --> 00:38:20,615

We should be indexing to the leaders of

the organization and how much they own

596

00:38:21,155 --> 00:38:23,865

versus the, the pure size of the company

597

00:38:25,640 --> 00:38:26,220

Ryan: Very good point.

598

00:38:26,390 --> 00:38:27,050

Very good point.

599

00:38:27,140 --> 00:38:30,190

So lastly, Aaron, fantastic conversation.

600

00:38:30,210 --> 00:38:30,950

I love it.

601

00:38:31,400 --> 00:38:36,100

A lot of information here and facts

that information I didn't know about.

602

00:38:36,730 --> 00:38:41,390

Lastly, for all the financial advisors

out there listening, how can they use this

603

00:38:41,400 --> 00:38:43,590

strategy in their clients' portfolios?

604

00:38:43,650 --> 00:38:45,740

You own the index.

605

00:38:46,010 --> 00:38:49,480

How can they implement this

strategy within a portfolio?

606

00:38:50,215 --> 00:38:50,365

Haren Bhakta: Yeah.

607

00:38:50,365 --> 00:38:51,405

We have the ETF.

608

00:38:51,455 --> 00:38:55,715

ETF's ticker symbol is O-W-N, OWN.

609

00:38:56,214 --> 00:38:56,444

Ryan: Love

610

00:38:56,535 --> 00:38:57,395

Haren Bhakta: easy to remember.

611

00:38:57,544 --> 00:38:58,134

Ryan: that one,

612

00:38:58,385 --> 00:38:58,965

Haren Bhakta: Yeah.

613

00:38:59,255 --> 00:38:59,675

Yeah.

614

00:38:59,754 --> 00:39:00,854

Ryan: we can remember that one.

615

00:39:01,195 --> 00:39:01,695

Haren Bhakta: Yeah.

616

00:39:01,745 --> 00:39:02,045

Yeah.

617

00:39:02,045 --> 00:39:06,535

So what I find is for, oh, for one,

it has a 49 basis points, so just

618

00:39:06,545 --> 00:39:11,575

under half a percent expense ratio,

and it's well-deserved because,

619

00:39:11,635 --> 00:39:15,205

again we're capturing more exposure

to the most innovative companies.

620

00:39:15,315 --> 00:39:20,375

And what I find advisors using is, for

one they could reduce exposure to the

621

00:39:20,375 --> 00:39:22,745

stock market, I believe, by being…

622

00:39:22,755 --> 00:39:28,885

having a more concentrated portfolio

of stocks that are more innovative

623

00:39:28,905 --> 00:39:30,695

and, potentially have more upside.

624

00:39:31,015 --> 00:39:39,335

So advisors could, by using OWN, they

could diversify the client portfolios

625

00:39:39,335 --> 00:39:44,045

in other asset classes more as the

stock market is at all-time highs,

626

00:39:44,335 --> 00:39:46,905

we should be looking to participate.

627

00:39:47,335 --> 00:39:49,215

You have to participate in

the stock market, for one.

628

00:39:49,215 --> 00:39:50,645

You can't time yourself out of it.

629

00:39:50,925 --> 00:39:56,075

But what you can do is reduce exposure

to the stock market at all-time highs

630

00:39:56,305 --> 00:40:01,005

or near all-time highs and diversify

in other alternatives or fixed income.

631

00:40:01,455 --> 00:40:06,196

And as the market gets cheaper, you

could allocate more and more to the

632

00:40:06,196 --> 00:40:09,885

market at the at cheaper prices.

633

00:40:09,925 --> 00:40:15,965

But what I find advisors doing is

using the OWN index to get more

634

00:40:15,965 --> 00:40:19,695

of what's working or more of the

innovative companies while reducing

635

00:40:19,695 --> 00:40:21,105

exposure to the stock market

636

00:40:23,062 --> 00:40:23,332

Ryan: Love it.

637

00:40:23,632 --> 00:40:23,982

Perfect.

638

00:40:24,302 --> 00:40:25,272

Perfect information.

639

00:40:25,272 --> 00:40:29,442

So those advisors, our audience,

if they want more information about

640

00:40:29,472 --> 00:40:34,232

Inside Ownership Index and the ETF,

where can they get that information?

641

00:40:34,557 --> 00:40:38,757

Haren Bhakta: Yeah, I have an even

easier website, insideownership.com.

642

00:40:38,757 --> 00:40:41,587

Very easy to find, insideownership.com.

643

00:40:41,897 --> 00:40:46,887

M- they could also look me up on

LinkedIn and other social media.

644

00:40:46,887 --> 00:40:49,447

I'm very easy to find here in BHACTA.

645

00:40:49,507 --> 00:40:54,267

Website also they could email me

through the website insideownership.com.

646

00:40:54,627 --> 00:40:56,227

So very, yeah, very easy to find.

647

00:40:56,227 --> 00:41:00,327

Happy to talk to anyone get,

go deeper into the methodology

648

00:41:00,827 --> 00:41:01,967

with anyone who's interested

649

00:41:03,056 --> 00:41:03,966

Ryan: I love it, Aaron.

650

00:41:04,076 --> 00:41:05,816

Fantastic conversation.

651

00:41:05,886 --> 00:41:06,966

I really enjoyed it.

652

00:41:06,976 --> 00:41:08,216

Like I said, I learned a lot.

653

00:41:08,216 --> 00:41:11,636

You threw a lot of great information,

supporting data, supporting

654

00:41:11,646 --> 00:41:14,226

information, which I really enjoy.

655

00:41:14,296 --> 00:41:18,286

I will include those links to

the website in the show notes.

656

00:41:18,326 --> 00:41:20,746

Really interesting stuff,

and I like it simple.

657

00:41:21,556 --> 00:41:21,836

you for

658

00:41:21,947 --> 00:41:22,137

Haren Bhakta: Awesome.

659

00:41:22,186 --> 00:41:23,776

Ryan: it simple for me, Aaron.

660

00:41:23,967 --> 00:41:24,467

Haren Bhakta: Yeah

661

00:41:24,526 --> 00:41:24,666

Ryan: it.

662

00:41:24,696 --> 00:41:25,936

It's been an honor.

663

00:41:26,216 --> 00:41:27,116

Really enjoyed it.

664

00:41:27,156 --> 00:41:28,436

So thank you for coming on.

665

00:41:29,166 --> 00:41:33,606

thank you so much for listening to this

episode of Adjusted for Risk podcast.

666

00:41:33,876 --> 00:41:37,416

You can watch all of our other episodes

on YouTube and all the other platforms

667

00:41:37,416 --> 00:41:39,346

that you listen to your favorite podcasts.

668

00:41:39,406 --> 00:41:41,936

Please be sure to like and

subscribe to those channels and

669

00:41:41,936 --> 00:41:43,206

give us a follow on LinkedIn.

670

00:41:43,596 --> 00:41:46,236

Thank you very much and have

a great rest of your week

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