On the Adjusted for Risk podcast, host Ryan Nauman interviews Haren Bhakta, founder and CEO of the Inside Ownership Index, who explains how the S&P 500’s free-float weighting effectively underweights shares held by controlling insiders and can end up buying more of founder-led companies after key leaders die.
Bhakta describes manually compiling 20 years of S&P 500 proxy filings to aggregate insider-ownership data and creating a passive index that weights companies by insider ownership as a “skin in the game” approach. He argues high ownership aligns management with shareholders, supports long-term innovation, and avoids value-destroying incentives, citing ownership patterns among 100-baggers and major S&P value destroyers. He also warns that proxy voting power concentrated in large asset managers entrenches mediocre leadership.
Connect with Ryan Nauman:
Learn more about Inside Ownership Index:
Related:Russell’s Rebalance Is a Healthy Pruning Amidst an Epic Small-Cap Run
00:00 Welcome and Guest Intro
01:08 Origin of the Index
02:04 Free Float Problem
03:17 Building the Dataset
08:02 Why Ownership Matters
11:50 Power Law Leaders
14:37 Hundred Bagger Evidence
18:00 Long Term Culture Edge
27:24 Downside Protection
33:57 Passive Voting Risks
38:27 How Advisors Use OWN
40:25 Where to Learn More
41:29 Closing and Subscribe
Ryan Nauman Host Adjusted for Risk:
Welcome everyone to Adjusted for Risk
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podcast from the shores of Lake Tahoe.
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Over the years, many investment
professionals have spent many days and
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years researching the different factors
and drivers of equity performance
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to try and uncover signals that can
give them a competitive advantage.
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My m- next guest has launched
a strategy that he feels can
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help find top performing stocks.
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All right, enough from me.
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I've already talked enough.
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Let's go ahead and bring
on the star of the show.
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I'd like to give a very warm
welcome to Hiren Bhakta.
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Hiren is the founder and
CEO Inside Ownership Index.
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Hiren, thank you so much
for coming on the show.
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Really looking forward
to this conversation.
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Love all the research you've done.
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Wanna dig deep into that,
so looking forward to it.
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It's an honor to have you on.
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Can you please tell us a little bit more
about yourself and Inside Ownership Index?
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Haren Bhakta Founder & CEO Inside Ownership Index:
Sure.
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A little about myself.
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I started out in the investment
industry in 2010 at Merrill Lynch, going
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through the wealth management program.
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Went to Morgan Stanley after about
two and a half years in 2000- in 2012.
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Spent about five and a half
years at Morgan Stanley.
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In 2017, I left Morgan Stanley to
start my own investment practice,
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and I've been doing that since.
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In 2024, I created the Inside
Ownership Index, and I, I think
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I created the idea while sitting
at the Berkshire annual meeting.
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So I'm a huge Warren Buffett fan.
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I bought a lot of Berkshire for myself
and for my clients because of that
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belief and trust in Warren Buffett.
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So I've read everything he's put out,
listened to everything he's ever said.
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And I was sitting at
the meeting in 2024, in
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the back of my mind, afraid of what am
I gonna do with Berkshire when he dies.
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And this was the first meeting Charlie
Munger wasn't there because he had passed
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away about six, five months earlier.
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And so I'm sitting there afraid,
and at some point in the meeting
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it hit me that the S&P 500 will
actually be buying more Berkshire
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Hathaway when Warren Buffett dies.
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A lot of people don't know that.
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And the, the reason for that is
the S&P is what's called free
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float adjusted market cap weighted.
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So they don't count his shares because
he's a controlling shareholder.
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When he dies, he's not gonna be a
con-controlling shareholder anymore.
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Those shares become free floating.
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So I just thought, "Who would want more
Berkshire Hathaway without Warren Buffett?
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Who would want more
Tesla without Elon Musk?"
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'Cause they don't count the
20% of Tesla that he owns.
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And, same thing with Meta.
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Who wants more Meta
without Mark Zuckerberg?
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And I just thought, "Who…
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why is the S&P on the opposite side of the
table of these super value-creating CEOs?"
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We should wanna be on the
same side of the table.
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So I came home from Omaha and launched…
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figured out how to get this ownership
data first, and nobody had it.
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Nobody had CapIQ, Bloomberg FactSet.
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None of these data
providers had the ownership.
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So I had to go manually through all,
every single proxy filing of the S&P
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500 constituents going back 20 years.
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So I'm talking about 20,000, more than
20,000 different proxy filings manually.
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And the, the proxy filings are quite
complicated in a sense that AI can't
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easily just pull out the numbers.
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At least it couldn't in 2024.
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So I'm currently the only one
with, with the data aggregated.
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The data's there in the proxies,
it's just n- nobody has it.
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So essentially, the Inside Ownership Index
is a, a passive index that tracks the
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performance of shares owned by insiders
versus the S&P is the reverse of that.
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It's, the S&P is what's called the
free float adjusted market cap.
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So it's counting all the shares
that's essentially not held by
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controlling shareholders, and I'm
counting the shares that are actually
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held by controlling shareholders.
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It's essentially, as my
T-shirt says, skin in the game.
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Says, it's the skin in the game index
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Ryan: Love that, Heron.
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And that's fantastic.
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I don't…
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Like you said, I don't think a
lot of people realize that about
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the S&P and being free float.
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And yet I'm, doing research here before
we jumped on, it is really interesting.
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Yeah when, Warren passes along, it's
inter- S&P is gonna be buying up
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Berkshire, but then at the same time,
it's do you really wanna own it?
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There's so much uncertainty.
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Yes, they have a succession plan in place,
but still a lot of uncertainty there.
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So it's interesting.
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Yes,
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Haren Bhakta: Right
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Ryan: will go along with the S&P and,
buy whatever they're adding to the
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index, but it raises questions, and
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Haren Bhakta: Yeah.
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What I find in my research is that a
brilliant CEO, I think about half the
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time they could find a good replacement.
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And one, one example of that is Apple.
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So Steve Jobs found a good
replacement in Tim Cook.
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But what I've…
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I can't find a single scenario where the
replacement could find a good replacement.
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And because by then the, the company
gets bureaucratic, and to rise up the
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ranks in an organization, it becomes
very political, very suit-wearing type
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person, and they're good at maybe sales
or talking, but they're not good at
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innovation, which is what re- what's
really requi- required in a technology
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company to take the company to the next
level, especially in a changing world.
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And we have an extremely fast-paced
changing world right now with AI, right?
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So you…
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We don't see Apple participating
at all in this next future.
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And, when the cellphone changes, and
it hasn't changed in, in, 20 years or
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almost 20 years now, s- but when the
world does change, y- I don't see Apple
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participating 'cause they're not investing
any capital into the future at all.
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And I…
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and it's probably the right decision
because they don't have the talent.
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Now, we have a Mark Zuckerberg
at Meta making huge bets.
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We have Amazon with Jeff Bezos.
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Jeff Bezos is not the CEO,
but he is the chairman.
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He is overseeing strategy.
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When you have people capable of making
these big bets you want them to.
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And in, in Apple's case,
you don't have that.
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My research finds that the world
going back, 1,000 years has always
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changed by the m- minority few.
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And to capture more of that by using an
inside ownership weighted index you get
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a more concentrated version of the S&P
and bigger bets on the biggest innovators
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Ryan: Yeah, I'm a firm
believer in that too, Harry.
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If you are committed to something,
conviction in it, right?
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Go all in versus…
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in some cases for investors,
maybe going all in on Bitcoin
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maybe is not the best thing to do.
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But there's a lot of things.
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If you are convicted, you have conviction
in a certain strategy, investment
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thesis or something go all in on it and
show that you're committed to it, and
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that, so it's interesting that you're
talking about on the corporate side.
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So it.
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Great start here.
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So why does inside ownership
and really shareholder alignment
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matter when it comes to investing?
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Haren Bhakta: Shareholder
alignment is huge.
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What you want is leaders of the
organization to think like shareholders
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and to be aligned with shareholders.
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Otherwise, you get scenarios where
insiders have perverse incentives, right?
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Where they are not aligned with
shareholders, they become agents for
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the corporation and, more concerned
with their own base salaries and/or
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board fees versus, versus actual-
actually creating shareholder value.
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One example I have that, of
that right now, playing out
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right now is eBay and GameStop.
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So Ryan Cohen, the CEO of GameStop, has
placed a bid, a takeover bid for eBay.
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Now, I'm not an eBay shareholder,
so I can't tell you whether
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it's a good deal for eBay.
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But what I can tell you is that
eBay's board cannot objectively decide
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whether it's good for shareholders.
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You know what I mean?
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Because they're not shareholders.
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They're getting $300,000 in board fees
every year, and the CEO is getting
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$30 million in compensation who's
never purchased any stock himself.
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So you have essentially people protecting
their own job deciding whether a deal
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is good for shareholders or not, and
it is just creating a skin in the game
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problem where you get these corporations
with no share ownership themselves
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deciding what's good for owners
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Ryan: Yeah, that's really interesting.
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And I like to think too, Heron, on
the investment side, very rarely…
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stock picking's really hard.
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I'm not very good at it, so
I focus on the professionals.
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I'll pay, points or whatever, how much it
is to have professionals manage the money.
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But when I'm doing that, one
of my criteria is I want these
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managers, portfolio managers,
to eat their own cooking or have
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their skin in the game, as you
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would say.
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I want their own skin in the game.
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I don't want to invest in a
portfolio manager who doesn't
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invest in their own strategy,
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Haren Bhakta: Exactly.
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Yeah.
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Yeah very exactly similar and my,
one of my favorite investors is
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named Nick Sleep out of the UK.
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He's very underrated.
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A lot of people don't know about him.
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He created enormous wealth for investors,
and he eventually shut down his fund
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because he made so much money and he
told his investors that, "Hey, you
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don't need to pay me fees anymore.
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Just buy these three stocks.
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That's what I'm gonna do."
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So he had this fabulous
run and he said, "Hey…"
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I think he shut down in 2014, and he
said, "Hey, just buy these three stocks
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'cause that's what I'm gonna own."
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He bought Costco, Amazon,
and Berkshire Hathaway.
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And he- his line is that the best
investors are not investors at all.
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They're entrepreneurs that
never sold, which is true.
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Now we l- look at the best investors.
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You got Jeff Bezos, Mark
Zuckerberg Warren Buffett.
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These aren't investors.
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Essentially, they're entrepreneurs
that never sold their stock.
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So what we should be doing is
outsourcing our investing to these
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greatest investors, and by doing that
an inside ownership w- index basically
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does that for you in a systematic way
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Ryan: Yeah, exactly.
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I, yeah, I think it's very important
to invest in people that, like you
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said, they have skin in the game too.
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You wanna invest
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Haren Bhakta: Yeah.
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Sa- Sam Hinkie, s- the old GM of 76ers
he had a line that the people are power
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law, and the best ones change everything.
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And the, and society has
always worked that way.
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The best people are power law, and
the best ones do change everything.
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Look at the last 2,000 years.
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We've…
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Society has moved by the f- the, the
small number of individuals have created
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enormous value or y- m- maybe more than
1,000 years ago is more about armies.
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But today, you can classify a
organization or corporation as a,
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a, as its own little army, right?
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And, it's always been the individual who
has taken, who people have rallied around
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that individual and created enormous value
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Ryan: Yeah, a- and speaking of
power law, I'm glad you brought that
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up, Erin, because I've done some
research, h- and it's clear power law
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is very evident in today's market.
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For not only for recent years with
the Mag Seven stocks, and even go
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back in time, power law, it's where
very few names, 10 names, drive the
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performance of the overall market.
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So same with people too
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Haren Bhakta: Absolutely.
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There was this s- study done by a
Arizona State University professor who
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looked at all US stocks over 100 years.
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So we're talking about a century of data,
looking at every single stock in America.
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What he discovered was 4% of all stocks
delivered all the wealth creation, while
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the other 96% matched US Treasury bills.
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So it's not even just a recent phenomenon.
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The stock market has always been a
small number of stocks carrying the
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00:13:53,847 --> 00:13:56,107
entire performance of the indices.
223
00:13:56,577 --> 00:13:58,527
So it's always been power law driven.
224
00:13:58,797 --> 00:14:05,217
But what, where academia got it half
right is that the leaders of organizations
225
00:14:05,227 --> 00:14:07,867
have exhibit even bigger power laws.
226
00:14:08,377 --> 00:14:12,847
There's a small number of leaders
that create enormous wealth, and
227
00:14:12,877 --> 00:14:17,297
we can look at that today with
Elon Musk and Jensen and Jeff Bezos
228
00:14:17,307 --> 00:14:18,957
and Z- and Mark Zuckerberg, right?
229
00:14:19,217 --> 00:14:25,037
So these few exceptional leaders create
enormous value while most of society
230
00:14:25,037 --> 00:14:30,777
and m- most of these companies don't
deliver enormous shareholder wealth.
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00:14:31,347 --> 00:14:37,669
And so by investing in these exceptional
leaders you could raise your performance.
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00:14:37,669 --> 00:14:41,579
And I looked at every
hundred bagger I could find.
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00:14:41,779 --> 00:14:46,379
A hundred bagger is a stock that
delivers 100 times your money.
234
00:14:46,599 --> 00:14:49,329
So you put in $10,000, it
turns into over a million.
235
00:14:49,759 --> 00:14:51,299
Between the years 2000 to 2025,
236
00:14:53,479 --> 00:14:59,179
I found about 21, and only two exceptions.
237
00:14:59,509 --> 00:15:07,699
Every single one of those 21 except for
two, Apple and FICO Isaac, had ownership
238
00:15:07,949 --> 00:15:14,839
above 5% at the start before it went on
that, that hundred bagger return journey.
239
00:15:15,109 --> 00:15:19,079
So Apple surprisingly
is kind of an asterisk.
240
00:15:19,079 --> 00:15:26,529
So Steve Jobs didn't own a huge part
of Apple despite being a founder, and
241
00:15:26,549 --> 00:15:29,579
is-- the reason for that is he got
kicked out of Apple and then came back.
242
00:15:29,819 --> 00:15:34,079
So he had sold out of Apple I, I believe
two times throughout his career, he
243
00:15:34,079 --> 00:15:36,369
had sold out of Apple and got back in.
244
00:15:36,999 --> 00:15:40,389
The f- the s- the last time is
because he was kicked out, so he,
245
00:15:40,549 --> 00:15:42,369
sold his whole entire stake of Apple.
246
00:15:42,959 --> 00:15:46,929
And so and the other exception
was FICO Isaac, but all the other
247
00:15:46,929 --> 00:15:52,259
ones had ownership above 5%,
and very often more than that.
248
00:15:52,609 --> 00:15:55,349
And there was no other
commonality I could find.
249
00:15:55,349 --> 00:15:57,469
They were all in diverse
different industries.
250
00:15:57,809 --> 00:16:01,009
It wasn't necessarily the CEO
that, that owned the stock.
251
00:16:01,329 --> 00:16:03,259
It wasn't necessarily a founder.
252
00:16:03,829 --> 00:16:08,599
Tractor Supply was one company that,
that achieved that hundred bagger
253
00:16:08,619 --> 00:16:10,789
return, and that was an old company.
254
00:16:10,879 --> 00:16:13,679
Didn't have a founder
but it had ownership.
255
00:16:14,249 --> 00:16:19,879
Monster Beverage, again, that
wasn't founder-led, but it was
256
00:16:19,899 --> 00:16:21,069
people with skin in the game.
257
00:16:21,679 --> 00:16:23,599
So it doesn't have to be
a founder, essentially.
258
00:16:23,809 --> 00:16:26,419
Warren Buffett is not the
technically the founder of Berkshire.
259
00:16:26,679 --> 00:16:30,899
Howard Schultz was not
the founder of Starbucks.
260
00:16:31,419 --> 00:16:32,009
Yeah.
261
00:16:32,379 --> 00:16:37,489
And, even surprisingly, Elon Musk is
technically not the founder of Tesla.
262
00:16:39,259 --> 00:16:40,489
Yeah, a lot of people don't know that.
263
00:16:40,489 --> 00:16:47,619
So he a- he acquired Tesla or made a
huge investment into Tesla early on.
264
00:16:47,639 --> 00:16:51,039
Yeah, he was early on, but he's
technically not the founder, although
265
00:16:51,039 --> 00:16:54,769
he's probably labeled the founder, just
like Warren Buffett is now labeled the
266
00:16:54,769 --> 00:16:59,049
founder of Berkshire, and rightfully
they, he created the value of modern
267
00:16:59,049 --> 00:17:05,439
day Berkshire, but technically speaking,
he's not the original idea or he
268
00:17:05,439 --> 00:17:08,529
didn't create the, the entity Berkshire
269
00:17:10,137 --> 00:17:11,907
Ryan: Yeah, that's interesting
because I didn't know that.
270
00:17:11,907 --> 00:17:15,578
I just assumed that Musk was a
founder, and same with Warren.
271
00:17:15,578 --> 00:17:18,818
So interesting there.
272
00:17:19,108 --> 00:17:26,938
Also, who would've thought if you
said, asked somebody 2,100 baggers
273
00:17:26,938 --> 00:17:30,758
over the past, 20 years or so when
you started this, who would've
274
00:17:30,758 --> 00:17:34,038
thought Tractor Supply would've
named Tractor Supply as one of them?
275
00:17:34,833 --> 00:17:35,483
Haren Bhakta: Yeah, yeah.
276
00:17:35,483 --> 00:17:40,493
Tractor Supply, Universal, w- a
company called Universal Insurance.
277
00:17:40,993 --> 00:17:42,113
Yeah, again, 21 of them.
278
00:17:42,113 --> 00:17:45,323
Netflix, Nvidia, Apple g-
279
00:17:45,488 --> 00:17:47,528
Ryan: I think people would've gone there.
280
00:17:47,923 --> 00:17:48,413
Haren Bhakta: Yeah.
281
00:17:48,868 --> 00:17:51,128
Ryan: Supply I don't think would've
282
00:17:51,213 --> 00:17:53,723
Haren Bhakta: O'Reilly's another
one, the auto parts store.
283
00:17:53,783 --> 00:17:55,253
O'Reilly's, another hundred bagger.
284
00:17:55,643 --> 00:18:00,023
Again, O'Reilly's wasn't founder led I
don't believe, but it was family operated.
285
00:18:00,703 --> 00:18:07,883
So what I find is that w- it takes an
owner/operator to have that extreme
286
00:18:07,903 --> 00:18:12,183
outlier type returns, and the reason
for that is it's a cultural thing.
287
00:18:12,373 --> 00:18:16,873
So if you d- have no ownership
on a board or at the executive
288
00:18:16,873 --> 00:18:20,163
level, you are judged quarterly.
289
00:18:20,673 --> 00:18:25,693
And when you're judged quarterly,
you're gonna think quarterly, and to
290
00:18:25,763 --> 00:18:31,103
have these extreme returns, you have
to do things that make your company
291
00:18:31,103 --> 00:18:37,113
look less profitable now in order
to achieve these enormous returns.
292
00:18:37,313 --> 00:18:44,933
So for example Walmart and Costco,
they purposely suppressed margins.
293
00:18:44,973 --> 00:18:49,413
They wanna offer, and Amazon is too,
they wanna offer low prices, right?
294
00:18:50,293 --> 00:18:54,803
They could raise prices and probably
increase profits over the next
295
00:18:54,803 --> 00:18:59,003
quarter or year, but that would
damage the long-term aspect of their
296
00:18:59,003 --> 00:19:02,143
business in, in providing low prices.
297
00:19:02,683 --> 00:19:08,403
So when you have no ownership
and you reward CEOs for
298
00:19:08,433 --> 00:19:14,333
quarterly performance, they get
incentivized to perform quarterly.
299
00:19:14,563 --> 00:19:17,503
But to create these enormous
returns you can't think quarterly.
300
00:19:17,513 --> 00:19:19,433
Jeff Bezos thought in decades, right?
301
00:19:19,853 --> 00:19:27,593
He was perfectly fine failing in
small projects that had maybe a
302
00:19:27,593 --> 00:19:32,423
high chance of failure, but if
successful, had these enormous runways.
303
00:19:32,433 --> 00:19:36,223
So one example, a couple examples
is he failed with the Fire Phone,
304
00:19:36,653 --> 00:19:41,473
but through, through trial and
error, they came up with AWS, right?
305
00:19:41,583 --> 00:19:44,483
Huge a world-class company now.
306
00:19:44,803 --> 00:19:49,933
Jeff Bezos created essentially
not just one world-class company,
307
00:19:49,933 --> 00:19:55,743
he created two, Amazon retail
store, or web store, and AWS.
308
00:19:56,343 --> 00:20:01,453
These individuals are able
to create enormous value.
309
00:20:01,453 --> 00:20:06,683
We should want to essentially ride
their coattails, and when they're
310
00:20:06,683 --> 00:20:12,563
gone not be invested in those
companies as much, or if at all.
311
00:20:12,768 --> 00:20:15,908
Ryan: And e- exactly like you said
too, they're thinking long-term.
312
00:20:15,908 --> 00:20:20,518
They're not just thinking, "Oh, we gotta
meet our objectives quarter to quarter."
313
00:20:20,838 --> 00:20:24,618
They're thinking long-term, just
like I keep, going back to if I'm
314
00:20:24,618 --> 00:20:31,108
going to invest in a portfolio
manager, three quar- three months?
315
00:20:31,148 --> 00:20:32,938
Yeah, that doesn't really do it for me.
316
00:20:33,188 --> 00:20:40,498
I want a portfolio manager that has been
very successful over 10 years, right?
317
00:20:40,553 --> 00:20:41,183
Haren Bhakta: Exactly.
318
00:20:41,263 --> 00:20:41,933
Exactly.
319
00:20:42,323 --> 00:20:42,683
Yeah.
320
00:20:42,723 --> 00:20:46,263
And so the, the other importance
of skin in the game is, like Jeff
321
00:20:46,283 --> 00:20:52,143
Bezos said, basically, if you
want to be successful, you have
322
00:20:52,143 --> 00:20:55,573
to be willing to be misunderstood.
323
00:20:56,603 --> 00:21:02,933
And if you're a CEO or board with
no ownership, they don't have
324
00:21:02,933 --> 00:21:04,913
the luxury to be misunderstood.
325
00:21:05,533 --> 00:21:12,323
They don't have the luxury of doing
things now that are unexplainable
326
00:21:12,813 --> 00:21:18,563
or, people or shareholders or Wall
Street doesn't understand now.
327
00:21:18,803 --> 00:21:21,253
So they don't have the luxury
of doing things where they
328
00:21:21,253 --> 00:21:22,623
can be proven right later.
329
00:21:23,043 --> 00:21:28,173
They have to essentially innovate
by consensus, and consensus
330
00:21:28,203 --> 00:21:30,863
and committees do not innovate
331
00:21:33,396 --> 00:21:34,726
Ryan: Yeah, that's a very good point.
332
00:21:34,946 --> 00:21:39,216
So during your research, when you looked
at all these 100 bag- baggers, the
333
00:21:39,236 --> 00:21:44,396
21 of them from, over the past, that
time period that you were looking at,
334
00:21:44,466 --> 00:21:48,346
was there a cutoff, like a percentage
when you're talking about ownership?
335
00:21:48,346 --> 00:21:51,436
Was it like 10% ownership, 20%?
336
00:21:51,475 --> 00:21:57,875
Haren Bhakta: Well, 5% was, 5% was
the cutoff that I looked at, and
337
00:21:57,875 --> 00:22:06,293
19 of those 21 had at least 5%, and
very often more Right at the start.
338
00:22:06,303 --> 00:22:08,253
So they didn't all finish
with that kind of ownership.
339
00:22:08,253 --> 00:22:11,553
So for example, NVIDIA now the…
340
00:22:11,553 --> 00:22:18,333
What you find is a lot of the founders
or owners do sell along the way, and
341
00:22:18,333 --> 00:22:20,823
it's not because that they're bearish.
342
00:22:21,193 --> 00:22:26,863
It's because that their 99% of their
net worth is often tied to this company,
343
00:22:27,303 --> 00:22:30,413
and they're going to bed thinking
about it, waking up thinking about it.
344
00:22:30,693 --> 00:22:32,743
So they're taking liquidity along the way.
345
00:22:33,483 --> 00:22:34,393
So rightfully so the…
346
00:22:34,443 --> 00:22:34,763
Yeah.
347
00:22:34,933 --> 00:22:38,673
So what-- Jeff Bezos has been selling
Amazon for 20 years, but that,
348
00:22:38,693 --> 00:22:40,113
that's not because he's bearish.
349
00:22:40,123 --> 00:22:42,413
He's, all his net worth is
tied up into the company.
350
00:22:43,043 --> 00:22:47,493
And which actually brings me
to my favorite analogy is that
351
00:22:47,563 --> 00:22:53,633
what I call a hired CEO, I call
I call a hired CEO a zoo animal.
352
00:22:54,373 --> 00:22:56,893
Now, a zoo animal gets
fed every day, whether it
353
00:22:56,913 --> 00:22:58,533
successfully hunts or not, right?
354
00:22:58,953 --> 00:23:04,313
A zoo animal or a hired CEO gets
their base salary, quarterly bonus
355
00:23:04,313 --> 00:23:06,173
and very often a golden parachute.
356
00:23:06,763 --> 00:23:10,043
I like to call a
owner/operator a wild lion.
357
00:23:10,293 --> 00:23:11,763
A wild lion is trained to survive.
358
00:23:11,773 --> 00:23:16,693
These CEOs have already proven
their ability to create value in the
359
00:23:16,693 --> 00:23:20,573
world, so they're trained to survive.
360
00:23:21,123 --> 00:23:25,343
And when they don't successfully
hunt, they feel the pain, and that's
361
00:23:25,343 --> 00:23:26,593
what you're looking for in a CEO.
362
00:23:26,763 --> 00:23:32,063
You want them to feel the pain of
failure, and you want their net
363
00:23:32,063 --> 00:23:34,233
worth to be directly exposed to that.
364
00:23:34,693 --> 00:23:38,073
And very often, these owner/operators
are taking the lowest salaries.
365
00:23:38,383 --> 00:23:43,453
It's the hired CEOs that are taking
the large base salaries, right?
366
00:23:43,843 --> 00:23:45,793
So they don't often feel that pain.
367
00:23:46,163 --> 00:23:52,933
And innovation comes from feedback
loops, trial and error, and it's--
368
00:23:53,673 --> 00:23:56,813
This is exactly why it's very hard
to innovate through committee.
369
00:23:56,813 --> 00:24:00,773
You don't get those feedback
loops, and they don't feel the
370
00:24:00,773 --> 00:24:02,933
pain of mistakes initially.
371
00:24:03,283 --> 00:24:04,183
It's suppressed.
372
00:24:05,223 --> 00:24:06,843
And yeah, the, the…
373
00:24:06,913 --> 00:24:10,703
One of my favorite books is How
Innovation Works and by Matt Ridley.
374
00:24:10,703 --> 00:24:14,413
He talks a lot about how innovation
really works, and it works it through
375
00:24:14,703 --> 00:24:20,623
trial and error and not through
decentralized decision-making.
376
00:24:20,713 --> 00:24:23,263
Or I'm sorry, not through
centralized decision-making.
377
00:24:23,263 --> 00:24:30,233
It comes from des- decentralization, where
the people working on the problem have
378
00:24:30,783 --> 00:24:33,433
actual decision-making power to to pivot.
379
00:24:33,783 --> 00:24:38,843
And what you get in non-skin in the
game companies is centralization
380
00:24:38,853 --> 00:24:41,023
of decision-making from the top.
381
00:24:41,563 --> 00:24:43,673
And that's not how innovation works
382
00:24:45,412 --> 00:24:47,212
Ryan: And he goes right
back to skin in the game.
383
00:24:47,903 --> 00:24:50,333
And it's a care factor too.
384
00:24:50,883 --> 00:24:56,403
Like you said, that, zoo lion, yeah,
they probably, they, the care factor
385
00:24:56,403 --> 00:24:58,703
is not there as a hired CEO more.
386
00:24:58,713 --> 00:25:04,423
Maybe they just have more of a
figurehead CEO versus that, lion, that
387
00:25:04,423 --> 00:25:06,483
wild lion who's got that care factor.
388
00:25:06,483 --> 00:25:09,433
They really care that they're gonna
eat, and they gotta go hunt, and
389
00:25:09,896 --> 00:25:11,916
A very important part is caring,
390
00:25:12,459 --> 00:25:13,199
Haren Bhakta: Exactly.
391
00:25:13,229 --> 00:25:13,599
Yeah.
392
00:25:13,829 --> 00:25:18,249
So I did, so I, you heard me talk
about the 21 100 baggers, which,
393
00:25:18,269 --> 00:25:19,909
19 of them all had ownership.
394
00:25:20,539 --> 00:25:27,809
I also studied the five largest
value destroyers of the S&P over
395
00:25:27,809 --> 00:25:34,339
the last five years, and all
five had very low ownership.
396
00:25:34,489 --> 00:25:39,339
So not only are we getting more
outlier returns from high ownership
397
00:25:39,339 --> 00:25:43,569
companies, we're also getting the
biggest value destroyers of the S&P
398
00:25:44,769 --> 00:25:47,699
having no or very low ownership.
399
00:25:47,899 --> 00:25:54,139
So number one was PayPal, the biggest
value destroyer between 2001 and 2026.
400
00:25:54,139 --> 00:25:57,799
The second biggest value
destroyer destroyer was Adobe.
401
00:25:58,039 --> 00:25:59,099
Again, no ownership.
402
00:25:59,659 --> 00:26:00,949
Haren Bhakta Inside Ownership Index:
Disney was number three.
403
00:26:01,299 --> 00:26:05,069
Comcast I believe Nike was number
five or number six, I can't remember.
404
00:26:05,069 --> 00:26:07,839
But the, the point is that every
single one had low ownership.
405
00:26:07,839 --> 00:26:12,749
Nike, founded by Phil Knight,
world-class brand, right?
406
00:26:13,819 --> 00:26:17,259
Down 70% over the last five years.
407
00:26:17,899 --> 00:26:22,629
We're talking about a world-class
brand of Nike and the biggest bull
408
00:26:22,629 --> 00:26:27,869
market in stock market history,
and yet the stock is down 70%.
409
00:26:27,929 --> 00:26:30,409
This is because Phil Knight is
no longer part of the company.
410
00:26:31,569 --> 00:26:37,949
It's remove from a company who made it
great and you removed what made it great
411
00:26:39,738 --> 00:26:39,918
Ryan: Yeah.
412
00:26:40,148 --> 00:26:45,068
That's interesting because,
with Nike you do think that…
413
00:26:45,088 --> 00:26:48,388
nike's all over the place,
but it doesn't mean that it's
414
00:26:48,408 --> 00:26:50,018
performing well or it's stock.
415
00:26:50,028 --> 00:26:50,128
And
416
00:26:50,189 --> 00:26:50,829
Haren Bhakta: Exactly.
417
00:26:50,868 --> 00:26:52,138
Ryan: Knight is
418
00:26:52,149 --> 00:26:54,079
Haren Bhakta: 70% down in the
biggest bull market in history.
419
00:26:54,118 --> 00:26:54,988
Ryan: that care factor
420
00:26:55,599 --> 00:26:56,349
Haren Bhakta: Exactly.
421
00:26:56,479 --> 00:26:56,879
Yeah.
422
00:26:57,109 --> 00:27:00,419
Someone going to bed thinking
about the company, waking up
423
00:27:00,419 --> 00:27:01,499
thinking about the company.
424
00:27:01,679 --> 00:27:05,019
And the co- it's not a fast-moving
thing when these founders retire.
425
00:27:05,379 --> 00:27:08,019
It's that the culture slowly erodes
426
00:27:10,687 --> 00:27:14,137
And they start thinking about the
wrong things, and that's what it is
427
00:27:15,164 --> 00:27:15,854
Ryan: It's interesting.
428
00:27:15,864 --> 00:27:20,154
So there is a high correlation or a
correlation between high ownership
429
00:27:20,154 --> 00:27:21,984
companies and strong culture then
430
00:27:23,017 --> 00:27:24,137
Haren Bhakta: Absolutely.
431
00:27:24,227 --> 00:27:28,347
And, that actually brings me to
the, the title of your show, Zephyr.
432
00:27:28,347 --> 00:27:29,727
We went back 20 years.
433
00:27:29,737 --> 00:27:32,227
So the index itself has
been live for two years now.
434
00:27:32,227 --> 00:27:36,747
The ETF that tracks the index only
launched about a month and a half ago.
435
00:27:37,027 --> 00:27:40,987
But the index itself, and we've been
managing portfolios according to
436
00:27:40,987 --> 00:27:42,917
the index for almost two years now.
437
00:27:43,437 --> 00:27:49,897
But what we looked at is how it's
performed in volatility periods.
438
00:27:50,157 --> 00:27:52,557
So we went back 20 years.
439
00:27:52,557 --> 00:27:58,267
What we found is it is more concentrated,
so it, it does have more volatility.
440
00:27:58,867 --> 00:28:06,597
However, in 2008 and 2020, the
two global catastrophic events
441
00:28:06,597 --> 00:28:08,057
we've had over the last 20 years.
442
00:28:08,257 --> 00:28:14,167
So these were not just volatility
periods like 2022 or 2025 or 2018.
443
00:28:14,417 --> 00:28:17,037
These were actual global
catastrophic events.
444
00:28:18,287 --> 00:28:24,817
And S&P 500 went down more than these
high ownership companies collectively.
445
00:28:25,627 --> 00:28:33,677
So while we could use academic risk models
to say, one is more volatile than the
446
00:28:33,677 --> 00:28:39,347
other, but when you needed a safety the
most in these two global catastrophic
447
00:28:39,347 --> 00:28:47,555
events, what we found was that the S&P
fared worse And that's because high
448
00:28:47,565 --> 00:28:50,305
ownership companies are better run.
449
00:28:50,655 --> 00:28:53,785
They have better management,
they have better balance
450
00:28:53,795 --> 00:28:55,765
sheets, they are less levered.
451
00:28:56,135 --> 00:29:02,445
They also have access to
capital when nobody else does.
452
00:29:03,065 --> 00:29:07,075
So they have access to more capital
when the world is going through its
453
00:29:07,085 --> 00:29:09,155
l-liquidity crunch, like in 2008.
454
00:29:09,675 --> 00:29:15,255
We could, again, we could use
volatility as a measure, but what I
455
00:29:15,265 --> 00:29:21,605
find is the Warren Buffett principle
is, what gives you a, a chance of
456
00:29:21,605 --> 00:29:26,685
losing actual capital or permanent
capital, permanent loss of capital
457
00:29:26,695 --> 00:29:29,175
versus just gyrations in the market.
458
00:29:29,825 --> 00:29:32,645
And investing in these high
ownership companies I, you, I
459
00:29:32,645 --> 00:29:36,865
believe you, you have less chance
of losing permanent loss of capital.
460
00:29:37,175 --> 00:29:40,170
And the best example I have
is Silicon Valley Bank.
461
00:29:41,550 --> 00:29:47,160
Silicon Valley Bank was in the S&P 500,
so if you owned the S&P 500 in 2023,
462
00:29:47,520 --> 00:29:50,550
you had exposure to Silicon Valley Bank.
463
00:29:50,560 --> 00:29:57,000
And if you look at the proxy filing,
which I did in 2023 ownership was so low
464
00:29:57,700 --> 00:29:59,650
that it was represented by an asterisk.
465
00:30:00,910 --> 00:30:02,540
So insiders own nothing.
466
00:30:02,730 --> 00:30:08,740
So what you get is a company that
will leverage up the company to hit
467
00:30:08,740 --> 00:30:14,910
quarterly bonuses without thinking
about the exposure of failure.
468
00:30:15,320 --> 00:30:20,440
And when you have a true owner,
they're thinking about failure or
469
00:30:20,530 --> 00:30:27,640
catastrophic loss first, and then
optimi- optimizing performance secondary.
470
00:30:28,270 --> 00:30:33,890
But, when you have a company like Silicon
Valley Bank with no owners, they thought,
471
00:30:34,330 --> 00:30:39,540
"Let's hit it out of the park first,"
and, not worrying about surviving first
472
00:30:41,231 --> 00:30:42,431
Ryan: Yeah, that's fantastic.
473
00:30:42,431 --> 00:30:45,701
I love that you brought up about
just losing money, and one of
474
00:30:45,701 --> 00:30:50,071
my favorite quotes from Warren
is, I believe, r- his rules.
475
00:30:50,131 --> 00:30:51,341
Number one, don't lose
476
00:30:51,462 --> 00:30:52,632
Haren Bhakta: Don't lose my number two.
477
00:30:52,632 --> 00:30:53,942
Don't forget rule number one.
478
00:30:54,122 --> 00:30:54,912
Exactly.
479
00:30:55,021 --> 00:30:55,371
Ryan: that.
480
00:30:55,582 --> 00:30:55,902
Find…
481
00:30:55,932 --> 00:30:57,562
You brought up volatility.
482
00:30:58,302 --> 00:31:02,942
often find in investing we, we focus
on standard deviation and volatility.
483
00:31:03,242 --> 00:31:09,162
In recent years, it's shifted now in terms
of risk to just capital preservation.
484
00:31:09,292 --> 00:31:12,402
To me, that's the real
risk, Erin, is losing money,
485
00:31:12,857 --> 00:31:13,597
Haren Bhakta: Exactly
486
00:31:13,642 --> 00:31:16,542
Ryan: the upside volatility you want,
and it goes back to what Warren was
487
00:31:16,542 --> 00:31:17,812
saying, what you were just saying.
488
00:31:18,172 --> 00:31:22,812
Losing value, losing money is really
the risk that you want to mitigate,
489
00:31:23,737 --> 00:31:24,487
Haren Bhakta: Exactly.
490
00:31:24,977 --> 00:31:30,687
As Nassim Taleb says, "Never cross a
river that's on average four feet deep."
491
00:31:31,107 --> 00:31:35,917
So in order to achieve these
average returns, which, can be
492
00:31:35,917 --> 00:31:38,027
high, you must first survive.
493
00:31:38,397 --> 00:31:44,847
So that part of the, the S&P that was
in Silicon Valley Bank, that, that part
494
00:31:44,847 --> 00:31:47,897
of the money will never earn the average
ra- return because it went to zero.
495
00:31:48,287 --> 00:31:50,927
So what you want is to avoid losses.
496
00:31:51,027 --> 00:31:56,217
And like I mentioned the S&P's
biggest value destroyers were these no
497
00:31:56,217 --> 00:32:00,337
ownership companies, and the biggest
outliers were high ownership companies.
498
00:32:00,987 --> 00:32:05,667
And that's because these, when you have
leaders that own meaningful stakes,
499
00:32:05,687 --> 00:32:07,427
they do treat the company better
500
00:32:09,618 --> 00:32:09,868
Ryan: Yeah.
501
00:32:10,068 --> 00:32:14,378
And it goes back to while you're
talking it brings me back to trust too.
502
00:32:14,388 --> 00:32:19,688
You talked about these high ownership
companies, they're able to access capital
503
00:32:19,688 --> 00:32:23,118
markets even when capital markets are dry
504
00:32:23,481 --> 00:32:24,151
Haren Bhakta: Exactly
505
00:32:24,618 --> 00:32:25,668
Ryan: lending money.
506
00:32:26,618 --> 00:32:27,408
it trust?
507
00:32:27,408 --> 00:32:29,928
This industry's built huge on trust.
508
00:32:29,928 --> 00:32:32,018
If there wasn't trust in
wealth management, there
509
00:32:32,018 --> 00:32:33,478
wouldn't be wealth management.
510
00:32:34,558 --> 00:32:38,908
do you think that's wh- even though you
have Elon Musk and these big names that
511
00:32:38,908 --> 00:32:41,218
are very eccentric, they're out there.
512
00:32:41,648 --> 00:32:48,128
Is it because the capital markets
trust these, the owners and they're
513
00:32:48,163 --> 00:32:48,513
Haren Bhakta: Yeah.
514
00:32:48,638 --> 00:32:49,688
Ryan: We trust them, let them go"?
515
00:32:50,033 --> 00:32:52,843
Haren Bhakta: they're
proven successful leader.
516
00:32:52,853 --> 00:32:57,123
They're proven to be able to
create value in this world, right?
517
00:32:57,123 --> 00:33:01,013
So yeah, they're more
highly trusted, right?
518
00:33:01,013 --> 00:33:07,963
W- you would rather give capital to
Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, Warren Buffett
519
00:33:08,293 --> 00:33:11,173
than some guy you never heard of, right?
520
00:33:11,203 --> 00:33:14,593
Can you really name the CEO of Micron?
521
00:33:14,653 --> 00:33:17,623
Yeah, Micron is a trillion-dollar
company today, but who is the CEO?
522
00:33:17,673 --> 00:33:18,763
I have no idea.
523
00:33:19,073 --> 00:33:20,303
I don't think most people do.
524
00:33:21,303 --> 00:33:26,443
Right now, ExxonMobil is a
top 10 company in the S&P 500.
525
00:33:26,663 --> 00:33:28,233
Can you name the CEO?
526
00:33:28,703 --> 00:33:31,193
I have no idea who that is, right?
527
00:33:31,473 --> 00:33:37,313
In the Inside Ownership Index, you can
name every CEO in the top 10 of the index.
528
00:33:37,413 --> 00:33:44,203
But, m- you get these people who have
really no ownership, no significant
529
00:33:44,263 --> 00:33:49,423
past performance controlling these
enormous trillion-dollar companies who
530
00:33:49,423 --> 00:33:52,033
are essentially people we don't know.
531
00:33:53,403 --> 00:33:54,113
So it, you know-
532
00:33:56,018 --> 00:33:57,718
Ryan: That, that's a really good point.
533
00:33:57,728 --> 00:33:59,738
So let's talk to you.
534
00:33:59,838 --> 00:34:03,748
As a shareholder, you brought it
up, you get the chance to vote
535
00:34:04,208 --> 00:34:09,898
on corporate, whether it's CEO
or, whatever through ownership.
536
00:34:10,598 --> 00:34:15,918
But now you have these huge asset
managers, BlackRock, Vanguard, these
537
00:34:15,938 --> 00:34:23,588
passive market cap-weighted index funds
that control the voting through proxies.
538
00:34:23,928 --> 00:34:27,717
Is that gonna be an issue there
when you have these huge passive
539
00:34:28,078 --> 00:34:29,838
market cap-weighted index funds?
540
00:34:29,838 --> 00:34:31,467
Is that a hidden problem?
541
00:34:31,887 --> 00:34:32,917
Haren Bhakta: Yes, absolutely.
542
00:34:32,917 --> 00:34:36,067
I see that as a huge systemic
skin in the game problem.
543
00:34:36,837 --> 00:34:41,077
You have more and more of these
trillion-dollar companies or hundred
544
00:34:41,487 --> 00:34:47,097
billion dollar companies controlled by
a board and executives that maybe own no
545
00:34:47,097 --> 00:34:49,347
shares or purchase no shares themselves.
546
00:34:49,817 --> 00:34:54,056
So what you get is
perverse incentives, right?
547
00:34:54,306 --> 00:35:01,447
You get non-owners deciding what's
good for owners, and they have
548
00:35:01,447 --> 00:35:06,947
these enormous balance sheets
to fund their own lifestyle.
549
00:35:07,477 --> 00:35:09,567
And, it, it's a huge problem.
550
00:35:09,567 --> 00:35:13,297
So I think I mentioned this
earlier with Ryan Cohen and eBay.
551
00:35:13,707 --> 00:35:21,447
I think that's a, a big problem in
that in the past, if management was
552
00:35:21,447 --> 00:35:27,567
terrible or mediocre, they could be voted
out, and that's not the case anymore.
553
00:35:27,567 --> 00:35:30,227
So Warren Buffett actually talked
a lot about this, the biggest value
554
00:35:30,227 --> 00:35:32,957
destroyers in Warren Buffett's eyes.
555
00:35:33,037 --> 00:35:39,647
He said this in 1997, that the biggest
value destroyers are mediocre CEOs because
556
00:35:39,647 --> 00:35:46,097
a terrible CEO could be will be changed,
but a mediocre CEO will stay in a very
557
00:35:46,097 --> 00:35:50,687
long time and just destroy value over,
over the course of maybe a decade or two.
558
00:35:51,317 --> 00:35:52,127
Today
559
00:35:54,161 --> 00:35:58,441
Terrible CEOs can be locked
in because there's no longer
560
00:35:58,461 --> 00:36:00,361
a mechanism to remove them.
561
00:36:00,811 --> 00:36:06,401
Like I said, in the past, we could vote o-
vote out terrible management and replace
562
00:36:06,881 --> 00:36:11,431
m- terrible management with a CEO that
maybe shareholders think more highly of.
563
00:36:11,631 --> 00:36:16,891
But today, with BlackRock, Vanguard,
and State Street controlling all of
564
00:36:16,891 --> 00:36:22,621
corporate America, who automatically
essentially vote for incumbents, there's
565
00:36:22,621 --> 00:36:25,381
no longer a mechanism to remove them.
566
00:36:26,131 --> 00:36:30,611
And pretty soon, as they continue to
take market share we're gonna see…
567
00:36:30,611 --> 00:36:34,391
right now they're already the largest
shareholder in America, but pretty soon
568
00:36:34,401 --> 00:36:38,441
they're gonna be larger than all other
shareholders combined, and that's a
569
00:36:38,441 --> 00:36:45,201
scary thought where if they own more
than all other shareholders combined,
570
00:36:45,751 --> 00:36:55,091
this will entrench management, and
they will control, even being terrible,
571
00:36:55,871 --> 00:36:59,751
they will control that company with
no mechanism to have them removed.
572
00:36:59,981 --> 00:37:00,921
That's a scary thought
573
00:37:02,610 --> 00:37:05,150
Ryan: And do you even feel some
of these large asset managers
574
00:37:05,180 --> 00:37:07,070
even complete the proxy votes?
575
00:37:07,510 --> 00:37:08,630
Just are gonna
576
00:37:08,640 --> 00:37:08,870
shove
577
00:37:08,877 --> 00:37:11,677
Haren Bhakta: outsource it
to ISS and, things like that.
578
00:37:11,677 --> 00:37:14,937
So it's like they're automatically
essentially voting for incumbents.
579
00:37:15,107 --> 00:37:18,127
It's very hard for them to
get them to vote for a change.
580
00:37:18,607 --> 00:37:25,307
And w- if we, if you get a terrible
board, they're essentially locked in,
581
00:37:25,817 --> 00:37:28,747
and they're g- and that's becoming
more and more the case where these
582
00:37:28,747 --> 00:37:32,657
terrible boards are locked in with
no mechanism to have them removed.
583
00:37:32,937 --> 00:37:35,197
In the past, we would vote them out.
584
00:37:35,587 --> 00:37:40,217
Now no one's vote counts anymore except
for BlackRock, Vanguard, and State
585
00:37:40,217 --> 00:37:41,967
Street and they're not really voting
586
00:37:43,812 --> 00:37:47,742
Ryan: It's one of those risks
like you-- that hidden, right?
587
00:37:47,742 --> 00:37:53,212
It's a hidden r- people don't think about,
and as they just keep getting bigger and
588
00:37:53,212 --> 00:37:57,212
bigger, reduces our power as shareholder
589
00:37:57,325 --> 00:37:58,735
Haren Bhakta: absolutely, yeah.
590
00:37:59,585 --> 00:38:03,285
And you get these forced buyers,
so they're blindly throwing money
591
00:38:03,515 --> 00:38:06,795
at these companies, at these CEOs
that may not deserve it simply
592
00:38:06,795 --> 00:38:08,555
because of their market cap size.
593
00:38:08,885 --> 00:38:13,575
But the insiders own nothing, and blindly
the S&P just throws money at them.
594
00:38:14,255 --> 00:38:16,275
And I believe we created
a solution for that.
595
00:38:16,325 --> 00:38:20,615
We should be indexing to the leaders of
the organization and how much they own
596
00:38:21,155 --> 00:38:23,865
versus the, the pure size of the company
597
00:38:25,640 --> 00:38:26,220
Ryan: Very good point.
598
00:38:26,390 --> 00:38:27,050
Very good point.
599
00:38:27,140 --> 00:38:30,190
So lastly, Aaron, fantastic conversation.
600
00:38:30,210 --> 00:38:30,950
I love it.
601
00:38:31,400 --> 00:38:36,100
A lot of information here and facts
that information I didn't know about.
602
00:38:36,730 --> 00:38:41,390
Lastly, for all the financial advisors
out there listening, how can they use this
603
00:38:41,400 --> 00:38:43,590
strategy in their clients' portfolios?
604
00:38:43,650 --> 00:38:45,740
You own the index.
605
00:38:46,010 --> 00:38:49,480
How can they implement this
strategy within a portfolio?
606
00:38:50,215 --> 00:38:50,365
Haren Bhakta: Yeah.
607
00:38:50,365 --> 00:38:51,405
We have the ETF.
608
00:38:51,455 --> 00:38:55,715
ETF's ticker symbol is O-W-N, OWN.
609
00:38:56,214 --> 00:38:56,444
Ryan: Love
610
00:38:56,535 --> 00:38:57,395
Haren Bhakta: easy to remember.
611
00:38:57,544 --> 00:38:58,134
Ryan: that one,
612
00:38:58,385 --> 00:38:58,965
Haren Bhakta: Yeah.
613
00:38:59,255 --> 00:38:59,675
Yeah.
614
00:38:59,754 --> 00:39:00,854
Ryan: we can remember that one.
615
00:39:01,195 --> 00:39:01,695
Haren Bhakta: Yeah.
616
00:39:01,745 --> 00:39:02,045
Yeah.
617
00:39:02,045 --> 00:39:06,535
So what I find is for, oh, for one,
it has a 49 basis points, so just
618
00:39:06,545 --> 00:39:11,575
under half a percent expense ratio,
and it's well-deserved because,
619
00:39:11,635 --> 00:39:15,205
again we're capturing more exposure
to the most innovative companies.
620
00:39:15,315 --> 00:39:20,375
And what I find advisors using is, for
one they could reduce exposure to the
621
00:39:20,375 --> 00:39:22,745
stock market, I believe, by being…
622
00:39:22,755 --> 00:39:28,885
having a more concentrated portfolio
of stocks that are more innovative
623
00:39:28,905 --> 00:39:30,695
and, potentially have more upside.
624
00:39:31,015 --> 00:39:39,335
So advisors could, by using OWN, they
could diversify the client portfolios
625
00:39:39,335 --> 00:39:44,045
in other asset classes more as the
stock market is at all-time highs,
626
00:39:44,335 --> 00:39:46,905
we should be looking to participate.
627
00:39:47,335 --> 00:39:49,215
You have to participate in
the stock market, for one.
628
00:39:49,215 --> 00:39:50,645
You can't time yourself out of it.
629
00:39:50,925 --> 00:39:56,075
But what you can do is reduce exposure
to the stock market at all-time highs
630
00:39:56,305 --> 00:40:01,005
or near all-time highs and diversify
in other alternatives or fixed income.
631
00:40:01,455 --> 00:40:06,196
And as the market gets cheaper, you
could allocate more and more to the
632
00:40:06,196 --> 00:40:09,885
market at the at cheaper prices.
633
00:40:09,925 --> 00:40:15,965
But what I find advisors doing is
using the OWN index to get more
634
00:40:15,965 --> 00:40:19,695
of what's working or more of the
innovative companies while reducing
635
00:40:19,695 --> 00:40:21,105
exposure to the stock market
636
00:40:23,062 --> 00:40:23,332
Ryan: Love it.
637
00:40:23,632 --> 00:40:23,982
Perfect.
638
00:40:24,302 --> 00:40:25,272
Perfect information.
639
00:40:25,272 --> 00:40:29,442
So those advisors, our audience,
if they want more information about
640
00:40:29,472 --> 00:40:34,232
Inside Ownership Index and the ETF,
where can they get that information?
641
00:40:34,557 --> 00:40:38,757
Haren Bhakta: Yeah, I have an even
easier website, insideownership.com.
642
00:40:38,757 --> 00:40:41,587
Very easy to find, insideownership.com.
643
00:40:41,897 --> 00:40:46,887
M- they could also look me up on
LinkedIn and other social media.
644
00:40:46,887 --> 00:40:49,447
I'm very easy to find here in BHACTA.
645
00:40:49,507 --> 00:40:54,267
Website also they could email me
through the website insideownership.com.
646
00:40:54,627 --> 00:40:56,227
So very, yeah, very easy to find.
647
00:40:56,227 --> 00:41:00,327
Happy to talk to anyone get,
go deeper into the methodology
648
00:41:00,827 --> 00:41:01,967
with anyone who's interested
649
00:41:03,056 --> 00:41:03,966
Ryan: I love it, Aaron.
650
00:41:04,076 --> 00:41:05,816
Fantastic conversation.
651
00:41:05,886 --> 00:41:06,966
I really enjoyed it.
652
00:41:06,976 --> 00:41:08,216
Like I said, I learned a lot.
653
00:41:08,216 --> 00:41:11,636
You threw a lot of great information,
supporting data, supporting
654
00:41:11,646 --> 00:41:14,226
information, which I really enjoy.
655
00:41:14,296 --> 00:41:18,286
I will include those links to
the website in the show notes.
656
00:41:18,326 --> 00:41:20,746
Really interesting stuff,
and I like it simple.
657
00:41:21,556 --> 00:41:21,836
you for
658
00:41:21,947 --> 00:41:22,137
Haren Bhakta: Awesome.
659
00:41:22,186 --> 00:41:23,776
Ryan: it simple for me, Aaron.
660
00:41:23,967 --> 00:41:24,467
Haren Bhakta: Yeah
661
00:41:24,526 --> 00:41:24,666
Ryan: it.
662
00:41:24,696 --> 00:41:25,936
It's been an honor.
663
00:41:26,216 --> 00:41:27,116
Really enjoyed it.
664
00:41:27,156 --> 00:41:28,436
So thank you for coming on.
665
00:41:29,166 --> 00:41:33,606
thank you so much for listening to this
episode of Adjusted for Risk podcast.
666
00:41:33,876 --> 00:41:37,416
You can watch all of our other episodes
on YouTube and all the other platforms
667
00:41:37,416 --> 00:41:39,346
that you listen to your favorite podcasts.
668
00:41:39,406 --> 00:41:41,936
Please be sure to like and
subscribe to those channels and
669
00:41:41,936 --> 00:41:43,206
give us a follow on LinkedIn.
670
00:41:43,596 --> 00:41:46,236
Thank you very much and have
a great rest of your week