Trump Boat Bombings: How U.S. Strikes Are Shaping the War on Drugs in Latin America
Episode 37 • 25th October 2025 • Beneath the Cypress and Star • BlueRidge Pundit
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Summary

The war on drugs in Latin America took a lethal maritime turn in 2025. This October 25 episode examines U.S. strikes on suspected trafficking boats, the administration’s deterrence argument, and unresolved questions about evidence, authority, and human consequences. The broader context appears in Global Instability and international security pressures. A claim that a vessel carried drugs must be distinguished from publicly established facts about its passengers and cargo.

Key Takeaway

  • U.S. strikes and the war on drugs raise questions about the boundary between law enforcement and armed conflict.
  • Suspicion of trafficking does not establish every passenger’s identity, conduct, or legal status.
  • Destroyed vessels and announced casualties do not by themselves demonstrate reduced trafficking or fewer overdose deaths.
  • Evaluating counter-narcotics policy requires attention to evidence, accountability, regional cooperation, and civilian safety.

From Drug Interdiction to Lethal Strikes

Traditional drug interdiction in Latin America can involve monitoring routes, stopping vessels, seizing contraband, and investigating criminal networks. Destroying a suspected vessel changes that process: it can prevent questioning survivors or independent examination of the cargo. The analytical issue is what evidence supports the target selection, which authority is being used, and why lethal force was chosen.

On October 22, 2025, the Associated Press reported another strike in the eastern Pacific, with three deaths announced by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Its reporting described an expanding campaign and the administration’s position that it was engaged in an armed conflict with drug organizations. That characterization was an administration claim, not an uncontested legal determination.

Evidence and the Limits of Deterrence Claims

A policy assessment should ask whether trafficking volumes, market availability, violence, and public health outcomes actually change. It should also consider alternative explanations for any change. Counting strikes cannot answer those questions, and a dramatic video does not identify everyone aboard or establish the contents of a destroyed boat.

In its October 16 fact-check, PolitiFact found no evidentiary basis for Trump’s claim that each destroyed boat saved 25,000 American lives. Its analysis noted that even verified drug seizures cannot be directly translated into a specific number of prevented deaths. Claims of success therefore need a stated method and independently reviewable evidence.

Legal Questions and Regional Accountability

In a September 10, 2025 communication, United Nations human rights experts raised concerns about the September 2 strike and requested information from the United States. They questioned compliance with the right to life and other international obligations. Their communication records expert concerns and allegations requiring investigation; it is not a court judgment determining every disputed fact.

For Latin America’s security, the questions extend beyond any one boat: how governments cooperate, how communities are protected, and who reviews the use of force. Our discussion of elite theory and democratic accountability examines concentrated decision-making, while the discussion of National Guard deployment and presidential authority addresses the distinct domestic debate. Together, these episodes ask what meaningful oversight looks like when executive officials claim exceptional powers.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q1: What changed in the war on drugs in Latin America?

This episode focuses on the 2025 shift toward U.S. military strikes on suspected trafficking vessels and the resulting debate over evidence, deterrence, and legal authority.

Q2: How do lethal strikes differ from interdiction?

Interdiction can stop a shipment while preserving opportunities for seizure, arrest, and investigation. A lethal strike introduces different consequences and demands a separate assessment of its justification.

Q3: Were all people aboard proven to be traffickers?

The notes do not treat official allegations as proof about every individual. Publicly available evidence, identification procedures, and independent investigation remain essential to evaluating specific incidents.

Q4: Do destroyed boats prove that overdose deaths were prevented?

No. Such a conclusion requires evidence about cargo, replacement supply, drug markets, and public health outcomes. A vessel count cannot establish a defensible lives-saved estimate.

Q5: What would meaningful accountability require?

It would include disclosure of the asserted authority and targeting standards, credible investigation of deaths, review of disputed claims, and assessment of regional consequences and alternatives.

Related Episodes

Sources & Further Reading

Transcripts

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Welcome to The Deep Dive. We're the place you come to when you want to get past the headlines

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and really understand the complex stuff, the source material, the reports, the memos, all of it.

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We break it down so you're truly informed. And today, we're really digging into something that's

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caused a huge amount of international concern. We're talking about the U.S. military strikes.

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These are air strikes, kinetic attacks, targeting alleged drug smuggling vessels.

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This started back in September 2025, mainly in the Caribbean, but it's spread to the Pacific too.

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Yeah, let's just jump right in because the numbers alone are pretty stark. We're looking at what?

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As of late October 2025, at least 43 people confirmed killed across 10 incidents and only two

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survivors captured. That's right. And it's not just the number. It's the precedent. I mean,

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sources are clear. This is the first time the U.S. is publicly acknowledged carrying out air strikes

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in Central or South America since, well, since the Panama invasion in 1989. That's a big deal.

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Very big deal. The U.S. is using lethal military force and international waters. They're labeling

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the targets NARCO terrorists. But, you know, local reports often painted different pictures saying

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these are poor fishermen, people from coastal villages. It's complex. And the administration's line

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is very direct, very aggressive. They say this is about stopping drugs, specifically fentanyl.

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They're targeting groups, they name like Venezuela's Trende Aragua, Colombia's ELN,

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calling them NARCO terrorists. Exactly. The claim is they have to hit these boats to stop the flow.

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So our mission today for you listening is to really scrutinize those claims against what the

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sources actually say. We need to focus on what seems to be the core issue here, the almost total

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lack of public evidence for these claims. We also need to unpack the legal justification the

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administration has tried to build. Because international legal experts are calling these strikes

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extrajudicial killings? That's incredibly serious language. Absolutely. And ultimately we have to ask

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if it's not really about the drugs given the lack of evidence and the legal problems,

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what is the real motive here? The sources strongly suggested something else entirely.

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Okay, let's start with the timeline, the facts on the water. This wasn't just one random incident,

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was it? It escalated fast. No, not random at all. It kicked off September 1st,

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announced the next day that very first strike killed 11 people. Then by late October, boom,

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it expands way out into the Eastern Pacific off Colombia and Ecuador. And this wasn't just

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Coast Guard cutters. There was a significant military buildup beforehand, right? Mid-August.

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Yeah, sources confirmed Navy warships, personnel moving into place, starting mid-August.

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Yeah. And then the big one, the deployment of the USS Gerald Ford carrier strike group.

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Wow, a carrier strike group. Yeah, I mean, just so you understand the scale,

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that's thousands of sailors and aviators, maybe 6,000 service members, plus all the aircraft,

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destroyers, cruisers. It's massive power projection. It's isn't your typical drug

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interdiction. Well, it feels like something else. It is something else. And the language

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matched it. The administration wasn't just talking about criminals anymore. They were calling

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them terrorists. And the Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, he was pretty blunt about it.

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Oh, absolutely. He said, quote, instead of interdicking it on the president's orders,

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we blew it up. And it will happen again. We blew it up. That confirms it right there.

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It's a shift from law enforcement stopping and seizing to outright military destruction,

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killing. And here's the absolute crux of the problem, the thing that comes up in every critical

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analysis, the evidence gap. It's huge. The administration is asking everyone, including you,

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to accept this massive military operation, these killings based on what? Based on their word.

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They haven't released any verifiable public evidence. None. No proof the boats belong to the ELN,

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or Trende Aragua. No proof they were carrying drugs. But the president kept saying they were

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loaded with fentanyl. He even put videos online. Right. He did share those aerial strike videos. Yeah.

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But the fact checkers and analysts look closely. The videos show the explosions. Yes. They do not show

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bags of drugs, you know, floating around afterwards. Which you'd expect. Right.

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If a boat loaded with fentanyl gets blown up, you'd think so. You'd expect debris packages

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something. The visual evidence just doesn't back up the loaded claim. And the whole fentanyl

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focus itself seems questionable based on what we know about drug rights. It really does. I mean,

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experts are pretty clear. Most fentanyl getting into the US comes overland through Mexico.

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And it's largely smuggled by US citizens, actually. Not by sea from Venezuela.

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And Venezuela plays a really minor role in the drug flow reaching the US negligible,

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some experts say, especially compared to Mexico or Colombia. So focusing lethal military force

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there, specifically citing fentanyl. It just doesn't track with the intelligence picture. It

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immediately makes you wonder, doesn't it? Why Venezuela? A known adversary and not Mexico,

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the main source. What's the real target here? Exactly. And then look at the details of that first

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boat they hit, the San Juan de Unari. The description itself raises more questions. What was the

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description? Okay. So it was described as a flipper type boat. That's a low profile design.

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Semi submersible meant to dodge radar, about 12 meters, maybe 39 feet long, four big 200 horsepower

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engines. Okay. Maybe that fits a smuggler profile. But there's always a butt. The butt is the number

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of people on board 11 on a boat that small. That does seem like a lot. Yeah. Experts like Greg

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Grandin and David smile jumped on that immediately. They asked, why would a serious drug smuggling

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operation cram 11 people onto a small boat? Because usually spaces for the cargo, right? Maximize

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the profit. Precisely. Every inch, every pound of capacity is for the drugs. You keep the crew

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minimal. 11 people suggests, well, it suggests something else was going on. Maybe they weren't all

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essential crew. Maybe there were passengers. It just muddies the picture and contradicts the idea

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of a lean professional cartel operation. And then there's that really critical piece of intel

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that leaked out. Ah, yeah. The anonymous national security sources. What did they say about that

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first boat? The one where 11 people died. They acknowledged that the boat appeared to be turning

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back towards Venezuela when it was hit. Turning back. So potentially heading away from international

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waters or any perceived US target. Exactly. If it's turning back, it's arguably no longer an

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imminent threat that requires immediate lethal force. It might be fleeing heading home.

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Which means it should have been maybe tracked intercepted by law enforcement later, not blown

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up by the military. That's the implication. If that intelligence is accurate, it completely

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undermines the administration's justification for that first kinetic strike. It suggests the

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decision to use lethal force was made even when the supposed threat was diminishing or heading away.

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Okay. So the facts on the water are shaky. The evidence is missing. The intel is contradictory.

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This leads us straight into the legal justification or maybe the lack thereof. How did the

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administration try to frame this legally? Well, this is where they made a really significant and

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frankly, alarming move. They essentially tried to rewrite the legal rulebook for this specific

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situation. Oh, so on October 1st, they formally notified Congress and get this. They stated the US

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was now engaged in a non-international armed conflict. A non-international armed conflict.

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Okay. What does that mean in practical terms? It means they're invoking the laws of war,

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but not against another country against two then against unlawful combatants. And who do they

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designate is these unlawful combatants? The drug cartels. Wait, so they're saying drug traffickers

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are equivalent to enemy soldiers in a war? That's precisely the implication. By calling it an

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armed conflict and labeling them unlawful combatants, they're trying to take this completely

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outside the realm of criminal law, which means no need for warrants, arrests, trials do process.

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That's the goal. In an armed conflict under the administration's interpretation here,

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you can lawfully target and kill enemy fighters, even if they aren't posing an immediate direct

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threat at that exact moment. You don't need to try and arrest them first. Just neutralize them,

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like in a war zone. Exactly. It's a fundamental shift from treating drug trafficking as a crime to

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treating it as an act of war. And the traffickers is enemy combatants you can kill on site. What was

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a reaction from international legal experts? Immediate and overwhelmingly negative. Experts talking

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to major outlets like the BBC, UN Human Rights Specialists, they condemned it. They said these

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strikes violate basic international maritime law, violate human rights law. What terms did they use?

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They used terms like extrajudicial executions. Some called it murder. Because these individuals

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weren't soldiers in recognized conflict, and they were killed without any legal process.

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Any specific names stand out? Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell, who's a very respected voice on

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international law, was quoted saying the strike violated fundamental principles of international law.

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It wasn't seen as a gray area. It was seen as a clear violation by many in the field.

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So the administration basically created its own legal justification to allow these killings.

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They tried to create a legal framework where these actions could be seen as lawful

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by redefining the situation as war. But the international consensus seems to be that the

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redefinition itself isn't valid under existing law. What legal authority did they even cite initially?

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Was it clear? Not at first, no. It was quite vague. Eventually, they pointed to the president's

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inherent powers as commander-in-chief under Article 2 of the Constitution.

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Okay, the standard fallback. Right. But they also kept using that term,

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narco-terrists. And that felt very deliberate. Why? What's the significance of narco-terrists?

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It sounds like they were trying to suddenly link these actions to the 2001 authorization

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for use of military force, the AUMF. The post-911 authorization, how does that apply to drug cartels?

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Well, legally, it almost certainly doesn't. The AUMF was specifically about the groups involved

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in the 911 attacks. Applying it to drug cartels is a huge stretch, legally speaking.

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But using the terrorist language seems like an attempt to borrow some of that AUMF's expansive

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wartime authority. Critics must have picked up on that. Oh, absolutely. Former government lawyers,

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legal scholars called it lawless, dangerous, reckless, because it completely blurs that

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critical line between crime, which is handled by law enforcement and courts and war,

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which involves the military under very different rules. In this legal unease, it wasn't just

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outside experts, right? There were issues inside the administration. Definitely. Sources indicate

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that lawyers within the Pentagon itself raised serious flags. They were worried about the legal

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jeopardy for the military personnel actually carrying out these strikes. Could they face charges

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internationally? That's significant pushback from within the military's own legal counsel.

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It is. And it might explain, or at least contribute to, a pretty dramatic event, the sudden

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resignation of Admiral Halsey. The head of US Southern Command, the command actually running

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these operations. Exactly. Southcom. His abrupt departure was widely rumored, according to sources,

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to be directly related to disagreements over the legality of these strikes. An admiral quitting

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over policy like this, it suggests the internal conflict over the legal basis was really

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intense right up to the highest levels of command. So you have internal descent, international condemnation.

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But the administration pushed ahead. Did they seek approval from Congress like under the war

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powers resolution? I mean, they're calling it a conflict. No, they explicitly avoided that.

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The president himself basically said they weren't going to ask Congress for a declaration of war.

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What was his quote? Something quite direct. Very direct. He said, I don't think we're going to

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necessarily ask for a declaration of war. I think we're just going to kill people that are bringing

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drugs into our country. Wow. Just kill people bypassing Congress entirely.

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And when Democrats in the Senate tried to push back, the introduced a war powers resolution

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to try and limit the president's ability to keep doing this without congressional approval.

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How did that vote go? It failed. Nearly 51 to 48, which really shows you the partisan divide on this.

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You really have the Senate wanted to assert congressional authority, but just over half sided with

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the executive branch's claim of authority. And was Congress even kept in the loop?

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Was oversight happening? Apparently not sufficiently. Senator Mark Warner,

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who's a senior member of the intelligence committee, stated publicly he was not briefed

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before the first strike happened. Not briefed the intel committee. That's extraordinary.

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It suggests a deliberate effort to avoid scrutiny, even the legally required oversight mechanisms

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before launching these lethal operations. Okay, so if the drug rationale is weak,

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the evidence is missing and the legal basis is highly contested even internally.

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It forces the question, what is the real motive here? Why take all this heat?

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And this is where the sources really start pointing away from counter-arcotics

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and towards geopolitics and frankly domestic political calculations.

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Oh, so? By mid-October independent analysts, even some Venezuelan opposition figures talking

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to the media were saying the US objective had clearly shifted. It wasn't primarily about drugs

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anymore. It was about regime change in Venezuela, targeting President Nicholas Maduro.

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That's a huge shift in stated goals. It is. And you saw reactions reflecting that.

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Maduro himself accused the US of plotting regime change, warning his people to prepare to fight

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invaders. And on the other side, you had Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Karina Machado

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actually quoted, dedicating her Nobel Peace Prize to the US president. That directly links

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the strikes to the political goal of ousting Maduro. And it placed straight into that very vocal,

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very influential anti-Maduro constituency, especially in South Florida.

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So connecting the dots between the action and a desired political outcome in Venezuela?

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Exactly. And sources reveal this wasn't a universally agreed upon strategy within the administration

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either. There was apparently a real internal fight between who? What were the factions?

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Broadly, you had one camp reportedly led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio

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pushing for maximum pressure, hardline policies, including supporting regime change.

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Then there was another group favoring maybe more diplomacy or less direct military action.

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And who tipped the balance towards these kinetic strikes?

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The sources point strongly towards Steven Miller, the deputy chief of staff. And his reported

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reasoning is really illuminating. Why did he support the strikes? Was it about Venezuela for him?

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Apparently not primarily now. A source was quoted saying Miller sided with the Rubio camp,

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not because of regime change, but because Venezuela offered an outlet for the belief that the

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president can just kill these guys. Kill these guys. Meaning alleged criminals, drug smugglers.

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It suggests Miller saw this less as foreign policy towards Venezuela and more as an opportunity

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to expand presidential power specifically. The power to use the military unilaterally against

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perceived threats and to militarize domestic issues like the war on drugs or immigration.

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So setting a precedent, the president can order killings like this.

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That seems to be a key part of the motivation, according to these sources.

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It fits a pattern too. Remember those earlier reports about the president asking the advisors

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if they could just conduct military strikes inside Mexico to take out drug labs.

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Right, I remember that. So this wasn't totally out of the blue.

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No, it suggests a long-held desire to use military force directly against cartels,

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kind of bypassing international law and sovereignty concerns.

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Venezuela just became the place where they decided to actually do it.

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And the choice of targets reinforces this, doesn't it?

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Focusing on Venezuela over, say, Colombia.

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Absolutely. Colombia is by far the world's largest cocaine producer.

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Its drugs heavily impact the US. Venezuela produces, as sources state,

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negligible amounts of cocaine comparatively. So if your primary goal is stopping the flow of drugs,

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you'd focus on Colombia or Mexico, not Venezuela.

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Right. Focusing the military firepower on Venezuela strongly suggests the goal is putting pressure

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on the Maduro regime, not efficiently stopping narcotics.

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And look at the diplomatic fallout with Colombia itself.

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Huge fallout. Colombia and President Gustavo Petro,

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remember, Colombia is supposed to be a key US ally in the drug war.

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He flat out accused the US of murder.

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He named one victim, Alejandro Carrenza, said he was just a lifelong fisherman.

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How did the US administration respond to that accusation from an ally?

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Not well. The President attacked Petro personally, called him an illegal drug dealer,

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threatened to cut off USA to Colombia and post tariffs.

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Wow. So doubling down on the policy even at the cost of a critical relationship.

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Exactly. It shows the priority. Maintaining this aggressive military posture,

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even if it alienates the very country most crucial to actual counter-narcotics efforts,

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was deemed more important. The geopolitical objective, whether it's

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pressuring Maduro or expanding presidential power,

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clearly trumped the stated drug fighting objective.

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Which brings us back inevitably to the people caught in the middle of this, the human cost.

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Forty-three people killed. That number needs repeating.

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And reports from local media in Venezuela, Colombia, Trinidad, they often identified the victims

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not as Carquel King pins, but as fishermen, people from poor coastal towns like San Juan de Unar.

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We heard about bodies washing ashore in Trinidad.

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Yeah, two unidentified bodies washed ashore there.

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Families in Trinidad, families in Colombia, they came forward, accusing the US of killing poor people,

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saying there was no due process, no warning, just lethal force.

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It paints a picture far removed from a targeted strike against high-level

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narco terrorists. It really does. And then there's the incredibly revealing incident

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involving the survivors. The two men captured after that alleged narco

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submarine was hit on October 16th.

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Exactly. This was a previously unannounced strike that came to light.

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Two guys survived a Colombian and an Ecuadorian, and they were captured by the US.

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Now, if the administration really believed its own legal argument,

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that these guys were unlawful combatants captured during an armed conflict.

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This was their golden opportunity, right? They could have put their legal theory to the test,

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detain them, maybe try them in military commissions or even federal court,

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establish that precedent they seemed to want.

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But they didn't do that.

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No, they did the opposite. They very quickly and quietly repatriated them.

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Sent the Colombian back to Colombia, the Ecuadorian back to Ecuador.

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What was the official reason?

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Just vague language about it being a very standard way of handling something like this,

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which is just completely at odds with having labeled them enemy combatants in a war

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just days before.

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Why would they do that? Why give up the chance to prove their legal case?

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The interpretation from legal analysts is pretty clear.

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They likely did it to avoid a legal challenge.

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They knew if they tried to prosecute these men under the unlawful combatant theory

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in any real court military or civilian, the whole legal basis for the entire campaign

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could collapse under scrutiny.

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So better to get rid of the evidence, essentially, the living evidence.

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It looks that way. Repatriate the survivors quickly,

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avoid the courtroom, avoid a potentially devastating legal ruling that could declare

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the whole operation illegal. Keep the legal theory untested, asserted politically,

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but never validated judicially.

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And didn't things get even more awkward with the Ecuadorian survivor?

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Oh, yeah. This really undercut the US position.

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He gets sent back to Ecuador and what happens?

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Ecuadorian officials look into his case and promptly release him.

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Release him? Why?

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Because according to Ecuadorian officials, they found no evidence he committed a crime in Ecuador.

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So the US nearly kills him in international waters, calls him an unlawful combatant,

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sends him home, and his uncountry says there's no evidence he did anything wrong there.

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Precisely. It makes the initial US justification for the lethal strike

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look incredibly thin, if not entirely baseless, at least in that specific case.

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It just highlights the preference for military action over investigation,

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interdiction, and prosecution.

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Okay, so let's try and synthesize all this.

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What does it all add up to when you put the pieces together?

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Well, what emerges from the sources is a picture where the administration

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seems to be using counter narcotics as a pretext.

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The claims are disputed, the evidence is missing or non-existent,

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the intel even contradicts the narrative sometimes.

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And they're using this pretext to justify a military campaign

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that international law experts widely condemn as illegal, as extrajudicial killing.

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Right. And the real drivers seem to be twofold.

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First, a politically motivated desire to exert pressure on the Maduro regime in Venezuela,

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possibly aiming for regime change.

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And second, maybe even more fundamentally an internal push associated with figures like

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Stephen Miller to expand executive military power to establish the principle that the president

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can order the military to kill alleged criminals without trial under this new narcoterrest

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or unlawful combatant framework.

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And this framework, this legal theory, it's not just about Venezuela anymore, is it?

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Not at all. And this is where it gets really concerning looking forward.

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By declaring cartels unlawful combatants, they've essentially created an open-ended

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justification for military action.

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Which explains the expansion to the Pacific.

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Off-Columbia, Ecuador, Peru.

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Exactly. That swift expansion shows this isn't geographically limited,

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it's a legal doctrine they believe they can apply anywhere they designate these groups as operating.

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It creates a permanent roving authority for lethal strikes.

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And the president himself has hinted at what's next.

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Yeah, he told reporters quite explicitly, the land is going to be next.

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He suggested he might go back to Congress later to explain strikes on land,

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but he insisted he already has the authority.

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Already has the authority to conduct military strikes on land against these groups,

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presumably inside other countries.

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That's the implication based on this same unlawful combatant theory.

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So here's the final thought we want to leave you with,

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something to really mull over after hearing all this.

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If the administration has successfully, at least politically,

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rebranded drug smugglers criminals as unlawful combatants,

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allowing them to be killed militarily without trial in international waters.

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Right.

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A designation previously used for groups like al-Qaeda after 9-11.

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Then what actual practical limits are left?

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What stops the executive branch from using this same logic,

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the same military force against any other group domestic or international,

295

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that it decides to label a threat?

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It raises a profound question about the erosion of legal norms,

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and the potential for the unchecked militarization of problems

298

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that were once handled by law enforcement and the courts.

299

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Where does this doctrine stop if anywhere?

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