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E23. STACKED UNPACKED: Trend, Carry, and a Narrative-Busting Quarter
Episode 238th May 2026 • Get Stacked Investment Podcast • Ani Yildirim
00:00:00 01:19:47

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Based on our Q1 2026 commentary for the Return Stacked ETF suite, Corey Hoffstein and Adam Butler provide a detailed analysis of the strong quarter for trend following and carry, with a particular focus on the energy complex's impact. The conversation also explores the unique diversification benefits of merger arbitrage and provides a three-year retrospective on the efficacy of their trend replication models.

Topics Discussed

  • Overview of the Return Stacked ETF suite's growth and the core concept of capital efficiency
  • In-depth look at the trend following strategy, highlighting its three-year success in replicating the managed futures category beta
  • Analysis of the Carry strategy's strong Q1 performance, primarily driven by geopolitical events affecting the energy markets
  • Discussion of the Merger Arbitrage strategy as a unique diversifier against traditional credit risk
  • Examination of the RSSX ETF, which stacks a risk-balanced overlay of gold and Bitcoin on U.S. equities
  • Demonstration of the new Portfolio Visualizer tool for modeling and understanding Return Stacking concepts
  • Explanation of why broad market diversification, not just shorting equities, provides crisis alpha in trend strategies
  • Discussion on the complementary relationship between Trend and Carry strategies in different market environments

The performance data quoted above represents past performance. Past performance does not guarantee future results. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor's shares, when sold or redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost, and current performance may be lower or higher than the performance quoted above.

For prospectus and performance and risks visit the fund pages.

RSST https://www.returnstackedetfs.com/rsst-return-stacked-us-stocks-managed-futures/

RSIT - https://www.returnstackedetfs.com/rsit-international-stocks-managed-futures/

RSBT – https://www.returnstackedetfs.com/rsbt-return-stacked-bonds-managed-futures/

RSSY – https://www.returnstackedetfs.com/rssy-return-stacked-us-stocks-futures-yield/

RSBY – https://www.returnstackedetfs.com/rsby-return-stacked-bonds-futures-yield/

RSBA – https://www.returnstackedetfs.com/rsba-return-stacked-bonds-merger-arbitrage/

RSSB – https://www.returnstackedetfs.com/rssb-return-stacked-global-stocks-bonds/

RSSX – https://www.returnstackedetfs.com/rssx-return-stacked-us-stocks-gold-bitcoin/

BTGD – https://quantifyfunds.com/stackedbitcoingoldetf/btgd/

RSSX does not invest directly in Bitcoin or Gold.

Investors should carefully consider the investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses of the Return Stacked® U.S. Stocks & Gold/Bitcoin ETF. This and other important information about the ETF is contained in the prospectus, which can be obtained by calling 1-844-737-3001 or clicking here. The prospectus should be read carefully before investing.

The Return Stacked® U.S. Stocks & Gold/Bitcoin ETF is distributed by Foreside Fund Services, LLC, Member FINRA/SIPC. Foreside is not related to Tidal, Newfound, or ReSolve.

Definitions:

Duration: refers to the average life of a debt instrument and serves as a measure of that instrument’s interest rate risk. Beta: how much an investment moves vs. a benchmark (like the market). Alpha: refers to returns above that of a passive market benchmark SocGen: is a common abbreviation for Société Générale S.A. Trend Index: tracks returns from trend-following strategies, aiming to capture gains from sustained market price movements across assets. FTSE 100 Index: Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index DAX index: Deutscher Aktienindex is the benchmark stock market index of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange Nikkei 225 or Nikkei Stock Average is the leading stock market index for the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) Alpha merger Index: tracks returns from merger arbitrage strategies, aiming to capture deal-related profits independent of the broader market.

A fund’s NAV is the sum of all its assets less any liabilities, divided by the number of shares outstanding. The market price is the most recent price at which the fund was traded.

Investments involve risk. Principal loss is possible. Unlike mutual funds, ETFs may trade at a premium or discount to their net asset value. Brokerage commissions may apply and would reduce returns. Bitcoin Investment Risk: The Fund’s indirect investment in bitcoin, through futures contracts and Underlying Funds, exposes it to the unique risks of this emerging innovation. Bitcoin’s price is highly volatile, and its market is influenced by the changing bitcoin network, fluctuating acceptance levels, and unpredictable usage trends. Not being a legal tender and operating outside central authority systems like banks, bitcoin faces potential government restrictions. The value of bitcoin has historically been subject to significant speculation, making trading and investing in bitcoin reliant on market sentiment rather than traditional fundamental analysis. Blockchain Technology Risk: Blockchain technology, which underpins bitcoin and other digital assets, is relatively new, and many of its applications are untested. The adoption of blockchain and the development of competing platforms or technologies could affect its usage. Cayman Subsidiary Risk: By investing in the Fund’s Cayman Subsidiary, the Fund is indirectly exposed to the risks associated with the Subsidiary’s investments. The futures contracts and other investments held by the Subsidiary are subject to the same economic risks that apply to similar investments if held directly by the Fund. The Subsidiary is not registered under the 1940 Act, and, unless otherwise noted in the Fund’s Prospectus, is not subject to all the investor protections of the 1940 Act. Commodity Risk: Investing in physical commodities is speculative and can be extremely volatile. Commodity-Linked Derivatives Tax Risk: The tax treatment of commodity-linked derivative instruments may be adversely affected by changes in legislation, regulations, or other legally binding authority. As a registered investment company (RIC), the Fund must derive at least 90% of its gross income each taxable year from certain qualifying sources of income under the Internal Revenue Code. If, as a result of any adverse future legislation, U.S. Treasury regulations, and/or guidance issued by the Internal Revenue Service, the income of the Fund from certain commodity-linked derivatives, including income from the Fund’s investments in the Subsidiary, were treated as non-qualifying income, the Fund may fail to qualify as RIC and/or be subject to federal income tax at the Fund level. The uncertainty surrounding the treatment of certain derivative instruments under the qualification tests for a RIC may limit the Fund’s use of such derivative instruments. Commodity Pool Regulatory Risk: The Fund’s investment exposure to futures instruments will cause it to be deemed to be a commodity pool, thereby subjecting the Fund to regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission rules. Because the Fund is subject to additional laws, regulations, and enforcement policies, it may have increased compliance costs which may affect the operations and performance of the Fund. Credit Risk: Credit risk refers to the possibility that the issuer of a security will not be able to make principal and interest payments when due. Changes in an issuer’s credit rating or the market’s perception of an issuer’s creditworthiness may also affect the value of the Fund’s investment in that issuer. Derivatives Risk: Derivatives are instruments, such as futures contracts, whose value is derived from that of other assets, rates, or indices. The use of derivatives for non-hedging purposes may be considered to carry more risk than other types of investments. Digital Asset Risk: Digital assets like bitcoin, designed as mediums of exchange, are still an emerging asset class and are not presently widely used as such. They operate independently of any central authority or government backing and are subject to regulatory changes and extreme price volatility. Equity Market Risk: By virtue of the Fund’s investments in equity securities, equity ETFs, and equity index futures agreements, the Fund is exposed to equity securities both directly and indirectly which subjects the Fund to equity market risk. Common stocks are generally exposed to greater risk than other types of securities, such as preferred stock and debt obligations, because common stockholders generally have inferior rights to receive payment from specific issuers. Equity securities may experience sudden, unpredictable drops in value or long periods of decline in value. This may occur because of factors that affect securities markets generally or factors affecting specific issuers, industries, or sectors in which the Fund invests. Gold Investment Risks: The Fund will not invest directly in gold but will gain exposure through gold futures contracts and Underlying Funds. These investments are subject to significant risk due to the inherent volatility and unpredictability of the commodities markets. The value of these investments is typically derived from the price movements of physical gold or related economic variables. Leverage Risk: As part of the Fund’s principal investment strategy, the Fund will make investments in futures contracts to gain long and short exposure across four major asset classes (commodities, currencies, fixed income, and equities). These derivative instruments provide the economic effect of financial leverage by creating additional investment exposure to the underlying instrument, as well as the potential for greater loss. New Fund Risk: The Fund is a recently organized with no operating history. As a result, prospective investors do not have a track record or history on which to base their investment decisions. Non-Diversification Risk: The Fund is non-diversified, meaning that it is permitted to invest a larger percentage of its assets in fewer issuers than diversified funds. Underlying Fund Risk: The Fund’s investment strategy, involving indirect exposure to bitcoin and gold through one or more Underlying Funds, is subject to the risks associated with bitcoin as well as gold. Shareholders in the Fund bear both their proportionate share of expenses in the Fund and, indirectly, the expenses of the Underlying Funds.

Tidal Investments, LLC (“Tidal”) serves as investment adviser to the Funds and the Funds’ Subsidiary.

Newfound Research LLC (“Newfound”) serves as investment sub-adviser to the RSST, RSBT, RSSY, RSBA, RSSB, RSSX and RSIT.

ReSolve Asset Management SEZC (Cayman) (“ReSolve”) serves as futures trading advisor to the Return Stacked® Bonds & Managed Futures ETF (RSBT), Return Stacked® U.S. Stocks & Managed Futures ETF (RSST), Return Stacked® US Stocks & Futures Yield ETF (RSSY), Return Stacked® Bonds & Futures Yield ETF (RSBY), Return Stacked® U.S. Stocks & Gold/Bitcoin (RSSX), and Returned Stacked® International Stocks & Managed Futures (RSIT).

Quantify Chaos Advisors, LLC (“Quantify”) serves as the sub-adviser to the STKd 100% Bitcoin & 100% Gold ETF (BTGD).

Quantify has entered into a brand licensing agreement with Newfound and Resolve, granting Quantify the right to use the “STKd” brand, a derivative of Return Stacked®. Neither the Trust or the Advisor is a party to this agreement. In exchange for the branding rights, Quantify will pay Newfound and Resolve a fee based on the percentage of the Fund’s unitary management fee.

The Return Stacked® ETFs Suite is distributed by Foreside Fund Services, LLC, Member FINRA/SIPC. Foreside is not related to Tidal, Newfound, ReSolve or Quantify.

Transcripts

Adam Butler:

I go back to the dot com bubble, when dot com rolled over in

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mid 2000, it was long energies, long

metals that carried the portfolio

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for the next five, six years.

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It's not the ability to short

equities that that often gives you

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that equity bear market offset.

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It's the ability to be long other markets.

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Corey Hoffstein: Hello everyone.

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Welcome to the Q1 2026 Stacked Unpacked.

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My name is Corey Hoffstein, CEO of

Newfound Research and co-founder

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of the Return Stacked ETF suite.

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And it is my absolute pleasure to

be joined my by my good friend and

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colleague, Adam Butler, CIO of ReSolve

Asset Management and fellow co-founder

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of the Return Stacked ETF suite.

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Adam, great to be joined

by you this quarter.

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Excited to dive into the performance and

drivers of returns and our different ETFs.

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I think this is, uh, man, what

a difference a quarter makes.

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Right.

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Adam Butler: Yeah.

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Absolutely.

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welcome everyone.

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It's, uh, great to get a chance

to nerd out Corey and, nice to

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continue to deliver good news all.

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Corey Hoffstein: And before we

dive right in, just a reminder

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that you can submit comments.

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We will try to address

them in a timely manner.

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If there's something we can

address in real time, we will.

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Otherwise, we'll hold comments

and questions until the end.

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without further ado,

I'm gonna dive right in.

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This is meant to be a

recap of what we saw in Q1.

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This is, this commentary is

available at returnstackedETFs.com.

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If you want to go through it yourself,

we're gonna try to hit all the

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highlights and maybe discuss sort of

what we're seeing in the important

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charts and graphs that we put in here.

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very excited to finish the

quarter at just under 1.2

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billion.

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Uh, excited to say today

we opened the day with 1.3

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billion, so we continue to see

really strong growth in the suite.

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We're incredibly grateful for everyone

who has allocated either their own

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money or allocated money on behalf

of their clients into these products.

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Obviously, this is something

that we believe very strongly in.

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This is a, a new tool set that we think

really helps people rethink portfolio

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construction and we're really enthused

to see the adoption within the industry.

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So thank you very much.

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We're incredibly grateful and, and we look

forward to, dare I say, the next billion.

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I'm gonna dive right in.

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We're gonna hit these ETFs one by one.

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Some of these we're gonna spend

a little bit more time on.

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the first I wanna start off with

is probably our simplest and yet

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the most flexible ETF we offer.

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This is the return stack global

stocks and bonds ETF RSSB.

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RSSB provides a dollar of global

equity and a dollar of US treasury

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exposure for every dollar invested.

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The idea here isn't so much that you would

use this ETF to try to stack bonds on your

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existing stock bond portfolio, but rather

use it as a capital efficiency tool.

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So, as a really simple example, if you

were to say have 60% stocks, 40% bonds.

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You could sell 10% of your stocks

and 10% of your bonds and put 10% of

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that freed up capital into RSSB, that

10% in RSSB would've give you the

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effective exposure of the 10% stocks

and the 10% bonds that is missing.

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But now you'd have 10% freed

up sitting in cash with which

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you can do whatever you want.

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And when you allocate that

freed up cash to some other

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investment, it is effectively

stacked on top of your portfolio.

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So we like to think of RSSB

as our low cost Swiss army

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knife of capital efficiency.

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And the goal here is simply to track

as closely as possible a 100 100

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portfolio comprised of a hundred percent

passive global equities, plus a hundred

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percent of a US treasury benchmark.

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in figure one, you can see here

over the prior 12 months, the black

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line is that total index benchmark

and then the green line is both.

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We have a version of RSSB

price and RSSB nav and we can

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see we tracked quite closely.

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If we zoom out to just look at

summary statistics really quickly.

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Again, the goal here is not to

be prescriptive about returns,

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but rather to use this as a tool.

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The idea would be to have the sense

inception returns, track that a hundred

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hundred as closely as possible after fees.

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I believe we are almost perfectly 35

bips behind the 100 100 cents inception,

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which is where we would like to be.

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So we are, uh, very enthused again about

our ability to track our benchmark.

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Our stated objective here and

RSSB is our largest ETF creeping

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up on almost 500 million.

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I think simply because of this

flexibility, it is our simplest ETF to

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understand and frankly, it has the most

flexibility in what you can do with it

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and things you can stack and creative

things you can do in your portfolio.

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And so it's no surprise that this

is our most popular ETF to date.

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Adam Butler: I mean, I don't think

we should, be too prescriptive

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here, but like, I, I think it's

worth visiting a couple of potential

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popular use cases for this, right?

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I mean, obviously the return stack suite,

we don't cover all potential diversifiers.

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Also, advisors have special relationships

and, and, and styles and strategies

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and managers that they like.

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So the idea is you can trim back,

let's say if you sell down 20% of

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your, 50 50 stock bond portfolio,

you put 10% back into RSSB.

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Now you've, you, you're right back up

to your full exposure to your 50 50

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portfolio, but you've also got 10% free

to add your favorite manager or, uh,

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you know, maybe your client's got a

purchase that they're trying to fund.

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They can, they can extract those

funds and go and deploy them,

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to some sort of purchase, right?

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So just a couple of, of really simple

and and popular use cases for this kind

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of Swiss, Swiss Army knife product.

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Corey Hoffstein: Yeah.

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I would say where we see it most

frequently can is when, when.

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An allocator that we're working with

already has a suite of alternative

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funds that they've vetted, right?

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Their team has already

done the due diligence.

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They might have three or

four alternative funds.

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Maybe they have an alternative model

that they're comfortable with, and rather

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than doing diligence on our alternatives,

and I would put our alternatives toe

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to toe with anyone else's, of course.

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But instead of if, if they already have a

suite of alternatives they're comfortable

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with and yet wanna figure out how to stack

those alternatives, RSSB is the solution.

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It gives them the ability to take

those alternatives that they're

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already comfortable with and, and use

them in a return stacking framework.

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So let's now move on and talk about

some of the alternatives we offer.

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And again, one of the most

popular is our trend line.

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We have the Return Stack Bonds and Managed

Futures ETF just hit its three year

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anniversary in, February, early February.

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And as well as our Return Stacked

US Stocks and Managed Futures ETF,

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which will be hitting its three

year anniversary, uh, in September.

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Now, these two funds, every dollar

you give them based on their name,

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they'll either give you a dollar

of bonds or a dollar of US stocks,

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plus a dollar of a managed futures

trend following strategy on top.

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Now, our approach to this trend following

strategy is a replication based approach.

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We are trying to hit what we would

call sort of the category average of

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systematic trend following managers.

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So if you were to look at something

like, say the SocGen Trend Index

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or the Morningstar systematic

trend category, that is the type

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of return we're trying to generate.

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We are trying to provide effectively the

beta of the managed futures category.

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And there's two ways we do this.

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We use what's called a top down approach,

where we're effectively looking at

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prior returns and trying to figure out

what sort of portfolio configuration

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would've led to those returns.

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And then there's the bottom up

approach where we're actually running

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a trend following process and all the

parameterization of that process about

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trend speeds and which markets we trade

in, all that sort of stuff, and how much

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weight we give each market in each sector

is determined to try to fit the long-term

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return characteristics of the category.

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And then we blend those two approaches.

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What we're really enthused to see,

and this is unique in this quarter's

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commentary, is looking at the

three years of live track record we

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now have doing this in our funds.

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and what what we're very happy about

is the original thesis we had, which

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was each of these different replication

approaches has efficacy as on a standalone

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basis, but process diversification

should lead us to a place of a better

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result and a better fit absolutely

came out in the realized numbers.

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So we run three approaches, two

top-down approaches, one with a smaller

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universe, one with a larger universe.

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We also run the bottom up approach,

and when we look at their correlation

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to say the SocGen Trend Index or their

individual tracking error to the SocGen

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Trend Index, we see substantially higher

numbers than a blended approach that

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takes the target weight results of,

of all three and blends them together.

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When we look at the actual three year

results here, what we have in the black

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line over the last three plus years is the

SocGen trend index and the green line is

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the blended net approach that we apply.

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And then we can see the individual

gray lines actually represent the

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individual replication models.

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And we can see at any given time some

models are performing better than others.

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The top down small performed

best over this full period, but

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there were certainly sub periods.

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It was the worst performer.

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It arguably had one of the worst fits,

even though it was the best performer.

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But we can see the blended result

ended up almost perfectly at the

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end of the day at the same point

with a high degree of correlation.

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So this is something that, you

know, again, three years isn't

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the end all, be all of of time

periods to measure something over.

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But given the volatility we saw in the

trends category over the period, given

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the dispersion among managers that we saw

as well, uh, you know, we're very, very

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happy and pleased with this result in

trying to deliver trend beta, and I think

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we delivered upon that mandate quite well.

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Adam Butler: I think it's worth mentioning

that, you know, three years is not

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nearly enough time to determine whether

a strategy can can generate alpha, but it

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is a very substantial time to determine

whether something delivers a beta.

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And you know, I think, I think we've

done some internal analysis and we've

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also sort of examined it against the

historical modeling that we did, right?

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'cause we can go back several decades

to see how well this combination

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approach has worked in the past.

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To track the SG trend index or you know,

a variety of other index, uh, indices.

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And so we had a lot, had a fair

amount of confidence going in.

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First of all, that the model

was theoretically sound.

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We'd also validated it on several decades

of historical context and is really,

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you know, fulfilling to see this in,

in three years out a sample delivering

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effectively the same tracking error

and, and correlation that we observed in

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sample during testing and modeling stages.

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Right?

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So, you know, it's a really nice

validation over three years and, you know,

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I continue to come back to a question

of why managers are taking benchmark

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risk with, you know, trying to select

individual managers in this space when low

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cost beta alternatives with the specific

objective of minimizing that tracking

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error to the benchmark, are available

in these kinds of liquid packages.

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Corey Hoffstein: Yeah, I, one of the

figures that I love and, and we put

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this in every commentary, and though

it's usually on a quarterly basis, but

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this shows the full three years, is the

relative performance of each approach

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as well as the blended approach versus

that SocGen trend index benchmark.

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So you can think of it sort of as

taking the green and gray lines here

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and dividing it by the black line.

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And so when the line is going down,

it's underperforming SocGen trend.

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When it's going up, it's

outperforming perfect replication

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would be a, a flat horizontal line.

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And one of the things right,

I think we can see is that.

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The individual gray lines, while they have

a degree of correlation to each other,

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there are certainly periods where they zig

and zag in their own idiosyncratic way.

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And I think that's really clear, for

example, over the last year with, with

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what I, the top down small, which is

the top line there where you can see

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a huge pop during the tariff tantrum

period, as I like to call it, last April.

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This was massive outperformance, I

would argue, and as, and we wrote in

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the commentary for that quarter, like

this was not skill, this was luck.

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This was this, this being misallocate,

not tracking the index, but getting

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lucky in not tracking the index and

then subsequently bled most of that

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performance back very different than

say the what, the top down large, or, or

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the, uh, bottom up did over that period.

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And so in terms of just trying to

track closely to the category, again,

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the blend allows us to average out

all that idiosyncratic noise or, or

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a high degree of that idiosyncratic

noise to try to get closer to target.

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uh, and I think the last three years

have been a great case study of that.

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So we, we look forward and hopefully

over the next, you know, two years, we'll

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we'll do a five year retrospective and

then a 10 year, and hopefully we'll,

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we'll continue to see strong results.

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um, co goes directly to Q1 and I'll,

I'll go through this quickly, trend

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posted another positive quarter after

a couple of frustrating years, trends

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returned over the last, call it, 12

months have been, uh, much, much better,

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particularly from the bottoms of April.

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It's had a very strong performance

driven not just by equities, but

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driven by exposure to metals.

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More recently, some exposure to energies.

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So it's been, it's been, a good time

over the last, call it 10 months to have

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trend as an overlay in the portfolio.

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Uh, again, this we can

see in, in figure four.

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The green line is our model

approach to replicating the category

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black as the SocGen trend index.

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High degree of correlation,

good degree of fit.

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Point to point, this is

exactly what we're looking for.

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And again, this is, these are the type

of results we're trying to deliver,

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uh, in actually providing exposure

to this category as an overlay.

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We can see, again, using that relative

performance, it's never a perfect fit.

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But what we're ultimately hoping for

is that blended approach is certainly a

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better fit over the full period than any

of the individual approaches, which again,

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I think we see here from a positioning

and return contribution perspective in

239

:

Q1, what we, what we've seen is that

we entered with something like fixed

240

:

income, positive weights, transition

to negative weights over the quarter.

241

:

equities, we substantially

reduced weights over the quarter.

242

:

We saw a pickup in exposure to

energies, somewhat of a pullback in an

243

:

exposure to metals, and sort of mixed

change in what we saw in currencies.

244

:

One of the things I want to remind people

of here is that, lemme make sure I can

245

:

do this correctly, is that, we actually

have all of this live on our website.

246

:

So if you go to our return stacked ETFs

dot com and go to, let's say the RSST

247

:

ETF page every single day not only can

you download the notional weights of what

248

:

we're holding, this is true for every ETF,

but to make it easier to interpret what's

249

:

in actually in the driver's seat, we

show the actual risk allocations by asset

250

:

class as well as market that we trade.

251

:

So as of yesterday, we can

see that equities capture

252

:

about 32% of our current risk.

253

:

In the managed futures program,

energies are about 25%.

254

:

Metals are only about eight and a half.

255

:

Currencies are are just about

nothing, and bonds are negative 10%.

256

:

This is something that gets

updated every single day.

257

:

So if you are curious about how the

strategy is positioned and what's actually

258

:

in the driver's seat, I think this is a

great way to look at it intra quarter.

259

:

And what's important here is that these

are, again, risk adjusted weights.

260

:

When you look at the notional weights,

how much we actually have allocated This

261

:

can be a little bit misleading 'cause a

low volatility market, we might have to

262

:

have a really big position in to have it

have an impact versus a high volatility

263

:

market like say oil right now we might

have a very small position in, and that

264

:

small position in something like oil might

have the same risk as a large position in

265

:

something like five year US treasuries.

266

:

We do all the work of translating that to

put 'em on an equal basis when we, when

267

:

we do this risk weighting on the website.

268

:

So again, for anyone looking to

see what's happening on a live

269

:

basis, I highly recommend taking

a look at, at the actual website.

270

:

So now going back to the commentary, lemme

just make sure that goes up on the page.

271

:

There

272

:

we

273

:

Adam Butler: gonna start

talking about Carry now, or

274

:

Corey Hoffstein: Yeah.

275

:

We're gonna quickly jump to Carry.

276

:

There's, again, look,

keeping our eye on the time.

277

:

one of the things I do want to point

out though is just from a contributions

278

:

perspective, I think there was a

lot of people who expected that

279

:

equities were sort of the big driver

in over the last, call it 12 months.

280

:

that actually really wasn't the case.

281

:

We can see that over the last year,

metals were a really big driver.

282

:

Energy was a positive driver.

283

:

Yes, equities were a driver, but this

is once again the, the breadth of, the

284

:

markets we trade in the trend program.

285

:

There were a significant number of

contributors over the year and, and

286

:

that's why the breadth is important.

287

:

Uh, Adam, I wanna pause really quickly.

288

:

There was a question here about

the possibility of the investment

289

:

universe expanding into more markets.

290

:

Um, this is something we have looked into.

291

:

There's, there's sort of two answers here.

292

:

One, we need to make sure the impact

it has on the goodness of fit.

293

:

Um, there's a lot of research that

shows that when you are trying to

294

:

track the sort of beta of trend, you

actually don't need that many markets.

295

:

And as you add more and more markets,

it actually complicates the math problem

296

:

of trying to track the benchmark.

297

:

That said, there might be one or two key

markets that we might look to introduce.

298

:

Um, not anytime in the short

future, but it's something we've

299

:

been, we have been exploring.

300

:

And if we can get comfortable with it,

you might see one or two new markets come

301

:

in that we do think would improve the

goodness of fit, uh, to, to the category.

302

:

Adam, anything you wanna add there?

303

:

Adam Butler: Yeah.

304

:

The, the other quick thing is

that, you know, the benchmarks we

305

:

track, it, these are the, these

are very, very large managers.

306

:

The largest managers in

the world, typically.

307

:

In fact, definitionally, they are in this

OC gen trend index and large managers

308

:

are sort of definitionally restricted

to allocating a majority of their risk

309

:

to the most liquid markets, right?

310

:

So if we were to, to, to go too far

out the tail in, into more esoteric

311

:

markets or less liquid markets, what

we're doing is now adding a bunch of

312

:

markets that most of the managers that

are in the index that we track can't

313

:

actually allocate a lot of risk to.

314

:

So we're adding markets that they're

not trading in very large size.

315

:

And, and that also complicate

the math of, of tracking.

316

:

So there's definitely

a, a, a balance here.

317

:

I think we're pretty close to, to

the right balance, but we're always,

318

:

you know, reevaluating whether we're

missing something or whether there's

319

:

opportunities for improvement.

320

:

And we'll change it as

we go, as that warrants.

321

:

Corey Hoffstein: Yeah.

322

:

One of the questions here, and

then I wanna get to Carry is,

323

:

um, someone's surprised that we

still have a position in gold.

324

:

So gold is down quite a bit from the high.

325

:

Why?

326

:

Why do we still have a long position?

327

:

you know, look, gold's from the highs

is down about 15%, give or take.

328

:

But if we zoom out over a nine month

period, you know, go back to last

329

:

summer, late last summer, September,

it's still up about 45%, right?

330

:

And so when we talk about trend following.

331

:

and, and the type of trends

that these managers trade.

332

:

Intermediate trend is sort of

where things tend to fall out.

333

:

So the long intermediate to

long trend is still intact.

334

:

Now that said, our risk adjusted

weight in gold has come way down.

335

:

I think it's down over 50% from its high.

336

:

So we have seen, you know, some

of the shorter term trends that we

337

:

trade and just volatility adjusting.

338

:

Position wise, it has come way

down as all exploded as gold,

339

:

uh, rallied so dramatically.

340

:

But if you zoom out to more of a nine to

12 month trend, uh, I think most people

341

:

would agree that the trend remains intact.

342

:

And so it's no surprise in my opinion that

the model still has some gold exposure.

343

:

Adam Butler: Yep.

344

:

Nothing to add there.

345

:

Absolutely.

346

:

Corey Hoffstein: All right,

let's move on to Carry.

347

:

This is, um.

348

:

You know there, there's a lot to

digest here 'cause this is one we've

349

:

been writing a lot about, trying

to build intuition for people as to

350

:

what Carry is, with lots of examples.

351

:

It's frankly been a bit of a

frustrating run, but this was

352

:

a heck of a quarter for Carry.

353

:

Adam Butler: It has been.

354

:

And you know, the, the challenge with

carry is that you, you get caught on,

355

:

a, a bunch of false starts, right?

356

:

So Q4, 2025 was a really good

example of, we had a couple of

357

:

conflicts that were initiated, right?

358

:

We had these geopolitical events.

359

:

markets reacted, they got fearful,

they repriced the, the energy complex

360

:

and, and other market segments, right?

361

:

But the conflicts petered

out pretty rapidly, right?

362

:

The, the Venezuelan conflict

petered out almost immediately.

363

:

The Iran, war lasted just a few days.

364

:

So, you know, we, we

had this, these sort of.

365

:

risk events and the market sort of

tightening, especially in the futures

366

:

in, in the energy complex and leading

to a short term, you know, risk on

367

:

position and energies especially.

368

:

And then that reversed because the

conflict ended really quickly, right?

369

:

Now, in contrast in Q1, we had a, a major

conflict, emerge and it was sustained

370

:

and there were real, in the real world

shortages that persisted and there were

371

:

real consumers of energy products that

became very concerned about not having

372

:

enough, inventory on hand, jet fuel

or diesel for shipping or, you know,

373

:

for, for a wide variety of gasoline.

374

:

And therefore you had these consumers that

were bidding up prices on the front end.

375

:

And so you had this convenience

yield, this difference between the

376

:

front month or spot and futures

contracts that mature further down

377

:

the pipe, really rising substantially

right to, historically high level.

378

:

And that led to a very strong carry

signal suggesting that we should

379

:

be quite long the energy complex.

380

:

And this chart that we're showing here

shows how that carry signal strengthened,

381

:

pretty rapidly after the onset of the

Iran war and has persisted, and therefore,

382

:

you know, because that's persisted and

the front month energy prices actually

383

:

rose very substantially under that

persistent high carry, the carry strategy

384

:

was able to capitalize on that, right?

385

:

and the other markets in the portfolio,

there were a few others that contributed.

386

:

positively as well, but about 18% of that

22, 23% rise in the carry strategy in Q1

387

:

came from the energy complex, and this is

exactly the type of profile that we hope

388

:

to see for these types of strategies.

389

:

Right?

390

:

When do we most want these

diversifying stacks to pay off?

391

:

Well, when the other, sleeves in the

portfolio are having a difficult time.

392

:

Equities responded with a risk off

posture, When the war was initiated,

393

:

bonds did as well as markets began

to fear sustain inflation from a

394

:

potential persistent blockage or

embargo on the Strait Of Hormuz.

395

:

And so bonds sold off, equity sold

off, but the energy complex, which was

396

:

largely responsible for this risk on

posture and this inflation expectation

397

:

spike went on to more than compensate.

398

:

Right?

399

:

And so, you know, the, the carry strategy

more than offset the losses in bonds and

400

:

the losses in equities over that period.

401

:

At the same time, because we're, we're

paying attention to both the strength

402

:

of the carry signal and the expansion

and contraction and the risk of the

403

:

instruments that we're trading, we've

got a strengthening carry signal.

404

:

But because the volatility of the

energy complex also expanded pretty

405

:

substantially higher volatility means

that we need to contract exposure

406

:

to sustain our target level of risk.

407

:

So it, that risk expansion competes

with the increase in the strength

408

:

of the carry signal and, you know,

serves as a mediating factor.

409

:

As the carry has kind of

stabilized, but risk has, you

410

:

know, been, been sustained higher.

411

:

That overall position in, in energies

has contracted somewhat right?

412

:

And that's the natural ebb and flow and

the evolution of the weights in carry

413

:

that we expect to see and that, that we've

designed the strategy to capitalize on.

414

:

Right.

415

:

Anything you wanna

416

:

Corey Hoffstein: one of the things,

one of the things that's come up,

417

:

one of the question is, is when.

418

:

People's presumption is that this

situation with the Strait of Hormuz

419

:

is just gonna suddenly fix itself,

not fix itself, it will be fixed

420

:

and suddenly the Strait will be

open, oil will be flowing again.

421

:

And that allocating to something

like Carry right now would then

422

:

lead to substantial drawdowns.

423

:

Curious your, your thoughts on

that, that balance of, okay,

424

:

we've got a very steep curve.

425

:

What the market is pricing in, what

the carry signals say versus Right.

426

:

Bearing the risk of a supply crunch

and being stepping in and providing

427

:

the liquidity to that market, you

know, earning a risk premium for

428

:

that versus, you know, everyone's

expectation that, oh, this is, this is

429

:

suddenly going to reprice very quickly

and we're gonna be caught off sides.

430

:

And, you know, a big 22% return

in, in Q1 is going to become a

431

:

negative 20% return next quarter.

432

:

Adam Butler: Yeah.

433

:

I mean, what, what I think is most

important to realize is that the carry

434

:

signals are, are derived at root by what

the most experienced and knowledgeable

435

:

players in the markets are doing to hedge

their own supply demand dynamics, right?

436

:

You've got real consumers of these

products who've got actuaries, risk

437

:

managers, managers in various different

product lines, all making their forecasts.

438

:

They're as close to the metal as anybody

can be in markets in order to have the

439

:

best information and the, the fastest

reaction to changes information of anybody

440

:

in the marketplace, and all we're doing

is responding to the signals that those

441

:

experienced people that are closest to the

metal are sending via their own actions

442

:

in terms of how much they are preferring

to have, excess inventory on hand versus

443

:

how much they're willing to wait and pay

for cheaper crude, for example, a little

444

:

bit down the, down the line, right?

445

:

So, you know, if anything I am taking

advantage or, or I would be looking to

446

:

take advantage of the acute attention

that these players are paying to

447

:

these markets at the moment, and be

relying on the way that our, our,

448

:

our signals are viewing these markets

in order to capitalize on these

449

:

changes in views and adapt over time.

450

:

Corey Hoffstein: I think one of the

interesting things to also point out

451

:

is that if, again, if you go to the

RSBY or RSSY website pages, right?

452

:

You can see energy is a meaningful

contributor of our risk adjusted

453

:

weights, but it is by no means

like the only contributor, right?

454

:

We have positions in metals and equities

and bonds, and yes, energy's moved quite

455

:

a bit, but they weren't, they're, they're

not the, they're not in the driver's seat

456

:

per se, entirely of, of the portfolio.

457

:

Again, the idea here is that we're

constantly trying to balance risk

458

:

across all these different markets in

line with the strength of the signals.

459

:

Energies by far and away have

the most, the strongest signals.

460

:

but in the interest of diversification,

like their, their weight is actually

461

:

substantially below where their

theoretical weight could be given

462

:

the strength of their signals.

463

:

And we actually recently this

quarter added a scatter plot.

464

:

I'm gonna see if I can quickly

share my screen to the RSSY page.

465

:

RSBY as well.

466

:

And hopefully this is showing up.

467

:

And you can see this is the carry

score in the portfolio weights.

468

:

And you can go market by market

and see what its implied.

469

:

Carry score is, we're using some

math to back out a single carry

470

:

score in the portfolio versus

its risk adjusted target weight.

471

:

And you can see the

energy complex over here.

472

:

And despite having really high carry

scores, they are not, you know, so

473

:

heavily overweighted relative to other

things that have lower carry scores.

474

:

And this is a mix of, constraints

built into the optimizer as well as the

475

:

optimization process, trying to manage

diversification within the strategy.

476

:

And that leads to a situation where

energies are an important driver.

477

:

The other sectors are also contributing

a fair amount of risk, both positive

478

:

and negative to the portfolio

and from a directional basis.

479

:

So again, these are, these are all on the

website published daily, should be updated

480

:

daily with the most recent, scores.

481

:

The, this is a simplified view.

482

:

Again, we're using some math here to

back out sort of a single uniform score.

483

:

We use dozens to hundreds of different

carry measures under the hood to try

484

:

to find different ways of capturing

carry from these futures markets.

485

:

But this backs out sort of a single

snapshot view to just get a sense of

486

:

how these markets are being positioned

relative to the strength of their carry

487

:

and how we're trading off risk versus

return potential in the portfolio.

488

:

Adam Butler: just, just highlight a couple

of those dots that are in the lower right

489

:

quadrant there, which have positive carry

stores, but, but negative weights, right?

490

:

Corey Hoffstein: Yeah, so

natural gas is an example here.

491

:

you know, again, it's always

hard to, to say what an optimizer

492

:

is doing specifically, but this

does have a positive carry score,

493

:

but is being used negatively.

494

:

You know, I would guess that the optimizer

is using this to offset again, the

495

:

very positive exposures we have in the

496

:

Adam Butler: Yeah, that's right.

497

:

It's got a, it's got a slightly

positive, carry score, but it is, it's

498

:

a great diversifier against the general

energy risk and its diversification

499

:

utility now exceeds its expected

return utility in carry units.

500

:

And so it's, it's held short as a

diversifier rather than held being

501

:

held in the long book as a return.

502

:

As a return source.

503

:

Right.

504

:

And that's the, that's the nature

of the optimizer doing its work.

505

:

Corey Hoffstein: And we can see that

really clearly with the equities.

506

:

All of the equities have

negative carry right now.

507

:

But you have things like, the dax,

the NASDAQ 100 and, and the NI K 2 25

508

:

being held long while the Euro stocks

50 S&P 500, S&PTSX 60, the Canadian

509

:

market and the FS C 100 are being held

short and effectively, even though they

510

:

all have negative carry scores, right?

511

:

You're capturing somewhat of a spread

here, the spread in carry between these

512

:

markets and the up top versus the markets

down bottom, and you're, and you're

513

:

trading them against each other and

effectively, more or less, dare I say,

514

:

neutralizing the equity beta component

on sort of on average with these markets.

515

:

And this all comes out again from

the optimization process, trying

516

:

to find where, how it can maximize

the carry, given the amount of

517

:

risk it's allowed to take on.

518

:

Adam Butler: Yep.

519

:

Yeah, so that's a really good example

just to demonstrate how correlation

520

:

is also taken into, into account.

521

:

Right.

522

:

And, you know, so, so no surprise,

obviously the energy sector has been the

523

:

largest source of return attribution.

524

:

but, bonds have also been

contributed positively.

525

:

equity allocations have

contributed positively.

526

:

And, you know, it's just been really

nice to see how the, how the portfolio

527

:

has evolved in actually a fairly

intuitive way when you, when you

528

:

actually account for the expansion

and risk and the, the change in

529

:

characteristics over, the last few months.

530

:

So, doing its job.

531

:

Corey Hoffstein: Keeping

an eye on the time here.

532

:

I'm gonna keep moving.

533

:

There's a couple of questions that we

will get to at the end if people wanna

534

:

stick around, um, that have come up here.

535

:

But I wanna move on to, the Return

Stack Bonds and Merger Arbitrage ETF.

536

:

The idea behind this ETF is that for

every dollar invested, you're gonna

537

:

get a dollar of exposure to core US

treasuries, plus a dollar of exposure

538

:

to a merger arbitrage strategy.

539

:

And I would argue that sort of the

best comp to this portfolio would

540

:

be a, a corporate bond fund, right?

541

:

When you think about corporate bonds,

really what you're getting there is core

542

:

US treasuries plus a credit risk premium.

543

:

Here with something like RSBA, we're

trying to give you US treasuries

544

:

plus a merger arb risk premium.

545

:

And we think Merger ARB represents a

unique and very defensible risk premium.

546

:

Uh, something that tends to be less

correlated to credit, less correlated

547

:

to equity markets in general, uh,

and something we can argue why

548

:

should persist and be pervasive.

549

:

Um, and so then it's just a really a

question of how you're implementing

550

:

the merger arbitrage strategy.

551

:

Uh, our merger arbitrage strategy tracks

the Alpha Beta Merger Arbitrage Index.

552

:

This is a firm that was running a merger

arbitrage hedge fund that, uh, we hired

553

:

to translate their hedge fund strategy

into an index that we then use to track.

554

:

It's a machine learning based model

that trains on the history of US based

555

:

deals, all sorts of characteristics

to determine what they think both the

556

:

time horizon of deal closure is as well

as the probability of deal closure,

557

:

and uses that to figure out what

the expected return of the deal is.

558

:

And so long as the announced deal hits

an expected return threshold of 400

559

:

basis points above the risk-free rate,

we include it within the portfolio.

560

:

We saw a decent amount

:

561

:

We introduced four new positions

throughout the quarter, and

562

:

we closed out two deals.

563

:

you know, again, every deal that's

closed that doesn't fall apart

564

:

represents, uh, an accretive

positive return to the portfolio.

565

:

So that's great.

566

:

I think one of the things I, I want

to talk about really is this figure.

567

:

So what figure 14 shows is the

isolated excess return of credit

568

:

versus the isolated excess return

of the alpha beta merger arbitrage

569

:

index since RSBA's inception.

570

:

So when I talk about the isolated

excess return of credit, what

571

:

I'm effectively saying is take

corporate bonds and hedge out all the

572

:

underlying interest rate exposure.

573

:

What you're left over is with return

that's purely coming from the credit

574

:

spread, so changes in the credit

spread, as well as the excess yield that

575

:

you're generating for that credit risk.

576

:

Then in green, right, you're

effectively, simply getting, well,

577

:

what are, how are deals compressing

with the, merger risk premium?

578

:

How, how are, what are you returning?

579

:

I think what we can see is,

is two very, well, I'll say

580

:

three very important things.

581

:

the first is that substantially

lower volatility in the alpha beta

582

:

merger arbitrage index versus credit.

583

:

This is something I just think, again,

when you take a basket of idiosyncratic

584

:

deals and you hold them together,

it's no surprise that you tend to

585

:

have a lower volatility profile than

something like credit, which on average

586

:

has much more exposure to what's

happening collectively in the economy.

587

:

We can see over the period that it

did ultimately outperform credit.

588

:

We, we've started this fund

in fairness, at a point where

589

:

spreads have been quite tight.

590

:

They remain quite tight.

591

:

I think, again, it's a good argument for

why you should diversify against credit.

592

:

If we started this fund when spreads

were very, very high, I wouldn't expect

593

:

to necessarily see this outperformance.

594

:

But, you know, again, we're, we're

happy to have delivered excess returns

595

:

versus credit over this period.

596

:

But the thing I want to address is this

question that comes up a lot, which is

597

:

okay, we often say that the correlation

of merger arbitrage should be low to

598

:

credit and should be low to equities,

and certainly lower to equities than

599

:

the correlation between credit and

equities because you're combining all

600

:

of these idiosyncratic deals together.

601

:

And when you combine all these

idiosyncratic deals, and these deals

602

:

don't really have a lot to do with what's

happening necessarily in the economy.

603

:

More to do with, you know, what's

the regulatory environment like?

604

:

is it likely that the deal's gonna go

through earlier or later than expected?

605

:

All of that sort of stuff.

606

:

Are regulator's gonna intervene?

607

:

And you're combining a

whole bunch of those.

608

:

It's, it's no, in my opinion, no surprise

that you would expect low correlation.

609

:

But you do see some correlation.

610

:

And one of the things I, I wanna

try to provide some insight into

611

:

is like, why do you see correlation

between merger arb and equities when

612

:

you wouldn't necessarily expect the

deals to have day-to-day correlation?

613

:

And the answer is because how

the deals are priced, right?

614

:

So when a deal is announced, there's going

to be the pre trading price, but prior to

615

:

announcement that the stock was trading

at, and then the acquisition price.

616

:

And the stock is going to jump up towards

the acquisition price, taking into account

617

:

both the time value of money for when

the deal is expected to be closed and

618

:

the probability that the market thinks

the deal is going to close at, right?

619

:

And that how far it jumps is

effectively giving you in course

620

:

terms like the probability that the

market thinks the deal's gonna close.

621

:

But the deal's not closing

tomorrow, the deal's closing in

622

:

six months or maybe 12 months, or

maybe even 18 months or two years.

623

:

And over that time, the market

is going to move up and down.

624

:

And in the case that the deal

does fall apart, the stock is

625

:

going to fall to some price.

626

:

Now you typically assume it's gonna

fall to the pre-announcement price.

627

:

And then it's the pre-announcement price

adjusted by what the market has done.

628

:

So if that stock has a beta of one to

the market, for example, and the market

629

:

is going up over time, well, you would

actually expect the price, uh, that

630

:

it's trading at to get closer and closer

and closer to the acquisition price.

631

:

'cause the price it would fall to

if the deal fell apart, is actually

632

:

higher and higher and higher.

633

:

If the deal's gotten less

risky, your downside is lower.

634

:

But let's say all of a sudden the market

drops 50% and you expect, well, if the

635

:

deal fell apart, the price that we would

be falling to would actually be 50% lower.

636

:

Well, it's no surprise that the spread

then would actually widen a bit.

637

:

Now this is all gonna take into account,

you know, again, the time value of

638

:

money when we expect the deal to close.

639

:

Um, if we're expecting the deal to

close in a week, the deal might be

640

:

less sensitive to what's happening

in the market if we expect the

641

:

deal to close in six months.

642

:

But there's a low probability

of it closing, right?

643

:

It might, may, might be much

more sensitive to the market.

644

:

So all that plays in, but it's not,

it's not sensitive to the market because

645

:

the market falling apart necessarily

means more deals are gonna fail.

646

:

It's not inherently true.

647

:

These deals are very hard to get out of,

and unless the acquirer goes bankrupt,

648

:

they're typically going through.

649

:

It's simply that it's an

adjustment of risk, right?

650

:

All else held equal if the market

sells off and the price at which

651

:

the deal would fall to goes lower

than the spread should widen.

652

:

For us, that actually represents

a great opportunity for

653

:

the way our strategy works.

654

:

I mentioned that we added four

deals, uh, throughout the quarter.

655

:

two deals closed throughout the quarter.

656

:

We ended the quarter about 60% allocated

at the right, at the end of quarter,

657

:

after quarter turn, we added two more

deals, and these were deals that we

658

:

had passed over previously, but the

market had been so volatile in March.

659

:

And because equities had sold off, the

deals had actually widened out relative

660

:

to the a, the takeout price and actually

covered now our required return target.

661

:

And so we were able to take advantage

of short-term market volatility

662

:

to add those names 'cause they now

met our expected return threshold.

663

:

Um, so you do see some correlation and

it's, again, what I wanna stress is

664

:

it's not the reason people typically

expect you have correlation equities.

665

:

It's not 'cause the deal is

necessarily gonna fall apart.

666

:

It's simply because the price,

the risk is changing and that has

667

:

to get priced into the spread.

668

:

Adam Butler: I think too, it's just

quickly something to emphasize here,

669

:

like you, you've done your best to kind

of back out some of the impacts that

670

:

investors would actually experience

with an allocation of credit.

671

:

Like you've backed out

interest rate risk here, right?

672

:

On the black line.

673

:

Right.

674

:

But most investors can't back,

it's hard to, to back that out.

675

:

Right.

676

:

You don't, you don't typically get that.

677

:

And at the moment, people are actually

relatively fearful of duration and,

678

:

and fearful of interest rate risk.

679

:

Well, we talked to a lot of

advisors who are reticent to

680

:

put more bond risk on, right.

681

:

the, I think what's the weighted average

duration of these expected deal closures?

682

:

You, you, you're under a year.

683

:

Well, under a

684

:

Corey Hoffstein: Yeah, well.

685

:

Adam Butler: yeah.

686

:

So, so this is actually quite a,

a, a low duration credit index

687

:

with very low correlation to your

other normal credit indices, right?

688

:

So it's, it's a very nice

diversifier and it also provides

689

:

another escape hatch for you to, to

provide bond-like returns without.

690

:

Having that sort of duration exposure that

you would typically have to get by, you

691

:

know, in, in most other bond-like indices?

692

:

Right.

693

:

So at this moment, I mean, there's a lot

of reasons why merger ARB is attractive,

694

:

but at this moment I think it's especially

attractive for that group of investors

695

:

who are fearful of future inflation

and, and are unhappy with needing to

696

:

go out and have to allocate to duration

to get their normal, bond allocation.

697

:

Corey Hoffstein: Yeah, I

mean, this allows you to swap.

698

:

If you have duration, you're

gonna maintain your duration

699

:

and add the merger ARB on top.

700

:

But I think for us, what we're

particularly excited about is, is

701

:

in the short period we've had it

that sort of year and a quarter

702

:

that this fund has been live.

703

:

it has delivered excess returns relative

to both US treasuries and US corporates.

704

:

And, and I don't think the opportunity

to continue diversifying risk away

705

:

from corporates has diminished at all.

706

:

Spreads remain quite tight in US

corporates relative to history.

707

:

And so, uh, for folks who are looking to

diversify into another very defensible

708

:

risk premium, but have, you know, a

strategy that's going to look at around

709

:

the same risk in total volatility

as that corporate bond portfolio.

710

:

I think this is a very

compelling offering.

711

:

Adam Butler: Yeah, if you don't

want stack duration, this is

712

:

a really nice diversifier.

713

:

Corey Hoffstein: Yep.

714

:

All right, Adam, let's talk about RSSX.

715

:

Our, our newest ETF.

716

:

Adam Butler: Yeah, so

we've got, this is great.

717

:

This is a hundred percent

allocation to US equities and then

718

:

a risk adjusted or risk weighted

allocation to both gold and Bitcoin.

719

:

And, we love this because, you know,

equities do respond reasonably well

720

:

to moderate levels of inflation, but

historically, once inflation expectations

721

:

tick substantially above kind of 4%,

and especially if they tick materially

722

:

above 6%, then equity's also begin to

suffer right alongside bonds, right?

723

:

But that's right around the time

that historically hard assets like

724

:

gold and potentially Bitcoin might

really into kick into gear, right?

725

:

So you've got this really nice both

empirical diversification stocks,

726

:

gold and Bitcoin historically have

kind of, on average, about a zero

727

:

correlation to one another if you kind

of look back over a regional horizon.

728

:

But also they provide like a nice,

a nice structural diversification.

729

:

And when you risk balance the allocation

between gold and Bitcoin on average,

730

:

historically you'd be looking at

kind of somewhere between 70 and

731

:

80% gold and then 20 to 30% Bitcoin.

732

:

And that adapts over time as the,

the volatility of Bitcoin evolves

733

:

and the volatility of gold evolves.

734

:

And actually this quarter was a really

nice case study for that because the

735

:

gold volatility expanded so substantially

that even though we use a relatively

736

:

long-term lookback to measure the

relative volatilities, that vol

737

:

expansion gold was still substantial

enough to actually have an impact.

738

:

And so the allocation of Bitcoin

crept up a little bit in the

739

:

portfolio, the allocation of gold.

740

:

came down a little bit and that was really

helpful because, you know, there was a

741

:

bit of a narrative violation that happened

on the onset of this war in the Gulf.

742

:

I think probably the logical expectation

going in was a gold would rally and that

743

:

Bitcoin might sell off because Bitcoin

has been a bit of a risk on risk off

744

:

asset, over the past couple of years.

745

:

But the opposite happened.

746

:

And actually gold really had quite a

steep sell off, but Bitcoin started

747

:

to really, bounce higher and that,

that, that bounced kind of accelerated

748

:

as the, as the war proceeded.

749

:

And I'm not gonna try to explain

that, but it's just really nice to see

750

:

that, you know, we can tell ourselves

stories, and have expectations, but

751

:

really what we want to emphasize

is structural diversification.

752

:

And while the story didn't play out

the way we might've expected, the

753

:

diversification potential played out

exactly as we might've hoped, right?

754

:

And so the, the move in Bitcoin

higher offset to a meaningful

755

:

extent the sell off in gold.

756

:

And we saw a much smoother, line right

than we might expect from the fact that

757

:

we've got three assets, each of which has

quite a bit of volatility on their own.

758

:

But because of that diversification,

they do a nice job of smoothing return

759

:

when they're held together, right?

760

:

I mean, an expectation, if you were to

hold these three assets and they were

761

:

perfectly correlated, you'd be looking

at a volatility of about 40% on the

762

:

portfolio, but in expectation because

those three assets are, have about a zero

763

:

expected correlation with one another

that 40% volatility comes all the way

764

:

down to sort of 20 to 25% volatility.

765

:

Right.

766

:

Much more manageable.

767

:

And that's exactly what you see.

768

:

I mean, look at the, the black line

there relative to the experience of the

769

:

yellow, the green, and the blue lines.

770

:

Right.

771

:

I just think it's remarkable to

actually see that diversification

772

:

play out in real time and attenuate

that volatility experience.

773

:

This is really the, the, the

portfolio being much better than

774

:

the sum of its individual parks

because of that diversification.

775

:

Playing out.

776

:

Corey Hoffstein: There's the

narratives we tell ourselves versus

777

:

what markets actually do and, and I

think a lot of people would've said

778

:

the flight to safety in gold would've

been the obvious trade in March.

779

:

And maybe because it was obvious,

that's why it fell apart, right?

780

:

People were selling their gold perhaps

to shore up the dollars they needed or,

781

:

you know, to fund the exposure elsewhere.

782

:

I don't think anyone would've guessed

that Bitcoin would've been flat up

783

:

over that meaningful risk off period.

784

:

But, you know, again, this is why having

humility in, in enjoying long-term

785

:

structural diversification and trying to

balance the volatility of these assets

786

:

as in the overlay, um, I think is a, is

a great way and, and particularly why we

787

:

designed this strategy the way we did.

788

:

Adam Butler: Yep.

789

:

Corey Hoffstein: Despite all that

volatility, you know, again, compared to

790

:

just an s and p benchmark since inception,

and take these numbers with a large grain

791

:

of salt because it is less than a year.

792

:

you know, since inception still over

700 basis points annualized on the s

793

:

and p, it's been a good period for gold.

794

:

A bad period, horrible

period frankly, for Bitcoin.

795

:

Peak to trough had a

50% drawdown just about.

796

:

But still that risk weighted balance

between gold and Bitcoin more

797

:

than offset that drawdown with,

with the rally we saw in gold.

798

:

And that's exactly, you know, we designed

this that way so that neither asset

799

:

was completely driving the portfolio.

800

:

All right, we're hitting 50 minutes.

801

:

One of the things we want to do before

we go, and there's a whole bunch of

802

:

questions here Adam, so hopefully you

got some time to stick around after the

803

:

hour turns and we can talk about this.

804

:

But I wanna, I wanna share one more

thing that we published this quarter,

805

:

which is on our returnstacked.com

806

:

site.

807

:

We introduced a new tool, so

if you go to returnstacked.com

808

:

and go to tools, we launched what's

called the Portfolio Visualizer.

809

:

And if you launch the visualizer,

you'll be taken to a widget that

810

:

allows you to explore basically

return stacking concepts.

811

:

What you can do in a fairly isolated

manner is choose some sort of base

812

:

ranging from a hundred percent stocks, 0%

bonds, all the way to 0% bonds, a hundred

813

:

percent stocks, and then you can choose

some sort of allocation for your stack.

814

:

So let's say I wanted to explore what

a 50% managed futures, 50% merger arb

815

:

stack look like on top of my 60 40.

816

:

And I was willing to go

up to a 30% stack size.

817

:

We can see what the equity curves

would've historically looked like.

818

:

We can look at some

performance statistics.

819

:

These are nice to have.

820

:

But I think what's more useful from

an experience perspective is looking

821

:

at things like the rolling returns.

822

:

How, what periods would the stacked

portfolio have an outperformed

823

:

the strategic benchmark?

824

:

What does it feel like

over any 12 month period?

825

:

What does it feel like over a.

826

:

You know, longer horizon,

period, call it five years.

827

:

Right?

828

:

Let's look at the drawdowns.

829

:

How do these things compare?

830

:

How long would they have been?

831

:

When would you have had a bigger

drawdown in the stacked portfolio

832

:

versus the stock bond blend?

833

:

How long was the longest drawdown

in each of these portfolios?

834

:

You can look by calendar year, right?

835

:

How many years would it have

underperformed in a row?

836

:

How many years would've

it outperformed in a row?

837

:

What years that you care about that you

remember, like:

838

:

for me, that diversification just did not

work in:

839

:

bad would your relative return have been?

840

:

Is that something that you could stomach?

841

:

And then the opportunity to just look

at sort of the, the stacked blend in

842

:

isolation to look at the equity curve.

843

:

What would that have looked like?

844

:

How, how did it correlate to your stock

bond mix over a given period to get a

845

:

sense of, you know, how does, how stable

were those correlations over time?

846

:

All this, you know, again, in

a fairly isolated manner, but

847

:

to build the intuition, I think

it's a pretty powerful tool.

848

:

And then there's two things you can do.

849

:

There's a link to share if you want to

basically copy this and send it to someone

850

:

or send it to us to, if you're trying

to explore an idea, whoever loads that

851

:

link, we'll get this exact stock bond mix.

852

:

And the other thing you can do is you

can generate a summary PDF, that's

853

:

gonna take your exact blend, put it

into a PDF, take all these graphs and

854

:

charts and build out a really nice

looking PDF that you can walk away with.

855

:

Explore a little bit later.

856

:

Of course, you can always

discuss the stack you're building

857

:

with one of our consultants.

858

:

If you click on this, it'll send the

exact stack you've built so they know

859

:

what you're talking about, and you

can set up a meeting with them to

860

:

discuss what you're working on and,

and the goals you're trying to achieve.

861

:

So this is something we published

a little over a month ago.

862

:

We've seen a really big pickup in usage

and adoption, which we'd love to see.

863

:

Again, we're just trying to provide

the tools to help people build some

864

:

intuition as to how these things look

and the trade-offs that come in when

865

:

you choose different bases versus

different stacks and different stack

866

:

sizes and different stack combinations.

867

:

It all leads to different outcomes

and, and what stack size and what

868

:

blend is appropriate for you or your

clients, or a particular client is

869

:

gonna be very based on their risk

appetite, risk tolerance, and their

870

:

ultimately their goals and objectives.

871

:

And so this is a tool that lets us

explore some of those degrees of freedom.

872

:

We have to get an idea of how

things would've played out.

873

:

Adam Butler: We should also note

that there's an even more flexible

874

:

and robust tool coming down the pipe

that we'll be launching imminently.

875

:

And so we would encourage you to go to

the site and sign up for that now, and

876

:

we'll let you know when that's available.

877

:

And, we're pretty excited about it.

878

:

there's a lot of new tools

that we've got on the burner.

879

:

This one is just extraordinarily

helpful and useful.

880

:

And, so come to the site,

sign up and, and get access to

881

:

all the future tools as well.

882

:

If you're an advisor.

883

:

Corey Hoffstein: Yeah, the more

advanced version will basically

884

:

allow you to build any base stack,

any base portfolio you want using.

885

:

I think it's like three

dozen different indices.

886

:

Any stack you want using three

different dozen different indices.

887

:

really powerful.

888

:

Uh, so, so stay tuned for that.

889

:

We'll have, you know, obviously varying

levels of trying to build intuition.

890

:

Sometimes a little bit of constraint.

891

:

It does is helps you build that base

intuition before you really dive

892

:

deep and, and customize and explore.

893

:

Alright, Adam, we have

a lot of questions here.

894

:

I'm gonna start by saying

thank you everyone for, for

895

:

sticking with us this long.

896

:

we have probably maybe a dozen, half a

dozen questions I, I want to get to here.

897

:

But for those of you who have to

leave, thank you for your time.

898

:

We really appreciate it.

899

:

If you do have any questions,

please go to return stack.com,

900

:

go to the contact section.

901

:

Um, you can fill out a contact form

or get in touch directly with your

902

:

regional consultant and they can

answer any questions you have, whether

903

:

it's about our products or anything

else, return stacking related.

904

:

and again, thank you for your time.

905

:

We're just gonna stay here

and try to get through as many

906

:

of these questions as we can.

907

:

And if you have to leave, this will have

a replay eventually and you can tune

908

:

in and hear the q and uh, afterwards.

909

:

So again, thank you Adam.

910

:

I wanna start uh, the very first

question we got was, uh, I know you

911

:

can't give specifics, but do you guys

have plans to expand the ETF lineup?

912

:

really it is tough to talk about because

we are technically in the quiet period.

913

:

We have an ETF that we have

filed for that filing is public.

914

:

So I can say that we have filed for an

international equity and managed futures,

915

:

ETF I cannot state our exact plans on

when we intend or hope to launch that

916

:

fund, but we did file for that, call it,

I don't know, 65 days ago, 60 days ago.

917

:

Um, so that is public.

918

:

You can go find that filing, uh,

in the SEC's Edgar database and,

919

:

and look up all the details there.

920

:

Again, it is not an effective filing.

921

:

I cannot tell you if or

when it will go effective.

922

:

Um, but that is a product we have

intentions to launch and we do in

923

:

intend to continue to build out the

suite in different combinations of,

924

:

of bases and stacks so that we can

provide maximum flexibility to people

925

:

building return stacking portfolios.

926

:

Adam Butler: Right.

927

:

We've got another question here

about the introduction of grain

928

:

markets in the, the futures lineup.

929

:

So grains have more rigid CFTC limits.

930

:

We can't trade them in the

same size at front month.

931

:

A lot of managers do trade back

month contracts in order because

932

:

they have much larger, limits

than the front month contracts.

933

:

And that would typically be what

you'd find maybe in, in some, hedge

934

:

fund style two and 20 products.

935

:

We have investigated that.

936

:

and we, we do some back month

grains in, in some other products.

937

:

The reality is when we look at the

replication suite, they don't add,

938

:

they don't explain a lot of, extra

variance of the benchmark index.

939

:

and so, you know, adding them

doesn't add a lot of extra margin,

940

:

but it does add a substantial amount

of extra operational complexity.

941

:

And so it's not something that we're,

clamoring to do at the moment, but

942

:

it's definitely on the research agenda.

943

:

And, you know, for consideration

sometime down the line.

944

:

Corey Hoffstein: Yeah.

945

:

I think to add to that, we, we

found, I think soybean was maybe

946

:

of the AGs the largest traded and

maybe having the largest impact.

947

:

But when you consider it would be

the 28th market we trade, it doesn't

948

:

suddenly become a huge position.

949

:

It, it stays like a one 28th risk

position and from there it's just, it

950

:

has a marginal impact, but it's hard

to really extract whether that's.

951

:

Noise or true value.

952

:

when we look at really what is the

major factors that are driving the

953

:

beta, it's no surprise, it's, it's

things like gold oil, equity, beta, the

954

:

10 year US treasury, euro dollar, yen

dollar, like those are the big drivers.

955

:

And in, and the reason they're the

big drivers is because when you have

956

:

a really big crisis, most of the

long tail stuff ends up correlating

957

:

with the big macro drivers, which

get picked up in those markets.

958

:

And so when you look at, like, when the

category really moves, you don't have a

959

:

lot of, it's not a tremendous number of

like factors that are driving things.

960

:

It's one or two factors that are

picked up by just a couple of markets.

961

:

And so, continuing to add markets tends to

make I think what research, which suggests

962

:

more of an absolute return product and

less of a product that is convex to macro

963

:

environments, which is what the beta sort

of category return tends to look like.

964

:

very specific question here.

965

:

Do you have a document that shows

how much of the bond component or

966

:

government obligations for tax purposes?

967

:

Uh, yes we do.

968

:

Uh, please send us a message

directly and I can send you a PDF.

969

:

We don't have that on the website

at the moment, but that is something

970

:

I can send to you directly.

971

:

Uh, hoping to improve our tax reporting

in:

972

:

this stuff available on the website..

973

:

Adam Butler: Corey, as Convergent herb

strategies can have nonlinear fat left

974

:

tails during liquidity crisis, how do

you expect RSBA to behave in a GFC or.com

975

:

style crisis?

976

:

That's a

977

:

Corey Hoffstein: Yeah, so I think, again,

it depends on the, on the type of crisis.

978

:

Dot com is very different than GFC, right?

979

:

But regardless, you know, if you have a

deal that's closing in a year and over

980

:

that year the market sells off 50%, or

it sells off 50% very quickly and spends

981

:

its time down there, like the spread is

going to blow out meaningfully for any

982

:

deal, even if the probability of that

deal getting closed doesn't change.

983

:

That gets exacerbated in like a true

liquidity crunch like the GFC where

984

:

people have to sell out of every position.

985

:

They have to fund positions

elsewhere, come up with cash.

986

:

And so you see spreads

blow out wider and wider.

987

:

So there is some left tail.

988

:

Some of it again, is just.

989

:

The repricing effects.

990

:

I discussed that in a big drawdown, right?

991

:

you're going to have certain

deals just get wider and wider.

992

:

But again, these deals are,

tend to be somewhere between six

993

:

months and two years in length.

994

:

The deals we've had on, I think, have

been much closer to six to nine months.

995

:

Some of them have been as short as three

months, if I'm not mistaken, right?

996

:

If you have a market sell off over a

two year period, but you have a bunch of

997

:

deals that keep closing in six months,

they, they're gonna be fighting that, that

998

:

need for the deal to approach the deal

price versus, you know, the spread being

999

:

forced wider by the market going down.

:

01:02:53,507 --> 01:02:58,307

It's not as big an impact versus

a very sudden sharp sell off.

:

01:02:58,337 --> 01:03:00,977

You would expect to see all deals widen.

:

01:03:01,407 --> 01:03:06,687

GFC again being the liquidity crunch

element of that is, is unique.

:

01:03:06,777 --> 01:03:09,417

And when you have a liquidity

crunch market wide, yes, you're

:

01:03:09,417 --> 01:03:11,037

gonna see deal spreads blowout.

:

01:03:11,397 --> 01:03:13,347

Again, not necessarily because

the probability of the deal.

:

01:03:13,347 --> 01:03:14,037

Closure change.

:

01:03:14,067 --> 01:03:18,297

Closure change is just maybe with the bath

water, people need to come up with cash.

:

01:03:18,517 --> 01:03:18,937

Adam Butler: Yeah.

:

01:03:18,937 --> 01:03:23,197

And, and also I think you'd

probably expect the, the deal

:

01:03:23,197 --> 01:03:26,737

frequency to slow down substantially

during, during recessions or

:

01:03:26,737 --> 01:03:27,847

during liquidity events, right?

:

01:03:28,387 --> 01:03:30,291

Just, capital gets more expensive.

:

01:03:30,291 --> 01:03:36,727

People begin to, to, to pull in their

risk budgets and, so that might limit

:

01:03:37,147 --> 01:03:39,157

expected returns over those periods.

:

01:03:39,267 --> 01:03:42,777

that's less of a risk exposure

and more of just a, you know,

:

01:03:43,017 --> 01:03:44,907

lack of return opportunities.

:

01:03:45,387 --> 01:03:48,987

But what happens then is, is

typically that those same acquisition

:

01:03:48,987 --> 01:03:53,572

targets have the same strategic

accreative value to the acquirers.

:

01:03:53,962 --> 01:03:59,362

So there tends to be like a, a cluster

then of, of major deals that happens

:

01:03:59,362 --> 01:04:04,542

as, as those credit spreads close and

as the the liquidity event, moderates,

:

01:04:04,612 --> 01:04:07,912

which makes more, that makes up for

what happened during that interim time.

:

01:04:08,822 --> 01:04:10,022

Corey Hoffstein: Adam,

we got a question here.

:

01:04:10,232 --> 01:04:10,622

We get.

:

01:04:10,982 --> 01:04:12,422

One of the things I love

about these quarterlies is

:

01:04:12,422 --> 01:04:13,712

we get really into the weeds.

:

01:04:13,772 --> 01:04:16,512

Uh, we got a question here about the

trading costs differences between

:

01:04:16,512 --> 01:04:19,452

the three trend systems and are there

differences in liquidity that drive

:

01:04:19,452 --> 01:04:26,132

higher trading costs for, between the

top down, say small universe and the

:

01:04:26,132 --> 01:04:32,282

top down larger universe where we're

trading 27 contracts versus a much

:

01:04:32,282 --> 01:04:35,612

smaller amount of contracts and those

contracts tend to be more liquid.

:

01:04:35,612 --> 01:04:38,882

So I dunno, if you want to, if you

want to comment there, I, all I will

:

01:04:38,882 --> 01:04:43,112

say is like measuring trading costs.

:

01:04:43,532 --> 01:04:48,692

I know this is, this has been a topic on

a lot of trend following podcasts lately.

:

01:04:49,532 --> 01:04:54,002

I think people make measuring trading

costs sound a lot easier than it truly is.

:

01:04:55,172 --> 01:04:57,512

Because when you talk about

measuring trading costs, there's a

:

01:04:57,512 --> 01:04:59,642

lot of what if that goes into it.

:

01:04:59,642 --> 01:05:02,522

There's obviously the very explicit

trading costs that you can easily

:

01:05:02,522 --> 01:05:07,172

measure, which is, you know, what are

the actual like commissions you pay?

:

01:05:07,922 --> 01:05:11,612

And those are things you can negotiate and

try to get better rates than other people

:

01:05:11,612 --> 01:05:13,892

and, and the way you work with brokers.

:

01:05:14,221 --> 01:05:19,532

But then there's the question of, if I

choose to say, implement my trade as a

:

01:05:19,562 --> 01:05:26,702

twap over intraday, I might have lower

market impact, but my actual price of

:

01:05:26,702 --> 01:05:33,602

execution may be worse than if I had

just had a higher impact and dumped

:

01:05:33,602 --> 01:05:34,502

it all at the beginning of the day.

:

01:05:35,522 --> 01:05:35,942

Right?

:

01:05:36,422 --> 01:05:38,312

Is that good or bad execution?

:

01:05:38,312 --> 01:05:41,732

Well do, if you don't have a view

as to the beginning, the market

:

01:05:41,732 --> 01:05:45,242

where the market's going, intraday,

like, you know, it might just be

:

01:05:45,242 --> 01:05:47,642

the cost of the trade sometimes.

:

01:05:47,642 --> 01:05:49,712

For example, I've heard people talk about.

:

01:05:50,552 --> 01:05:53,012

Running what's called a taker

versus a maker algorithm.

:

01:05:53,012 --> 01:05:55,562

Are you crossing the spread

to implement your trade?

:

01:05:56,162 --> 01:05:59,102

Well, if you cross the spread,

that's an explicit cost.

:

01:05:59,402 --> 01:06:02,312

People might say, well, I

run a, I'm, I'm patient.

:

01:06:02,642 --> 01:06:03,992

I let people come to me.

:

01:06:04,471 --> 01:06:08,612

Well, if you let people come to you, but

the real price of the asset has moved

:

01:06:08,612 --> 01:06:12,452

and they're, you know, sort of quote

unquote taking through you, yes, you

:

01:06:12,452 --> 01:06:16,232

didn't have to cross the spread, but you

got traded at a price that's incorrect.

:

01:06:16,232 --> 01:06:19,862

And if you look at the ticks after

your trade, you've actually lost

:

01:06:19,862 --> 01:06:21,392

money relative to where you traded.

:

01:06:21,902 --> 01:06:22,982

It is in Incredi.

:

01:06:22,982 --> 01:06:26,642

And these are, I know some of this might

not make sense to many people listening,

:

01:06:26,642 --> 01:06:34,232

but the point is measuring trading costs

is incredibly difficult and nuanced.

:

01:06:34,232 --> 01:06:37,742

And I think a lot of the conversation

that's been going on in some popular

:

01:06:37,742 --> 01:06:41,702

podcasts around the trading costs of

trend following are just substantially

:

01:06:41,702 --> 01:06:43,742

missing the details of some of this.

:

01:06:44,072 --> 01:06:48,782

Um, and I, I don't think it's

easy to say, like one system

:

01:06:48,782 --> 01:06:51,677

has more or less trading costs.

:

01:06:51,677 --> 01:06:54,377

You generally expect higher liquidity

instruments to have lower trading

:

01:06:54,377 --> 01:06:58,187

costs, but if you're trading them in

larger size, 'cause you have fewer

:

01:06:58,187 --> 01:07:01,817

instruments, you might have more

impact because you're making bigger

:

01:07:01,817 --> 01:07:03,557

trades even though they're more liquid.

:

01:07:03,887 --> 01:07:09,287

So it's, it's not easy to say and it

requires a ton of detailed analysis.

:

01:07:10,082 --> 01:07:13,412

Adam Butler: I mean, look,

execution matters a lot.

:

01:07:13,742 --> 01:07:18,466

And, you know, we've been trading

tures for, well, since, since:

:

01:07:18,736 --> 01:07:21,076

and we learned a lot over that period.

:

01:07:21,076 --> 01:07:27,736

And we have renegotiated with our, our

service providers, and we've improved

:

01:07:27,736 --> 01:07:29,686

our execution algorithms over time.

:

01:07:29,686 --> 01:07:33,496

And that continues to be an ongoing

battle that is well worth fighting.

:

01:07:33,706 --> 01:07:37,966

There's also some averaging

that goes on, right?

:

01:07:37,966 --> 01:07:40,396

So we don't trade those three

models in three different accounts.

:

01:07:40,396 --> 01:07:41,716

We trade them all in the same account.

:

01:07:41,716 --> 01:07:46,396

So you might have the, the medium sized

model might be saying we should be

:

01:07:46,396 --> 01:07:50,566

adding to our two year treasury position.

:

01:07:50,986 --> 01:07:55,306

The the nine asset model might

be saying we should be lowering

:

01:07:55,306 --> 01:07:56,836

exposure to the two year treasuries.

:

01:07:57,136 --> 01:08:01,156

And our bottom up model might be

saying, you know, no, no change today.

:

01:08:01,396 --> 01:08:06,226

So, you know, while both those models

may be arguing for a change because

:

01:08:06,226 --> 01:08:09,736

they're arguing for a change in opposite

directions, they average out and it

:

01:08:09,736 --> 01:08:13,666

ends up that there's actually no, no

trade in that market today, right?

:

01:08:13,966 --> 01:08:15,676

So you do get a lot of

this trade averaging.

:

01:08:16,095 --> 01:08:23,386

We also do a lot to, stabilize

our, our estimates for our models.

:

01:08:23,996 --> 01:08:27,626

And we also do, impose some

smoothing, the smoothing.

:

01:08:28,241 --> 01:08:29,651

Actually does two things.

:

01:08:29,770 --> 01:08:35,681

Obviously it lowers the amount of

daily trading, but also empirically

:

01:08:35,770 --> 01:08:37,901

it improves the fit, right?

:

01:08:37,961 --> 01:08:41,621

So it has this kind of, you know,

you don't actually, you don't see

:

01:08:41,621 --> 01:08:45,640

this very often, honestly, where

you make a decision to try to slow

:

01:08:45,640 --> 01:08:49,541

down your, your trading, you're not

gonna be as reactive to the signals.

:

01:08:50,031 --> 01:08:54,020

that actually helps in terms

of, of your performance from

:

01:08:54,020 --> 01:08:55,191

a tracking year perspective.

:

01:08:55,551 --> 01:08:57,470

And it also lowers your trading costs.

:

01:08:57,711 --> 01:09:01,491

So, you know, this is kind of

a happy, coincidence with the

:

01:09:01,491 --> 01:09:03,151

tracking, models that we run.

:

01:09:03,151 --> 01:09:04,951

So there's a lot going on.

:

01:09:05,011 --> 01:09:06,901

We take execution very seriously.

:

01:09:07,441 --> 01:09:10,557

There are some beneficial ways to

the way that we model things and,

:

01:09:10,607 --> 01:09:12,227

we'll continue to improve over time.

:

01:09:13,051 --> 01:09:16,721

Corey Hoffstein: We do have some actual

hard numbers that we think we can sort

:

01:09:16,721 --> 01:09:20,711

of back out as to what our trading costs

have been over the last three years.

:

01:09:21,131 --> 01:09:25,152

but again, I, I'm not, I don't wanna

share those hard numbers with, without

:

01:09:25,152 --> 01:09:28,692

the caveat of, like other people talking

about hard numbers might be measuring

:

01:09:28,692 --> 01:09:31,332

them entirely differently than we are.

:

01:09:31,542 --> 01:09:35,082

And you can be, someone can say their

trading costs are 10 basis points.

:

01:09:35,261 --> 01:09:38,022

Someone might say they're 200 basis

points and they're just measuring

:

01:09:38,022 --> 01:09:39,702

completely different trading costs.

:

01:09:39,702 --> 01:09:44,711

And so to me it's, it's a conversation

that unless everyone at the table agrees

:

01:09:44,711 --> 01:09:48,642

as to how trading costs are measured, it's

not a conversation, frankly, worth having.

:

01:09:49,022 --> 01:09:49,232

Adam Butler: And a

:

01:09:49,631 --> 01:09:51,822

Corey Hoffstein: Good news is all

of those are baked into returns.

:

01:09:51,852 --> 01:09:53,051

Just look at the returns, right.

:

01:09:53,682 --> 01:09:54,372

It's all in there.

:

01:09:55,052 --> 01:09:55,292

Adam Butler: Yeah.

:

01:09:55,292 --> 01:09:57,962

I mean, a manager that gets access

to a strategy via swap, you don't

:

01:09:57,962 --> 01:09:59,402

even see the, the, the trading costs.

:

01:09:59,402 --> 01:10:01,532

They all happen behind the

scenes, you know, like it's,

:

01:10:01,532 --> 01:10:03,362

there's, it's complicated.

:

01:10:04,286 --> 01:10:06,446

Corey Hoffstein: one of the questions

here, Adam, is can you tell me how often

:

01:10:06,446 --> 01:10:10,406

RSBT and RSBY correlate with equities?

:

01:10:10,406 --> 01:10:15,476

Do you find that the futures normally

level off when the market runs higher?

:

01:10:15,716 --> 01:10:17,006

Sort of two questions there.

:

01:10:17,246 --> 01:10:18,326

Um, you wanna address this one?

:

01:10:19,711 --> 01:10:25,951

Adam Butler: So the correlation with

equities tends to be about zero on

:

01:10:25,951 --> 01:10:30,451

average over the long term for both the

trend strategy and the carry strategy.

:

01:10:30,931 --> 01:10:36,901

It's worth mentioning that carry and trend

correlate on average of about kind of 0.2

:

01:10:36,901 --> 01:10:37,891

to 0.3,

:

01:10:38,141 --> 01:10:40,871

historically over the,

over the long term, right?

:

01:10:41,471 --> 01:10:49,901

But by their nature and the ability for

the entire portfolio to adjust to changes

:

01:10:49,931 --> 01:10:56,981

in trends in the, in the equity complex,

in changes in carry in the equity complex,

:

01:10:57,311 --> 01:11:04,866

there will be time varying correlation,

to equities across both carry and trend.

:

01:11:05,406 --> 01:11:10,746

Now, conveniently and we continue to

say that, you know, in our opinion,

:

01:11:11,046 --> 01:11:15,666

the best way to allocate to trend and

carry is to allocate to both together.

:

01:11:16,326 --> 01:11:22,806

And that's because they view the markets

from very different angles and oftentimes

:

01:11:23,376 --> 01:11:28,116

for the very reason that that equities are

rising a lot and therefore the dividend

:

01:11:28,116 --> 01:11:31,536

yield on equities is, is often declining.

:

01:11:31,536 --> 01:11:36,076

If that, rise is, is relatively,

happens to a relatively short

:

01:11:36,106 --> 01:11:41,626

horizon, well, because then the

dividend yield is, is shrinking,

:

01:11:42,016 --> 01:11:44,056

the carry signal is also shrinking.

:

01:11:44,056 --> 01:11:48,856

At some point, if equities

rise enough, and especially if

:

01:11:49,246 --> 01:11:52,486

short-term interest rates are f

are also falling at the same time.

:

01:11:53,071 --> 01:11:58,051

The dividend yield relative to the

funding cost may flip negative, at

:

01:11:58,051 --> 01:12:02,971

which point you've got carry showing

a negative allocation or certainly a

:

01:12:02,971 --> 01:12:06,511

negative signal relative to equities.

:

01:12:06,511 --> 01:12:10,501

While, while trend has a positive

signal relative to equities and you,

:

01:12:10,591 --> 01:12:12,931

you often have one offsetting the other.

:

01:12:13,201 --> 01:12:16,921

And what's great is that often happens,

you know, during especially strong

:

01:12:16,921 --> 01:12:19,321

spikes, higher inequities, right?

:

01:12:19,621 --> 01:12:24,871

The carry strategy is kind of moderating

the equity allocation that would

:

01:12:25,021 --> 01:12:29,581

you'd otherwise be getting from that,

that that major move in equities.

:

01:12:29,881 --> 01:12:35,731

And so it, it mediates that the, the,

the give back that you get on the

:

01:12:35,881 --> 01:12:40,351

equity holdings and the trend strategies

when that trend reverses, right?

:

01:12:40,591 --> 01:12:44,581

So they're just very complimentary

in mechanically the way they work.

:

01:12:45,571 --> 01:12:45,861

Corey Hoffstein: Yeah.

:

01:12:45,866 --> 01:12:49,766

One of the things I often hear, and maybe

where this question is coming from, is,

:

01:12:50,306 --> 01:12:53,966

especially as an overlay, people are

uncomfortable with the idea of trend or

:

01:12:53,966 --> 01:12:57,626

carry trading equities where they already

have so much equity exposure in their

:

01:12:57,626 --> 01:13:02,006

portfolio and they sort of have this idea

that they're adding more equity risk.

:

01:13:02,006 --> 01:13:04,736

And there have certainly been periods

over the last three years that trend

:

01:13:04,736 --> 01:13:07,316

has been very equity correlated.

:

01:13:08,096 --> 01:13:08,396

Right.

:

01:13:08,666 --> 01:13:12,576

Um, what you find, and this is I think

we published some blog posts about

:

01:13:12,581 --> 01:13:16,716

this, Quanta has a great research paper

about this, is that if you take equities

:

01:13:16,866 --> 01:13:22,626

out of trend it or, or you cap equity

exposure or you do things to, you know,

:

01:13:22,626 --> 01:13:28,356

maybe only trade equities negative for

example, it has a very strong impact on

:

01:13:28,356 --> 01:13:30,966

the total return profile of trend, right.

:

01:13:30,966 --> 01:13:34,896

Equities have been a good contributor

trend, has worked on equities

:

01:13:34,896 --> 01:13:36,726

over the last 20, 25 years.

:

01:13:37,206 --> 01:13:42,966

And so you are in theory lowering

the excess return as well as

:

01:13:42,966 --> 01:13:46,266

lowering the internal diversification

within the trend program.

:

01:13:46,266 --> 01:13:50,736

So, you know, again, where our objective

is to, to track the beta of the category.

:

01:13:51,336 --> 01:13:53,496

The beta of the category

clearly has equities in it.

:

01:13:53,916 --> 01:13:56,376

You know, for us to meet that

objective, we have to trade equities.

:

01:13:56,706 --> 01:14:01,386

But I would also argue that those

equities, right, again, if you believe

:

01:14:01,386 --> 01:14:06,306

trend signals work on average over the

long run, like when those, you have

:

01:14:06,306 --> 01:14:10,086

that extra equity beta, that's precisely

when you want it in your portfolio.

:

01:14:10,146 --> 01:14:11,376

That's what trend is telling you.

:

01:14:11,736 --> 01:14:12,476

Same with Carry.

:

01:14:13,291 --> 01:14:18,266

Adam Butler: And historically it's

kind of a 50 50 bet about whether

:

01:14:18,476 --> 01:14:24,416

carry might be the best diversifier to,

to an equity allocation in a certain

:

01:14:25,406 --> 01:14:28,886

risk off environment for equities or

whether trend is gonna act as that,

:

01:14:29,356 --> 01:14:31,336

meet, you know, nice diversifier, right?

:

01:14:31,546 --> 01:14:37,606

It really is kind of 50 50 over time

and it's nice to have two potential

:

01:14:37,666 --> 01:14:43,486

opportunities as a risk offset in the

portfolio instead of relying on just one.

:

01:14:43,871 --> 01:14:46,466

Corey Hoffstein: Well, I think this

is a great point, Adam, because a lot

:

01:14:46,466 --> 01:14:50,876

of people I think might presume that

the offset to equities is coming from

:

01:14:50,876 --> 01:14:53,996

the ability to short equities and

the reality is like what we just saw

:

01:14:53,996 --> 01:14:58,826

in Q1 is the offset of equities in

carry was just long energy positions.

:

01:14:59,366 --> 01:15:01,196

We reline line the clock to:

:

01:15:01,976 --> 01:15:05,156

You know, none of our, our funds rely,

but this is just sort of empirically true.

:

01:15:05,156 --> 01:15:10,136

If you look at man futures funds, it

was shorting bonds and long the dollar

:

01:15:10,556 --> 01:15:16,436

that was driving performance, offsetting

equity losses, not the ability to short

:

01:15:16,436 --> 01:15:18,926

equities or or in that environment be long

:

01:15:19,041 --> 01:15:22,071

Adam Butler: I go back to the dot

com bubble, you know that when, when

:

01:15:22,081 --> 01:15:29,416

dot com rolled over in mid:

was long energies, long metals that

:

01:15:29,696 --> 01:15:34,906

carried the portfolio for, you know,

the next five, six years actually.

:

01:15:35,176 --> 01:15:36,826

so yeah, a hundred percent.

:

01:15:36,826 --> 01:15:40,786

It's not the ability to short

equities that that often gives you

:

01:15:40,786 --> 01:15:42,616

that equity bear market offset.

:

01:15:42,616 --> 01:15:44,686

It's the ability to be long other markets.

:

01:15:45,356 --> 01:15:47,281

Corey Hoffstein: Adam, one of the

questions we have here, and this is

:

01:15:47,281 --> 01:15:49,771

the, maybe the final question we'll

address is do we have any idea what

:

01:15:49,771 --> 01:15:52,321

the capacity is for each strategy?

:

01:15:52,891 --> 01:15:56,071

There's a lot of ETFs, but what I'll

say something like our stocks and

:

01:15:56,071 --> 01:15:58,771

bonds ETF as a massive capacity.

:

01:15:58,801 --> 01:16:04,831

We're effectively trading passive

global equities and US treasuries.

:

01:16:04,831 --> 01:16:09,811

I mean, there's just the capacity there

is in the tens of billions, if not more.

:

01:16:10,241 --> 01:16:15,011

when you talk about the trend products,

right, I think you can probably talk

:

01:16:15,011 --> 01:16:22,616

about in the, you know, five to 10 billion

before you really get to impact concerns.

:

01:16:22,616 --> 01:16:25,286

And there's things that can be

done there to alleviate impact.

:

01:16:25,286 --> 01:16:29,416

And then you're having a trade off of

impact versus goodness, affair, right?

:

01:16:30,816 --> 01:16:33,986

Carry, it's gonna be similar, you're

trading the same markets, carry

:

01:16:33,986 --> 01:16:35,366

tends to move a little slower.

:

01:16:35,366 --> 01:16:38,096

I don't know if you disagree with

with that, but I, in my experience,

:

01:16:38,096 --> 01:16:41,846

when I look at trend weights changing

over time, they tend to be move

:

01:16:41,846 --> 01:16:43,286

faster than the carry weights do.

:

01:16:43,376 --> 01:16:46,196

Carry weights can still move

at a rapid pace as we saw.

:

01:16:46,286 --> 01:16:49,256

You know, like with energy, if

the, if the curve reprices quickly,

:

01:16:49,256 --> 01:16:52,766

you're gonna get a very, meaningful

change in, in weight shortly, but

:

01:16:52,766 --> 01:16:54,356

on average they tend to move slower.

:

01:16:54,356 --> 01:16:56,336

So there's lower impact potential there.

:

01:16:56,336 --> 01:17:00,656

So you might say, you know, maybe

another 25, 50% capacity there.

:

01:17:01,556 --> 01:17:01,976

Merger

:

01:17:01,976 --> 01:17:02,846

arbitrage.

:

01:17:03,191 --> 01:17:08,211

Adam Butler: we could 10 x at least the,

the, the lineup and, and yeah, I mean,

:

01:17:08,511 --> 01:17:13,481

we, we would just use more sophisticated

execution strategies, but it, the,

:

01:17:13,586 --> 01:17:15,116

the capacity is, is there no question.

:

01:17:15,925 --> 01:17:18,786

Corey Hoffstein: Merger arbitrage,

you're probably talking about a billion

:

01:17:18,786 --> 01:17:20,856

capacity in the strategy as designed.

:

01:17:20,856 --> 01:17:25,686

There are some, there's some

flexibility to adjust the index to

:

01:17:25,716 --> 01:17:30,096

include more names, force liquidity,

constraints a little tighter.

:

01:17:30,096 --> 01:17:33,846

Our objective with all of these is

that they run at size the same way

:

01:17:33,846 --> 01:17:36,096

they run it 10 million or $50 million.

:

01:17:36,096 --> 01:17:39,096

We don't want a prior track record

to not be relevant to someone

:

01:17:39,096 --> 01:17:43,146

evaluating its size, but we're

not unaware of capacity issues.

:

01:17:43,196 --> 01:17:46,316

you know, I think around a billion

dollars merger, arb, we'd really have to

:

01:17:46,736 --> 01:17:48,506

make some decisions about some impact.

:

01:17:48,956 --> 01:17:53,276

And then, equities and gold

and Bitcoin, RSSX, huge amount

:

01:17:53,276 --> 01:17:54,536

of capacity there as well.

:

01:17:54,925 --> 01:17:57,326

you know, again, those are highly,

highly liquid markets that we're

:

01:17:57,326 --> 01:18:01,766

trading in and we're not making

huge, substantial day-to-day changes.

:

01:18:02,341 --> 01:18:07,061

Adam Butler: Importantly, you know,

we engineered these stacks to scale.

:

01:18:07,946 --> 01:18:11,966

the, the merger arbitrage strategy,

we could have made decisions

:

01:18:11,966 --> 01:18:14,906

that allowed for much smaller

deals to go into the portfolio.

:

01:18:14,906 --> 01:18:17,966

For example, we deliberately

excluded them, right?

:

01:18:17,966 --> 01:18:25,196

So, so we have made design decisions that

we think are on that Pareto frontier that

:

01:18:25,196 --> 01:18:33,026

gives us the maximum diversification and

portfolio execution efficiency at enough,

:

01:18:33,086 --> 01:18:37,166

capacity to scale these so that they

can be, you know, products that can be

:

01:18:37,166 --> 01:18:39,236

held in any portfolio for the long term.

:

01:18:40,211 --> 01:18:40,601

Corey Hoffstein: Yep.

:

01:18:41,171 --> 01:18:41,501

All right.

:

01:18:41,501 --> 01:18:42,941

I think we hit just about every question.

:

01:18:42,941 --> 01:18:46,581

If we didn't get to your

question, I apologize.

:

01:18:46,861 --> 01:18:49,321

it's just because I merely overlooked

it, not because I was avoiding it.

:

01:18:49,621 --> 01:18:53,431

Please, uh, uh, if you have any other

questions, send a message to us.

:

01:18:53,701 --> 01:18:54,961

Go to return stack.com,

:

01:18:54,961 --> 01:18:55,981

go to the contact page.

:

01:18:55,981 --> 01:18:58,141

You are gonna get in touch with

your regional consultant, or you

:

01:18:58,141 --> 01:19:00,241

can send an email in directly.

:

01:19:00,241 --> 01:19:04,141

And, uh, it's always all hands on deck

answering any inbound questions we have,

:

01:19:04,141 --> 01:19:06,300

so we'll jump on it as quickly as we can.

:

01:19:06,361 --> 01:19:08,371

Uh, I wanna thank everyone for

their time, especially if you

:

01:19:08,461 --> 01:19:09,536

stuck around for the q and a.

:

01:19:09,866 --> 01:19:13,741

Again, we really appreciate your interest

in the return stack, ETF suite, as

:

01:19:13,741 --> 01:19:15,241

well as your patronage of our products.

:

01:19:15,461 --> 01:19:18,550

and until next quarter, this

has been stacked unpacked.

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