Why do recessions happen? Tyler Goodspeed joins Kevin Coldiron to challenge some of the most deeply held beliefs in economics. Drawing on more than three centuries of data from the United States and the United Kingdom, he argues that recessions are rarely the inevitable consequence of excess or financial imbalances. Instead, they are often triggered by unexpected external shocks that are difficult to predict. The conversation explores why expansions do not simply die of old age, why recessions fail to cleanse the economy, and what policymakers and investors should focus on instead when preparing for an uncertain future.

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Episode TimeStamps:

00:00 - Why recessions are often caused by unexpected shocks

00:54 - Tyler Goodspeed's research into four centuries of economic history

06:05 - Why economic expansions do not die of old age

13:48 - Debunking the boom and bust theory of recessions

18:13 - Does monetary policy matter as much as we think

21:57 - Financial crises, credit growth and what the data really shows

27:11 - Why energy supply shocks have shaped economic history

30:58 - Why the UK and US have experienced different recessions

35:31 - Government intervention and whether it reduces recessions

39:09 - Do recessions actually make economies stronger

44:16 - Why the UK never returned to its pre 2008 growth trend

47:51 - Financial repression, government debt and the lessons of 2008

51:32 - Randomness, resilience and preparing for economic shocks

56:20 - Rare earths, energy security and the next potential recession trigger

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That's the kind of shock that reminds me of some of the past energy supply shocks, or some steel shocks, or cotton, on these essential products, the supply disruption of which can really have spillover effects into other parts of the economy.

Welcome to Top Traders Unplugged. In markets success doesn’t come from predicting what happens next, it comes from being prepared for what you can’t predict.

In each episode we go deep with some of the world’s most thoughtful minds in investing, economics, and beyond to understand how they think, how they prepare, and how they decide, and the experiences that shaped how they see the world. No noise, no short-cuts, just real conversations to help you think better and invest with confidence.

Welcome, everyone, to Top Traders Unplugged. My name is Kevin Coldiron, and I'm host of the Ideas Lab series where we talk with authors of new books that help us understand the global economy. Okay, so think about these ideas. Economic busts do not follow economic booms. Economic expansions do not simply die of old age. And recessions don't cleanse the system of previous excess.

If you find those ideas surprising, well, stay tuned because our guest today is going to explain why, after studying four centuries of data, he believes all those conclusions are correct. Our guest is Tyler Goodspeed.

Tyler is the Chief Economist of ExxonMobil, and previously he chaired the Council of Economic Advisors in the first Trump administration. And he's joining us today to talk about his fascinating new book, Recession: The Real Reasons Economies Shrink and What to Do About It.

Tyler, thanks for joining us and welcome to the show.

Thanks. Great to be with you, Kevin.

Okay, so I want to start off with a couple just sort of background questions. I mean, in the book, you work through explanations for what causes recessions. You explain the logic, and then you provide evidence to show mostly that the explanations we've been given don't work. But I guess my question is, did you go into the project thinking, hey, I really would like to just kind of systematically go through and test all these ideas and see if they really hold, or was it more, I don't think these ideas are correct based on my own work and my own experience, and I want to provide a way to convince others that that's the case?

Okay, so you were… I guess you kind of… Did you start the project with an idea that you were going to do that level of historic research, or was it really more initially focused on what happened during the pandemic and then you kind of expanded it?

And then also I extended the sample across the Atlantic to the United Kingdom. And what's interesting there is that here you have two very large advanced economies that have long been deeply financially and economically integrated, similar legal institutions. And yet when I compared the two, despite all those similarities, despite that integration, they've actually had very dissimilar recessionary experiences over the past 200 years.

Yeah, that was surprising to me how the level of correlation between the timings and the length of the recessions in those two economies. And maybe we can talk more about that as we go along.

So really what you are doing in the book is each chapter is kind of starting off with an explanation for what causes recessions or the drivers, the reasons we experience recessions. And then you say, okay, well, let's take a look at the data and see if that holds up.

And the first idea that you test is pretty straightforward. It's really, does the duration of an economic expansion influence the chances of recession and its severity? And you say that you're testing kind of a Dorian Gray explanation versus Peter Pan. So, I know those are pretty technical terms. Maybe you could just explain what you mean by them and then tell us what you found when you looked at that.

In another view of economic fluctuations is what I describe as the picture of Dorian Gray, that while Dorian Gray the person seems to be eternally youthful, to all outward appearances everything is fine, hidden away in an attic. The picture of Dorian Gray bears all the blemishes and disfigurements of each hedonistic excess until the whole rotten item can only be restored to its youthful beauty by execution at the hands of a very instrument of one of those hedonistic excesses.

So, the picture of Dorian Gray view of economic fluctuations is very much in keeping with the boom/bust view, whereas the Peter Pan view of economic fluctuations is in keeping with, no, sometimes these expansions that never grow old, just history or misfortune happens upon them.

Tell us how you went about examining that and drawing the conclusions that in the end it's really the Peter Pan view that's more correct.

Yeah. So, there are statistical tools that you can use to estimate the probability of death as a function of the age of an economic expansion. And, statistically, I found that an economic expansion on either side of the Atlantic is no more likely to die in its 10th year as in its first or second year.

Yeah, that's interesting. I mean, there's pretty clear differences in terms of returns to say, equities and bonds and recessions and in expansions. And so, it struck me that we spent a lot of time kind of trying to predict whether you're going to go from expansion to a recession, but maybe the juice is really, once you're in recession, to build a model of when you're going to get out of it. Although again, the number of data points there is pretty small, so it might not be that useful. (That's not part of your book. That's me just kind of thinking with my investor hat on.)

But let's talk about… So, that's one idea that you tested. And then there's multiple other ones. Chapter three and chapter four were similar in that you're kind of looking at, I guess what I would call, an over investment story. In the one case that you're sort of looking, I think in particular, at infrastructure investment like railroads, and in another, you're looking at building stock. And again, the idea is that you get, essentially, too much capital invested either in, like I said, in infrastructure or in buildings. And that leads, eventually, to a big correction. So, you get this kind of oscillation above and below trend. And tell us about why you wanted to test those ideas, why you thought they were important to test, and what you found.

One of the most common features of the boom/bust view of economic fluctuations is that there's information in the height of an economic expansion that can tell you something about the probability and the depth of the subsequent recession. And so, height can be measured in different ways. One could be just a cumulative increase in, say, GDP, or consumption, or investment, or bank lending.

It can also be a physical measure. There are some who suggest that skyscraper records, new skyscraper height records tend to correlate with the onset of deep recessions. And so, I test, in these chapters, whether higher, faster, longer economic expansions precede deeper, faster, longer economic recessions. And the answer is no. There is simply nothing, no informational content in the height, speed or duration of an economic expansion that can tell you anything about the depth, speed, duration or even probability of the subsequent recession.

And that finding is consistent with an older model of economic fluctuations that contrasts to that oscillationist view you described, that economic fluctuations are not about an economy rising above trend or rising above potential, and then enduring the inevitable correction, the negative deviation that corrects for that. Rather, economic fluctuations are about an economy that's growing pretty close to its potential, pretty close to its long run trend, and then it endures adverse shocks. It temporarily deviates from trend, negatively deviates from trend, and then recovers back to trend.

And so, while there's nothing in the height, the speed or the duration of an economic expansion that can tell you anything about the depth, speed or duration of the subsequent recession, there is information in the depth and speed of a recession that can predict the height and speed of the subsequent recovery. So, as I put it, economic expansions adhere to Newton's third law of motion, that to every action there's an equal and opposite reaction, whereas economic recessions are perennial violators of Newton's third law.

Yeah. And that seems to me, I mean, I think that, from my perspective, that was kind of one of the core takeaways from the book. I think you call it the pluck model versus the oscillation model. And essentially, if you're trying to visualize it, you can imagine a long-term trend with occasional falls below and then catch up.

And it struck me that's really, really important if that idea is true, because it suggests that the important things for government policy are, one, making sure that trend is as strong as it can be, number one, the long-term trend. Number two, don't do anything to screw up the recovery back to the trend. Would you agree with that?

I would because at the end of the day, though it’s kind of odd for a book about recessions to conclude in this way. In the book, I conclude that at the end of the day, we probably ought to be at least as worried about economic expansions as we are about economic recessions. Because the majority of the years in which economies expand ultimately matters more for long run economic prosperity than the minority of years in which they contract. I mean, the UK has had many fewer recessions over the past 200 years in the United States, but the UK is also, and has long been, about 30% poorer.

And so, insofar as recessions are about adverse shocks that we could neither fully anticipate nor effectively hedge against, that probably ought to caution policymakers against presuming that they can medicate or otherwise sedate economic expansions that at the end of the day die healthy and innocent in the mistaken belief that doing so will prevent recession because recessions will continue to happen, because history will continue to happen.

Does that mean that you are not a believer in the Fed kind of adjusting interest rates and credit conditions based on its view of the economy that we should be, I don't know, I mean, given what you're saying, should monetary policy be almost programmatic or rule based in some way, not trying to adjust for a business cycle that you say really isn't there?

Yeah, I want to come back to that point right there. I think essentially what you're saying, if I'm right, is that there's been a kind of a general long-term trend toward longer expansions and less volatility. And I want to come back to a potential explanation of that. But before that I did want to circle back to one other reason for oscillations, which you reject, but which I think is important enough that we should talk about.

So, you talk about infrastructure investment and building investment and there's also just kind of credit growth. And there's a famous book by Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff, This Time Is Different, which you talk about in your book, where they say, hey, recoveries following financial crises are particularly slow. And I think the implication is that, hey, you have got to be careful to not allow the economy to get into a situation where you have a big financial crash.

And you kind of dispute that conclusion. You say there's no real statistical evidence that that's the case. And I note that Ken Rogoff also wrote you a nice note on your book jacket, so I assume he's read that. But I'm curious, why are your results different? And tell us why they're different and let's start with that.

Yeah. So, first of all, when it comes to plucking, one of the variables I test is bank credit. And I find that the height and speed of the increase in bank credit and the volume of bank credit over the course of US and UK economic expansions does not explain variation in the depth or speed of the contraction in bank credit during the subsequent recession. Now that's on average, I mean, statistical regression is about averages. So, there could be… there's going to be a distribution there. So that's one finding.

The other statistical test I conduct is to test whether the height or the speed of a recovery is slower from a recession if that recession was coincident with a financial crisis. And I measure financial crises in two ways. One, using just a binary indicator variable that was developed by my former Oxford colleague Stephen Broadberry and co-authors. So, they coded up all UK recessions as to whether they involved a financial crisis or not. And the other way I proxy for financial crisis is to just include the volume of the contraction in bank credit during that recession.

So, how do I square that with the work of Reinhart and Rogoff for whom I have enormous respect? I think they're looking at a broader set of countries. I'm looking at just the United States and the United Kingdom. And if one is looking at a broader set of countries, I think that there might be a lot of other correlates with why those countries were having economic recessions that were coincident with financial crises. And those other correlates could be correlated with the speed, the pace of the subsequent recoveries.

Have you talked to Ken Rogoff about your results versus his?

We have, yeah. And it's still something we're comparing notes on.

The other thing I think that people naturally would be interested in and you address is energy supply shocks. Energy, some people would argue is kind of like the fundamental currency of economics, right? We have to use energy to make stuff. And when there's shocks to the availability and the price of that, it makes sense that would be a trigger of recessions. You looked at energy shocks going all the way back to when people were burning peat for home heating. You looked at coal, oil. What did you find in terms of the impact of energy supply shocks on recessions?

But if you go back farther in time, then industrial action on both sides of the Atlantic in the essential coal industry was a perennial contributor to recessions. And then as you just noted, if you go even further back in time, adverse harvest shocks were effectively energy supply shocks because provender, animal feed, was the primary fuel for the primary source of ground transportation, namely animal draft power. And also, when you had adverse winter weather, in particular, in the United Kingdom, it would destroy the supply of peat. And peat was regularly combusted to provide not only residential heating, but also industrial power generation.

And I think this speaks to the fact that there are sort of two different types of shocks, of recessionary shocks. You can either have big macro shocks that affect all sectors of the economy roughly equally, roughly contemporaneously. So, for example, a pandemic. But at least as important, and actually I find in the book, even more important, are sector-specific shocks that maybe only directly impact one or two sectors, but those sectors have very high linkages to the rest of the economy. And over a near-term time horizon, so say 12 months, it's just very difficult for households and businesses to find substitutes.

So that's why energy has been a perennial contributor to recessions on both sides of the Atlantic. But if you go back farther in time, another example would be cotton harvest shocks.

And so, I mean, that also seemed to me to be a quite important conclusion to the book because you said right at the beginning that, hey, if you actually look at the correlation of recessions in the UK and the US, they're not as correlated as one might expect, given that they're two kind of open economies with very tight trade and financial linkages.

And it seemed to me that part of the reason was that the way… basically, if you think of economies as like portfolios that have different sector compositions, different stock compositions, basically shocks propagate their way through those economies in different ways. They're insulated to different types of shocks. So that, I guess number one is that kind of correct?

Number two, does that make the job of, say, someone like you less about forecasting a recession and more about saying, hey, this is the kind of shock that we're exposed to, as an economy, given its construction, and this is the kind of shock that we're more insulated against?

Yeah. So, you touch upon two of the reasons why the United Kingdom was historically much less recession prone than the United States. Under the boom/bust view, one would think, well, maybe Brits are just less prone to mania and panic than are Americans. They're more excitable counterparts here in the US. But really, the main reasons are really much more prosaic.

Although that recession was extremely severe. Right? They had to go to the IMF for a bailout, if I remember correctly.

That was a nasty period. And I can't remember the IMF bailout came during the recession or a little bit after, but certainly, yeah, very much related. And yes, they had to limit workdays. There was the Arab oil embargo and then there was a major coal strike. And the Prime Minister, Ted Heath, decided to call an election and the slogan of his campaign was Who Governs Britain? And the answer of the British electorate was not Ted Heath.

You got to be careful with those slogans.

Okay, so, I guess we mentioned this earlier that it does appear that the length between recessions maybe has gone up in the post-World War II era. But you say it's really been more kind of a long-term trend across economies, a very long-term trend towards smoother economic growth.

And the natural thought that I had was, well, that's because the government is much bigger and the government has the ability to spend when other sectors are saving. So, the classic kind of Keynesian offset. And so, it functions as a kind of, you call it a buffer. I like to think of it as like an insurance provider. And you kind of analyze that in a chapter that you call firefighters and arsonists.

And I think you were a little kind of skeptical of that view in the end that you didn't really find that the government's role was a big driver, and the reason that we've got these kinds of longer expansions, if I'm correct. If not, let me know, but tell me how you went and thought about that and tested those ideas.

Yeah, so, because that was one of my priors as well, that the intervention, the rise of a more interventionist countercyclical state, that we might expect to smooth fluctuations in economic activity over time. There are a number of testable hypotheses that this hypothesis would generate - that view would generate.

Now,I should note, is not an argument for inaction because, while it may be the case that economies, in the aggregate, recover from recessionary shocks, that doesn't necessarily mean that every individual, every household does. And I make this point in the book. I think there's a strong normative case to be made for the provision of relief where relief is needed. And, in my view, that's where the income and employment loss is greatest.

But yeah, though the rise of a more interventionist state does not appear to have affected the frequency of recessions nor their depth, nor their duration, that is not necessarily an argument for inaction.

Toward the end of the book you sort of go through an examination of, I guess, the notion that recessions are a cleansing of the rottenness of the system. Right? To go forward we need to get rid of the excesses of the past. Or if you're going to be nerdier about it, do recessions serve a growth enhancing, reallocative purpose?

And I think a lot of people hold that view that there's creative destruction, this notion that we kind of almost have to… we deserve a recession in some sense. And can you tell us about how you examined whether that was the case or not and why you concluded that wasn't true?

Yeah. And so, I should begin by noting that I wanted it to be true.

Why did you want it to be true?

Because recessions are painful, they can be traumatic, they hurt a lot of people. So, one kind of wants to believe that at least it was for something. But what I find is that, while there is a large literature that demonstrates that so called creative destruction, I mean the movement of people and capital from less efficient to more efficient firms, often involving the failure of those less efficient enterprises, that view of creative destruction is important for long-term growth. However, I find that process is impaired rather than enhanced by recessions.

So, for example, I find that research and development is, I hate to use the word cyclical, but research and development is pro cyclical. So, it rises more during economic expansions, and then falls during economic recessions. Recessions are rampant age discriminators. They discriminate against younger workers. They discriminate against younger, often more dynamic firms.

Also, one thing I find in the book, and there's a large literature supporting this, is that one of the key mechanisms by which people and capital resources move from less efficient enterprises to more efficient enterprises is by quitting one job and being hired by another job that's a better match, that's more productive. And that whole ladder, that whole productivity ladder just collapses during economic recessions. Because quitting plummets because no one dares to leave the job, and hiring plummets because firms don't dare to take on new workers. And so, you usually have this period of poor quality employer/employee matches that follows during and immediate aftermath of a recession.

The other way I test this is to simply ask, well, okay, if there is reallocation that's taking place, then we should expect to observe the allocation of people and output across sectors to look fundamentally different at the end of a recovery versus how it would have looked had the economy continued uninterrupted along long run trends. And what I find is that typically the economy, the allocation looks pretty darn similar to how it would have looked had it continued uninterrupted along trend.

Yeah, those were fascinating sections of the book. And the story about the inefficiency of the matching of jobs really resonated with me. I remember I was running my business back, right after the financial crisis, and we were looking to hire someone, and we thought it was a good job in kind of accounting, and we couldn't get anyone. And a friend of mine who was a recruiter says, well, anyone who's got a job right now is not leaving. So, the only people that you're going to be able to interview are the people that you really wouldn't want to hire. And then also your point that the firms that tend to go under in recessions are younger, arguably are the ones that have the potential to change that structure of the economy. Had they survived, maybe they would be able to take business away from an incumbent. So, it's almost like the counter argument could be made that it leads to stagnation.

And also, often those younger firms, they don't have physical capital that they can pledge as collateral. It's hard for them to get a bank loan because they don't have a long credit history. So, that's why I say, yeah, recessions are often rampant age discriminators.

Now that had a much bigger impact, with liquidity coverage ratios, and supplemental leverage ratios, and additional tiered capital requirements, and stress testing, and all of these measures that effectively induced a substitution of lending to the public sector for lending to the private sector. Now this had a much bigger, more persistent impact in the United Kingdom than in the United States for two reasons. First, the United Kingdom was historically much more reliant on bank credit for external financing businesses, whereas in the United States we've always long had a robust ecosystem of venture capital, private equity, also, it's still a legacy of those thousands of regional banks that engage in relationship lending.

Do you think that is… I mean, I can think of two explanations for that policy change. Number one, I think the obvious one is looking back and they're like, well hey, the banks caused this. They were the over-leveraged, undercapitalized, under-regulated, etc. So, we're going to tighten things up. That's one.

The other one, maybe slightly more cynical, but I personally think longer-term is more important is governments are running huge deficits with no end in sight. And so, they need buyers of the debt. And so, it's like, hey, let's change the rules to basically, if not force banks to buy the debt, kind of force them by the back door. So, it's almost a form of financial repression. Do you have a personal view on either of those explanations?

I think they're both plausible. Whether it was deliberate or subconscious. I mean it did effectively resemble financial repression. I mean you're forcing financial institutions to hold more of your sovereign debt. That looks an awful lot like how both the UK and the United States got out of high debt burdens after World War II.

Yeah, and that's a narrative that is not quite forgotten, but close to being forgotten. And I remember that very well. There's this notion of peak oil, that the world was running out and prices might get to $200 a barrel or even more.

In the end, I think you kind of say, well, we should probably imagine ourselves as enrolled in a kind of negative economic lottery, which, in other words, if you imagine rolling a series of dice and if enough of the dice come up, recession or shock (I suppose is a better way to put it), then you're going to have recession. And you say that feels a bit disheartening because there's no… it is a random process. But you say, on the other hand, we have to remember that a lot of those dice have to come up red for us really to hit recession. The economy is actually remarkably robust. It's not just a shock. You need multiple shocks hitting at the same time and probably of a different nature.

And what that demonstrated was that the summation of chance or random causes can generate what looks like cyclical behavior, even though the underlying data generating process is in fact random. Now, that doesn't mean that we should just throw our hands up in desperation or in frustration that recessions are unforecastable and unpredictable, which I demonstrate in the book, that recessions are unforecastable and unpredictable, but what we can do is look at, as you know, the kinds of shocks that historically contributed to recessions. And to think about, okay, well, conditional on what I've seen in recent months or recent quarters, would I raise or lower the unconditional probability?

So, in the past century there's been about, in any given year there's been about a 1 in 100 chance of pandemic related recession. In any given year, in the United States, there's been about a 1 in 10 chance of an energy related recession, although that probability has been going down. And in any given year there's been about a 1 in 50 chance of a credit controls related recession. And so, you can subjectively ask yourself, okay, conditional on what I've just observed, do I think the probability in the next year is going to be higher or lower than that unconditional probability?

Yeah, I don't know if you're familiar with Nassim Taleb's first book, which was called Fooled by Randomness, but your book reminded me a lot of that because his basic idea was, hey, we're programmed to see patterns and sequences that are random. And it was very statistically focused. And yours is, it's a different book but essentially the underlying theme is similar. Right?

There's this randomness that we have this kind of need to assign a narrative to and we might be better off, or we would be better off just appreciating some of the key findings you talked about. Focus on long-term economic growth, focus on not screwing up the rebound and in making the economy as robust as it can to absorb as many shocks as it can.

I'm going to ask you a potentially unfair question to end it up. But since you mentioned that, maybe what economists should be focusing on now is kind of looking at what shocks have hit the economy and what that says for their ability to withstand future shocks. I mean, if we look at the US economy now, we have had some shocks in the last 18 months. We've had the imposition of tariffs, although that's changed up and down. We've had the oil shock with the Iran war. What does that tell you about the types of shocks that might be particularly dangerous now given what we've just experienced in the last 18 months? Or do you find that those shocks, maybe, aren't that meaningful? I mean, how are you thinking about it?

And so, across most advanced economies, we maintain strategic petroleum reserves as sort of a hedge against these kinds of supply disruptions. So, there are similarities, but also some key differences, which is why I think we've seen a lot of resilience over the past few months. In terms of potential shocks that the book has led me to consider, that maybe others aren't as concerned about, but probably should be, I found that a lot of recessions are related to sector-specific shocks, to specific sectors that are both highly linked to the rest of the economy and that the output of which is difficult for households and businesses to find substitutes.

So, right now we have on hold the threat of imposition of export restrictions on rare earth elements from the People's Republic of China. I mean, that's currently deferred until the autumn. But that's the kind of shock that reminds me of some of the past energy supply shocks, or some steel shocks, or cotton, on these essential products, the supply disruption of which can really have spillover effects into other parts of the economy.

Great. Well, I appreciate the thoughts on the current situation and very much appreciate you writing the book and taking the time to come and talk to us about it on the show. So, Tyler, thanks so much for your time today and thanks for joining us.

Thanks for having me on, Kevin, great talking with you.

Okay. The book is called Recession: The Real Reasons Economies Shrink and What to Do About It. And it's full of fascinating stories, great graphics, data. I guarantee we've only just scratched the surface, so please make sure you go out and get a copy and follow Tyler's work because I think you can tell from today's conversation many of these ideas are not being discussed on mainstream media. So, for all of us here at Top Traders Unplugged, thanks for listening and we'll see you next time.

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