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Why Insider 'Skin in the Game' May Beat the S&P 500
17th August 2026 • Adjusted for Risk • Ryan Nauman
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On the Adjusted for Risk podcast, host Ryan Nauman interviews Haren Bhakta, founder and CEO of the Inside Ownership Index, who explains how the S&P 500’s free-float weighting effectively underweights shares held by controlling insiders and can end up buying more of founder-led companies after key leaders die.

Bhakta describes manually compiling 20 years of S&P 500 proxy filings to aggregate insider-ownership data and creating a passive index that weights companies by insider ownership as a “skin in the game” approach. He argues high ownership aligns management with shareholders, supports long-term innovation, and avoids value-destroying incentives, citing ownership patterns among 100-baggers and major S&P value destroyers. He also warns that proxy voting power concentrated in large asset managers entrenches mediocre leadership.

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Learn more about Inside Ownership Index:

Related:Russell’s Rebalance Is a Healthy Pruning Amidst an Epic Small-Cap Run

00:00 Welcome and Guest Intro

01:08 Origin of the Index

02:04 Free Float Problem

03:17 Building the Dataset

08:02 Why Ownership Matters

11:50 Power Law Leaders

14:37 Hundred Bagger Evidence

18:00 Long Term Culture Edge

27:24 Downside Protection

33:57 Passive Voting Risks

38:27 How Advisors Use OWN

40:25 Where to Learn More

41:29 Closing and Subscribe

Transcripts

Speaker:

Ryan Nauman Host Adjusted for Risk:

Welcome everyone to Adjusted for Risk

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podcast from the shores of Lake Tahoe.

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Over the years, many investment

professionals have spent many days and

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years researching the different factors

and drivers of equity performance

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to try and uncover signals that can

give them a competitive advantage.

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My m- next guest has launched

a strategy that he feels can

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help find top performing stocks.

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All right, enough from me.

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I've already talked enough.

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Let's go ahead and bring

on the star of the show.

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I'd like to give a very warm

welcome to Hiren Bhakta.

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Hiren is the founder and

CEO Inside Ownership Index.

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Hiren, thank you so much

for coming on the show.

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Really looking forward

to this conversation.

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Love all the research you've done.

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Wanna dig deep into that,

so looking forward to it.

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It's an honor to have you on.

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Can you please tell us a little bit more

about yourself and Inside Ownership Index?

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Haren Bhakta Founder & CEO Inside Ownership Index:

Sure.

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A little about myself.

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I started out in the investment

industry in:

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through the wealth management program.

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Went to Morgan Stanley after about

two and a half years in:

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Spent about five and a half

years at Morgan Stanley.

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In 2017, I left Morgan Stanley to

start my own investment practice,

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and I've been doing that since.

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In 2024, I created the Inside

Ownership Index, and I, I think

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I created the idea while sitting

at the Berkshire annual meeting.

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So I'm a huge Warren Buffett fan.

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I bought a lot of Berkshire for myself

and for my clients because of that

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belief and trust in Warren Buffett.

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So I've read everything he's put out,

listened to everything he's ever said.

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And I was sitting at

the meeting in:

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the back of my mind, afraid of what am

I gonna do with Berkshire when he dies.

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And this was the first meeting Charlie

Munger wasn't there because he had passed

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away about six, five months earlier.

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And so I'm sitting there afraid,

and at some point in the meeting

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it hit me that the S&P 500 will

actually be buying more Berkshire

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Hathaway when Warren Buffett dies.

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A lot of people don't know that.

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And the, the reason for that is

the S&P is what's called free

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float adjusted market cap weighted.

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So they don't count his shares because

he's a controlling shareholder.

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When he dies, he's not gonna be a

con-controlling shareholder anymore.

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Those shares become free floating.

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So I just thought, "Who would want more

Berkshire Hathaway without Warren Buffett?

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Who would want more

Tesla without Elon Musk?"

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'Cause they don't count the

20% of Tesla that he owns.

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And, same thing with Meta.

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Who wants more Meta

without Mark Zuckerberg?

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And I just thought, "Who…

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why is the S&P on the opposite side of the

table of these super value-creating CEOs?"

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We should wanna be on the

same side of the table.

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So I came home from Omaha and launched…

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figured out how to get this ownership

data first, and nobody had it.

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Nobody had CapIQ, Bloomberg FactSet.

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None of these data

providers had the ownership.

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So I had to go manually through all,

every single proxy filing of the S&P

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500 constituents going back 20 years.

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So I'm talking about 20,000, more than

20,000 different proxy filings manually.

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And the, the proxy filings are quite

complicated in a sense that AI can't

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easily just pull out the numbers.

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At least it couldn't in 2024.

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So I'm currently the only one

with, with the data aggregated.

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The data's there in the proxies,

it's just n- nobody has it.

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So essentially, the Inside Ownership Index

is a, a passive index that tracks the

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performance of shares owned by insiders

versus the S&P is the reverse of that.

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It's, the S&P is what's called the

free float adjusted market cap.

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So it's counting all the shares

that's essentially not held by

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controlling shareholders, and I'm

counting the shares that are actually

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held by controlling shareholders.

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It's essentially, as my

T-shirt says, skin in the game.

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Says, it's the skin in the game index

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Ryan: Love that, Heron.

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And that's fantastic.

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I don't…

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Like you said, I don't think a

lot of people realize that about

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the S&P and being free float.

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And yet I'm, doing research here before

we jumped on, it is really interesting.

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Yeah when, Warren passes along, it's

inter- S&P is gonna be buying up

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Berkshire, but then at the same time,

it's do you really wanna own it?

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There's so much uncertainty.

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Yes, they have a succession plan in place,

but still a lot of uncertainty there.

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So it's interesting.

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Yes,

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Haren Bhakta: Right

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Ryan: will go along with the S&P and,

buy whatever they're adding to the

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index, but it raises questions, and

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Haren Bhakta: Yeah.

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What I find in my research is that a

brilliant CEO, I think about half the

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time they could find a good replacement.

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And one, one example of that is Apple.

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So Steve Jobs found a good

replacement in Tim Cook.

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But what I've…

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I can't find a single scenario where the

replacement could find a good replacement.

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And because by then the, the company

gets bureaucratic, and to rise up the

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ranks in an organization, it becomes

very political, very suit-wearing type

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person, and they're good at maybe sales

or talking, but they're not good at

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innovation, which is what re- what's

really requi- required in a technology

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company to take the company to the next

level, especially in a changing world.

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And we have an extremely fast-paced

changing world right now with AI, right?

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So you…

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We don't see Apple participating

at all in this next future.

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And, when the cellphone changes, and

it hasn't changed in, in, 20 years or

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almost 20 years now, s- but when the

world does change, y- I don't see Apple

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participating 'cause they're not investing

any capital into the future at all.

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And I…

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and it's probably the right decision

because they don't have the talent.

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Now, we have a Mark Zuckerberg

at Meta making huge bets.

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We have Amazon with Jeff Bezos.

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Jeff Bezos is not the CEO,

but he is the chairman.

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He is overseeing strategy.

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When you have people capable of making

these big bets you want them to.

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And in, in Apple's case,

you don't have that.

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My research finds that the world

going back, 1,000 years has always

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changed by the m- minority few.

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And to capture more of that by using an

inside ownership weighted index you get

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a more concentrated version of the S&P

and bigger bets on the biggest innovators

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Ryan: Yeah, I'm a firm

believer in that too, Harry.

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If you are committed to something,

conviction in it, right?

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Go all in versus…

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in some cases for investors,

maybe going all in on Bitcoin

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maybe is not the best thing to do.

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But there's a lot of things.

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If you are convicted, you have conviction

in a certain strategy, investment

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thesis or something go all in on it and

show that you're committed to it, and

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that, so it's interesting that you're

talking about on the corporate side.

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So it.

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Great start here.

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So why does inside ownership

and really shareholder alignment

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matter when it comes to investing?

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Haren Bhakta: Shareholder

alignment is huge.

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What you want is leaders of the

organization to think like shareholders

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and to be aligned with shareholders.

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Otherwise, you get scenarios where

insiders have perverse incentives, right?

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Where they are not aligned with

shareholders, they become agents for

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the corporation and, more concerned

with their own base salaries and/or

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board fees versus, versus actual-

actually creating shareholder value.

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One example I have that, of

that right now, playing out

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right now is eBay and GameStop.

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So Ryan Cohen, the CEO of GameStop, has

placed a bid, a takeover bid for eBay.

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Now, I'm not an eBay shareholder,

so I can't tell you whether

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it's a good deal for eBay.

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But what I can tell you is that

eBay's board cannot objectively decide

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whether it's good for shareholders.

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You know what I mean?

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Because they're not shareholders.

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They're getting $300,000 in board fees

every year, and the CEO is getting

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$30 million in compensation who's

never purchased any stock himself.

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So you have essentially people protecting

their own job deciding whether a deal

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is good for shareholders or not, and

it is just creating a skin in the game

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problem where you get these corporations

with no share ownership themselves

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deciding what's good for owners

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Ryan: Yeah, that's really interesting.

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And I like to think too, Heron, on

the investment side, very rarely…

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stock picking's really hard.

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I'm not very good at it, so

I focus on the professionals.

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I'll pay, points or whatever, how much it

is to have professionals manage the money.

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But when I'm doing that, one

of my criteria is I want these

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managers, portfolio managers,

to eat their own cooking or have

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their skin in the game, as you

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would say.

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I want their own skin in the game.

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I don't want to invest in a

portfolio manager who doesn't

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invest in their own strategy,

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Haren Bhakta: Exactly.

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Yeah.

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Yeah very exactly similar and my,

one of my favorite investors is

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named Nick Sleep out of the UK.

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He's very underrated.

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A lot of people don't know about him.

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He created enormous wealth for investors,

and he eventually shut down his fund

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because he made so much money and he

told his investors that, "Hey, you

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don't need to pay me fees anymore.

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Just buy these three stocks.

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That's what I'm gonna do."

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So he had this fabulous

run and he said, "Hey…"

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I think he shut down in 2014, and he

said, "Hey, just buy these three stocks

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'cause that's what I'm gonna own."

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He bought Costco, Amazon,

and Berkshire Hathaway.

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And he- his line is that the best

investors are not investors at all.

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They're entrepreneurs that

never sold, which is true.

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Now we l- look at the best investors.

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You got Jeff Bezos, Mark

Zuckerberg Warren Buffett.

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These aren't investors.

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Essentially, they're entrepreneurs

that never sold their stock.

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So what we should be doing is

outsourcing our investing to these

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greatest investors, and by doing that

an inside ownership w- index basically

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does that for you in a systematic way

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Ryan: Yeah, exactly.

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I, yeah, I think it's very important

to invest in people that, like you

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said, they have skin in the game too.

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You wanna invest

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Haren Bhakta: Yeah.

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Sa- Sam Hinkie, s- the old GM of 76ers

he had a line that the people are power

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law, and the best ones change everything.

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And the, and society has

always worked that way.

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The best people are power law, and

the best ones do change everything.

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Look at the last 2,000 years.

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We've…

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Society has moved by the f- the, the

small number of individuals have created

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enormous value or y- m- maybe more than

1,000 years ago is more about armies.

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But today, you can classify a

organization or corporation as a,

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a, as its own little army, right?

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And, it's always been the individual who

has taken, who people have rallied around

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that individual and created enormous value

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Ryan: Yeah, a- and speaking of

power law, I'm glad you brought that

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up, Erin, because I've done some

research, h- and it's clear power law

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is very evident in today's market.

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For not only for recent years with

the Mag Seven stocks, and even go

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back in time, power law, it's where

very few names, 10 names, drive the

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performance of the overall market.

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So same with people too

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Haren Bhakta: Absolutely.

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There was this s- study done by a

Arizona State University professor who

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looked at all US stocks over 100 years.

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So we're talking about a century of data,

looking at every single stock in America.

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What he discovered was 4% of all stocks

delivered all the wealth creation, while

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the other 96% matched US Treasury bills.

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So it's not even just a recent phenomenon.

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The stock market has always been a

small number of stocks carrying the

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entire performance of the indices.

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So it's always been power law driven.

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But what, where academia got it half

right is that the leaders of organizations

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have exhibit even bigger power laws.

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There's a small number of leaders

that create enormous wealth, and

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we can look at that today with

Elon Musk and Jensen and Jeff Bezos

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and Z- and Mark Zuckerberg, right?

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So these few exceptional leaders create

enormous value while most of society

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and m- most of these companies don't

deliver enormous shareholder wealth.

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And so by investing in these exceptional

leaders you could raise your performance.

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And I looked at every

hundred bagger I could find.

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A hundred bagger is a stock that

delivers 100 times your money.

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So you put in $10,000, it

turns into over a million.

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Between the years 2000 to 2025,

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I found about 21, and only two exceptions.

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Every single one of those 21 except for

two, Apple and FICO Isaac, had ownership

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above 5% at the start before it went on

that, that hundred bagger return journey.

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So Apple surprisingly

is kind of an asterisk.

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So Steve Jobs didn't own a huge part

of Apple despite being a founder, and

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is-- the reason for that is he got

kicked out of Apple and then came back.

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So he had sold out of Apple I, I believe

two times throughout his career, he

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had sold out of Apple and got back in.

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The f- the s- the last time is

because he was kicked out, so he,

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sold his whole entire stake of Apple.

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And so and the other exception

was FICO Isaac, but all the other

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ones had ownership above 5%,

and very often more than that.

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And there was no other

commonality I could find.

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They were all in diverse

different industries.

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It wasn't necessarily the CEO

that, that owned the stock.

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It wasn't necessarily a founder.

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Tractor Supply was one company that,

that achieved that hundred bagger

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return, and that was an old company.

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Didn't have a founder

but it had ownership.

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Monster Beverage, again, that

wasn't founder-led, but it was

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people with skin in the game.

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So it doesn't have to be

a founder, essentially.

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Warren Buffett is not the

technically the founder of Berkshire.

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Howard Schultz was not

the founder of Starbucks.

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Yeah.

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And, even surprisingly, Elon Musk is

technically not the founder of Tesla.

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Yeah, a lot of people don't know that.

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So he a- he acquired Tesla or made a

huge investment into Tesla early on.

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Yeah, he was early on, but he's

technically not the founder, although

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he's probably labeled the founder, just

like Warren Buffett is now labeled the

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founder of Berkshire, and rightfully

they, he created the value of modern

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day Berkshire, but technically speaking,

he's not the original idea or he

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didn't create the, the entity Berkshire

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Ryan: Yeah, that's interesting

because I didn't know that.

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I just assumed that Musk was a

founder, and same with Warren.

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So interesting there.

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Also, who would've thought if you

said, asked somebody 2,100 baggers

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over the past, 20 years or so when

you started this, who would've

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thought Tractor Supply would've

named Tractor Supply as one of them?

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Haren Bhakta: Yeah, yeah.

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Tractor Supply, Universal, w- a

company called Universal Insurance.

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Yeah, again, 21 of them.

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Netflix, Nvidia, Apple g-

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Ryan: I think people would've gone there.

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Haren Bhakta: Yeah.

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Ryan: Supply I don't think would've

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Haren Bhakta: O'Reilly's another

one, the auto parts store.

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O'Reilly's, another hundred bagger.

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Again, O'Reilly's wasn't founder led I

don't believe, but it was family operated.

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So what I find is that w- it takes an

owner/operator to have that extreme

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outlier type returns, and the reason

for that is it's a cultural thing.

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So if you d- have no ownership

on a board or at the executive

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level, you are judged quarterly.

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And when you're judged quarterly,

you're gonna think quarterly, and to

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have these extreme returns, you have

to do things that make your company

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look less profitable now in order

to achieve these enormous returns.

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So for example Walmart and Costco,

they purposely suppressed margins.

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They wanna offer, and Amazon is too,

they wanna offer low prices, right?

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They could raise prices and probably

increase profits over the next

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quarter or year, but that would

damage the long-term aspect of their

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business in, in providing low prices.

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So when you have no ownership

and you reward CEOs for

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quarterly performance, they get

incentivized to perform quarterly.

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But to create these enormous

returns you can't think quarterly.

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Jeff Bezos thought in decades, right?

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He was perfectly fine failing in

small projects that had maybe a

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high chance of failure, but if

successful, had these enormous runways.

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So one example, a couple examples

is he failed with the Fire Phone,

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but through, through trial and

error, they came up with AWS, right?

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Huge a world-class company now.

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Jeff Bezos created essentially

not just one world-class company,

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he created two, Amazon retail

store, or web store, and AWS.

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These individuals are able

to create enormous value.

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We should want to essentially ride

their coattails, and when they're

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gone not be invested in those

companies as much, or if at all.

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Ryan: And e- exactly like you said

too, they're thinking long-term.

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They're not just thinking, "Oh, we gotta

meet our objectives quarter to quarter."

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They're thinking long-term, just

like I keep, going back to if I'm

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going to invest in a portfolio

manager, three quar- three months?

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Yeah, that doesn't really do it for me.

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I want a portfolio manager that has been

very successful over 10 years, right?

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Haren Bhakta: Exactly.

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Exactly.

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Yeah.

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And so the, the other importance

of skin in the game is, like Jeff

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Bezos said, basically, if you

want to be successful, you have

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to be willing to be misunderstood.

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And if you're a CEO or board with

no ownership, they don't have

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the luxury to be misunderstood.

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They don't have the luxury of doing

things now that are unexplainable

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or, people or shareholders or Wall

Street doesn't understand now.

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So they don't have the luxury

of doing things where they

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can be proven right later.

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They have to essentially innovate

by consensus, and consensus

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and committees do not innovate

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Ryan: Yeah, that's a very good point.

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So during your research, when you looked

at all these 100 bag- baggers, the

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21 of them from, over the past, that

time period that you were looking at,

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was there a cutoff, like a percentage

when you're talking about ownership?

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Was it like 10% ownership, 20%?

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Haren Bhakta: Well, 5% was, 5% was

the cutoff that I looked at, and

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19 of those 21 had at least 5%, and

very often more Right at the start.

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So they didn't all finish

with that kind of ownership.

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So for example, NVIDIA now the…

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What you find is a lot of the founders

or owners do sell along the way, and

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it's not because that they're bearish.

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It's because that their 99% of their

net worth is often tied to this company,

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and they're going to bed thinking

about it, waking up thinking about it.

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So they're taking liquidity along the way.

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So rightfully so the…

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Yeah.

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So what-- Jeff Bezos has been selling

Amazon for 20 years, but that,

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that's not because he's bearish.

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He's, all his net worth is

tied up into the company.

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And which actually brings me

to my favorite analogy is that

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what I call a hired CEO, I call

I call a hired CEO a zoo animal.

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Now, a zoo animal gets

fed every day, whether it

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successfully hunts or not, right?

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A zoo animal or a hired CEO gets

their base salary, quarterly bonus

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and very often a golden parachute.

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I like to call a

owner/operator a wild lion.

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A wild lion is trained to survive.

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These CEOs have already proven

their ability to create value in the

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world, so they're trained to survive.

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And when they don't successfully

hunt, they feel the pain, and that's

361

:

what you're looking for in a CEO.

362

:

You want them to feel the pain of

failure, and you want their net

363

:

worth to be directly exposed to that.

364

:

And very often, these owner/operators

are taking the lowest salaries.

365

:

It's the hired CEOs that are taking

the large base salaries, right?

366

:

So they don't often feel that pain.

367

:

And innovation comes from feedback

loops, trial and error, and it's--

368

:

This is exactly why it's very hard

to innovate through committee.

369

:

You don't get those feedback

loops, and they don't feel the

370

:

pain of mistakes initially.

371

:

It's suppressed.

372

:

And yeah, the, the…

373

:

One of my favorite books is How

Innovation Works and by Matt Ridley.

374

:

He talks a lot about how innovation

really works, and it works it through

375

:

trial and error and not through

decentralized decision-making.

376

:

Or I'm sorry, not through

centralized decision-making.

377

:

It comes from des- decentralization, where

the people working on the problem have

378

:

actual decision-making power to to pivot.

379

:

And what you get in non-skin in the

game companies is centralization

380

:

of decision-making from the top.

381

:

And that's not how innovation works

382

:

Ryan: And he goes right

back to skin in the game.

383

:

And it's a care factor too.

384

:

Like you said, that, zoo lion, yeah,

they probably, they, the care factor

385

:

is not there as a hired CEO more.

386

:

Maybe they just have more of a

figurehead CEO versus that, lion, that

387

:

wild lion who's got that care factor.

388

:

They really care that they're gonna

eat, and they gotta go hunt, and

389

:

A very important part is caring,

390

:

Haren Bhakta: Exactly.

391

:

Yeah.

392

:

So I did, so I, you heard me talk

about the 21 100 baggers, which,

393

:

19 of them all had ownership.

394

:

I also studied the five largest

value destroyers of the S&P over

395

:

the last five years, and all

five had very low ownership.

396

:

So not only are we getting more

outlier returns from high ownership

397

:

companies, we're also getting the

biggest value destroyers of the S&P

398

:

having no or very low ownership.

399

:

So number one was PayPal, the biggest

value destroyer between:

400

:

The second biggest value

destroyer destroyer was Adobe.

401

:

Again, no ownership.

402

:

Haren Bhakta Inside Ownership Index:

Disney was number three.

403

:

Comcast I believe Nike was number

five or number six, I can't remember.

404

:

But the, the point is that every

single one had low ownership.

405

:

Nike, founded by Phil Knight,

world-class brand, right?

406

:

Down 70% over the last five years.

407

:

We're talking about a world-class

brand of Nike and the biggest bull

408

:

market in stock market history,

and yet the stock is down 70%.

409

:

This is because Phil Knight is

no longer part of the company.

410

:

It's remove from a company who made it

great and you removed what made it great

411

:

Ryan: Yeah.

412

:

That's interesting because,

with Nike you do think that…

413

:

nike's all over the place,

but it doesn't mean that it's

414

:

performing well or it's stock.

415

:

And

416

:

Haren Bhakta: Exactly.

417

:

Ryan: Knight is

418

:

Haren Bhakta: 70% down in the

biggest bull market in history.

419

:

Ryan: that care factor

420

:

Haren Bhakta: Exactly.

421

:

Yeah.

422

:

Someone going to bed thinking

about the company, waking up

423

:

thinking about the company.

424

:

And the co- it's not a fast-moving

thing when these founders retire.

425

:

It's that the culture slowly erodes

426

:

And they start thinking about the

wrong things, and that's what it is

427

:

Ryan: It's interesting.

428

:

So there is a high correlation or a

correlation between high ownership

429

:

companies and strong culture then

430

:

Haren Bhakta: Absolutely.

431

:

And, that actually brings me to

the, the title of your show, Zephyr.

432

:

We went back 20 years.

433

:

So the index itself has

been live for two years now.

434

:

The ETF that tracks the index only

launched about a month and a half ago.

435

:

But the index itself, and we've been

managing portfolios according to

436

:

the index for almost two years now.

437

:

But what we looked at is how it's

performed in volatility periods.

438

:

So we went back 20 years.

439

:

What we found is it is more concentrated,

so it, it does have more volatility.

440

:

However, in 2008 and 2020, the

two global catastrophic events

441

:

we've had over the last 20 years.

442

:

So these were not just volatility

periods like:

443

:

These were actual global

catastrophic events.

444

:

And S&P 500 went down more than these

high ownership companies collectively.

445

:

So while we could use academic risk models

to say, one is more volatile than the

446

:

other, but when you needed a safety the

most in these two global catastrophic

447

:

events, what we found was that the S&P

fared worse And that's because high

448

:

ownership companies are better run.

449

:

They have better management,

they have better balance

450

:

sheets, they are less levered.

451

:

They also have access to

capital when nobody else does.

452

:

So they have access to more capital

when the world is going through its

453

:

l-liquidity crunch, like in 2008.

454

:

We could, again, we could use

volatility as a measure, but what I

455

:

find is the Warren Buffett principle

is, what gives you a, a chance of

456

:

losing actual capital or permanent

capital, permanent loss of capital

457

:

versus just gyrations in the market.

458

:

And investing in these high

ownership companies I, you, I

459

:

believe you, you have less chance

of losing permanent loss of capital.

460

:

And the best example I have

is Silicon Valley Bank.

461

:

Silicon Valley Bank was in the S&P 500,

in:

462

:

you had exposure to Silicon Valley Bank.

463

:

And if you look at the proxy filing,

which I did in:

464

:

that it was represented by an asterisk.

465

:

So insiders own nothing.

466

:

So what you get is a company that

will leverage up the company to hit

467

:

quarterly bonuses without thinking

about the exposure of failure.

468

:

And when you have a true owner,

they're thinking about failure or

469

:

catastrophic loss first, and then

optimi- optimizing performance secondary.

470

:

But, when you have a company like Silicon

Valley Bank with no owners, they thought,

471

:

"Let's hit it out of the park first,"

and, not worrying about surviving first

472

:

Ryan: Yeah, that's fantastic.

473

:

I love that you brought up about

just losing money, and one of

474

:

my favorite quotes from Warren

is, I believe, r- his rules.

475

:

Number one, don't lose

476

:

Haren Bhakta: Don't lose my number two.

477

:

Don't forget rule number one.

478

:

Exactly.

479

:

Ryan: that.

480

:

Find…

481

:

You brought up volatility.

482

:

often find in investing we, we focus

on standard deviation and volatility.

483

:

In recent years, it's shifted now in terms

of risk to just capital preservation.

484

:

To me, that's the real

risk, Erin, is losing money,

485

:

Haren Bhakta: Exactly

486

:

Ryan: the upside volatility you want,

and it goes back to what Warren was

487

:

saying, what you were just saying.

488

:

Losing value, losing money is really

the risk that you want to mitigate,

489

:

Haren Bhakta: Exactly.

490

:

As Nassim Taleb says, "Never cross a

river that's on average four feet deep."

491

:

So in order to achieve these

average returns, which, can be

492

:

high, you must first survive.

493

:

So that part of the, the S&P that was

in Silicon Valley Bank, that, that part

494

:

of the money will never earn the average

ra- return because it went to zero.

495

:

So what you want is to avoid losses.

496

:

And like I mentioned the S&P's

biggest value destroyers were these no

497

:

ownership companies, and the biggest

outliers were high ownership companies.

498

:

And that's because these, when you have

leaders that own meaningful stakes,

499

:

they do treat the company better

500

:

Ryan: Yeah.

501

:

And it goes back to while you're

talking it brings me back to trust too.

502

:

You talked about these high ownership

companies, they're able to access capital

503

:

markets even when capital markets are dry

504

:

Haren Bhakta: Exactly

505

:

Ryan: lending money.

506

:

it trust?

507

:

This industry's built huge on trust.

508

:

If there wasn't trust in

wealth management, there

509

:

wouldn't be wealth management.

510

:

do you think that's wh- even though you

have Elon Musk and these big names that

511

:

are very eccentric, they're out there.

512

:

Is it because the capital markets

trust these, the owners and they're

513

:

Haren Bhakta: Yeah.

514

:

Ryan: We trust them, let them go"?

515

:

Haren Bhakta: they're

proven successful leader.

516

:

They're proven to be able to

create value in this world, right?

517

:

So yeah, they're more

highly trusted, right?

518

:

W- you would rather give capital to

Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, Warren Buffett

519

:

than some guy you never heard of, right?

520

:

Can you really name the CEO of Micron?

521

:

Yeah, Micron is a trillion-dollar

company today, but who is the CEO?

522

:

I have no idea.

523

:

I don't think most people do.

524

:

Right now, ExxonMobil is a

top 10 company in the S&P 500.

525

:

Can you name the CEO?

526

:

I have no idea who that is, right?

527

:

In the Inside Ownership Index, you can

name every CEO in the top 10 of the index.

528

:

But, m- you get these people who have

really no ownership, no significant

529

:

past performance controlling these

enormous trillion-dollar companies who

530

:

are essentially people we don't know.

531

:

So it, you know-

532

:

Ryan: That, that's a really good point.

533

:

So let's talk to you.

534

:

As a shareholder, you brought it

up, you get the chance to vote

535

:

on corporate, whether it's CEO

or, whatever through ownership.

536

:

But now you have these huge asset

managers, BlackRock, Vanguard, these

537

:

passive market cap-weighted index funds

that control the voting through proxies.

538

:

Is that gonna be an issue there

when you have these huge passive

539

:

market cap-weighted index funds?

540

:

Is that a hidden problem?

541

:

Haren Bhakta: Yes, absolutely.

542

:

I see that as a huge systemic

skin in the game problem.

543

:

You have more and more of these

trillion-dollar companies or hundred

544

:

billion dollar companies controlled by

a board and executives that maybe own no

545

:

shares or purchase no shares themselves.

546

:

So what you get is

perverse incentives, right?

547

:

You get non-owners deciding what's

good for owners, and they have

548

:

these enormous balance sheets

to fund their own lifestyle.

549

:

And, it, it's a huge problem.

550

:

So I think I mentioned this

earlier with Ryan Cohen and eBay.

551

:

I think that's a, a big problem in

that in the past, if management was

552

:

terrible or mediocre, they could be voted

out, and that's not the case anymore.

553

:

So Warren Buffett actually talked

a lot about this, the biggest value

554

:

destroyers in Warren Buffett's eyes.

555

:

He said this in 1997, that the biggest

value destroyers are mediocre CEOs because

556

:

a terrible CEO could be will be changed,

but a mediocre CEO will stay in a very

557

:

long time and just destroy value over,

over the course of maybe a decade or two.

558

:

Today

559

:

Terrible CEOs can be locked

in because there's no longer

560

:

a mechanism to remove them.

561

:

Like I said, in the past, we could vote o-

vote out terrible management and replace

562

:

m- terrible management with a CEO that

maybe shareholders think more highly of.

563

:

But today, with BlackRock, Vanguard,

and State Street controlling all of

564

:

corporate America, who automatically

essentially vote for incumbents, there's

565

:

no longer a mechanism to remove them.

566

:

And pretty soon, as they continue to

take market share we're gonna see…

567

:

right now they're already the largest

shareholder in America, but pretty soon

568

:

they're gonna be larger than all other

shareholders combined, and that's a

569

:

scary thought where if they own more

than all other shareholders combined,

570

:

this will entrench management, and

they will control, even being terrible,

571

:

they will control that company with

no mechanism to have them removed.

572

:

That's a scary thought

573

:

Ryan: And do you even feel some

of these large asset managers

574

:

even complete the proxy votes?

575

:

Just are gonna

576

:

shove

577

:

Haren Bhakta: outsource it

to ISS and, things like that.

578

:

So it's like they're automatically

essentially voting for incumbents.

579

:

It's very hard for them to

get them to vote for a change.

580

:

And w- if we, if you get a terrible

board, they're essentially locked in,

581

:

and they're g- and that's becoming

more and more the case where these

582

:

terrible boards are locked in with

no mechanism to have them removed.

583

:

In the past, we would vote them out.

584

:

Now no one's vote counts anymore except

for BlackRock, Vanguard, and State

585

:

Street and they're not really voting

586

:

Ryan: It's one of those risks

like you-- that hidden, right?

587

:

It's a hidden r- people don't think about,

and as they just keep getting bigger and

588

:

bigger, reduces our power as shareholder

589

:

Haren Bhakta: absolutely, yeah.

590

:

And you get these forced buyers,

so they're blindly throwing money

591

:

at these companies, at these CEOs

that may not deserve it simply

592

:

because of their market cap size.

593

:

But the insiders own nothing, and blindly

the S&P just throws money at them.

594

:

And I believe we created

a solution for that.

595

:

We should be indexing to the leaders of

the organization and how much they own

596

:

versus the, the pure size of the company

597

:

Ryan: Very good point.

598

:

Very good point.

599

:

So lastly, Aaron, fantastic conversation.

600

:

I love it.

601

:

A lot of information here and facts

that information I didn't know about.

602

:

Lastly, for all the financial advisors

out there listening, how can they use this

603

:

strategy in their clients' portfolios?

604

:

You own the index.

605

:

How can they implement this

strategy within a portfolio?

606

:

Haren Bhakta: Yeah.

607

:

We have the ETF.

608

:

ETF's ticker symbol is O-W-N, OWN.

609

:

Ryan: Love

610

:

Haren Bhakta: easy to remember.

611

:

Ryan: that one,

612

:

Haren Bhakta: Yeah.

613

:

Yeah.

614

:

Ryan: we can remember that one.

615

:

Haren Bhakta: Yeah.

616

:

Yeah.

617

:

So what I find is for, oh, for one,

it has a 49 basis points, so just

618

:

under half a percent expense ratio,

and it's well-deserved because,

619

:

again we're capturing more exposure

to the most innovative companies.

620

:

And what I find advisors using is, for

one they could reduce exposure to the

621

:

stock market, I believe, by being…

622

:

having a more concentrated portfolio

of stocks that are more innovative

623

:

and, potentially have more upside.

624

:

So advisors could, by using OWN, they

could diversify the client portfolios

625

:

in other asset classes more as the

stock market is at all-time highs,

626

:

we should be looking to participate.

627

:

You have to participate in

the stock market, for one.

628

:

You can't time yourself out of it.

629

:

But what you can do is reduce exposure

to the stock market at all-time highs

630

:

or near all-time highs and diversify

in other alternatives or fixed income.

631

:

And as the market gets cheaper, you

could allocate more and more to the

632

:

market at the at cheaper prices.

633

:

But what I find advisors doing is

using the OWN index to get more

634

:

of what's working or more of the

innovative companies while reducing

635

:

exposure to the stock market

636

:

Ryan: Love it.

637

:

Perfect.

638

:

Perfect information.

639

:

So those advisors, our audience,

if they want more information about

640

:

Inside Ownership Index and the ETF,

where can they get that information?

641

:

Haren Bhakta: Yeah, I have an even

easier website, insideownership.com.

642

:

Very easy to find, insideownership.com.

643

:

M- they could also look me up on

LinkedIn and other social media.

644

:

I'm very easy to find here in BHACTA.

645

:

Website also they could email me

through the website insideownership.com.

646

:

So very, yeah, very easy to find.

647

:

Happy to talk to anyone get,

go deeper into the methodology

648

:

with anyone who's interested

649

:

Ryan: I love it, Aaron.

650

:

Fantastic conversation.

651

:

I really enjoyed it.

652

:

Like I said, I learned a lot.

653

:

You threw a lot of great information,

supporting data, supporting

654

:

information, which I really enjoy.

655

:

I will include those links to

the website in the show notes.

656

:

Really interesting stuff,

and I like it simple.

657

:

you for

658

:

Haren Bhakta: Awesome.

659

:

Ryan: it simple for me, Aaron.

660

:

Haren Bhakta: Yeah

661

:

Ryan: it.

662

:

It's been an honor.

663

:

Really enjoyed it.

664

:

So thank you for coming on.

665

:

thank you so much for listening to this

episode of Adjusted for Risk podcast.

666

:

You can watch all of our other episodes

on YouTube and all the other platforms

667

:

that you listen to your favorite podcasts.

668

:

Please be sure to like and

subscribe to those channels and

669

:

give us a follow on LinkedIn.

670

:

Thank you very much and have

a great rest of your week

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