Japan rewired its politics: a power shift, a woman at the helm, and a minority government forced to bargain for every vote. What follows when high approval collides with hard math - aging demographics, weak yen, and defense budgets racing past old taboos?

Analyst Tobias Harris, author of The Iconoclast and writer of Observing Japan, joins The Jacob Shapiro Podcast to unpack the country’s most surprising election in years - one that produced its first female prime minister and a government held together by negotiation. Expect sharper debates on security, energy, food, and China ties, with South Korea and Washington watching. Is this real generational change or a new face for old factions? The stakes: whether Japan can act before events act on it.

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Timestamps:

(00:00) - Introduction

(00:25) - Challenges in Understanding Japanese Politics

(01:05) - Recent Japanese Election Overview

(02:00) - Unexpected Election Results and Political Shifts

(05:45) - Historical Context and Political Fragmentation

(07:29) - Farewell to Shigeru Ishiba

(12:31) - Rise of Japan's First Female Prime Minister

(22:57) - Public Perception and Future Prospects

(27:46) - Understanding Political Longevity

(28:30) - Policy Expectations and Challenges

(32:49) - Economic and Fiscal Policies

(37:39) - Foreign Policy and Relations with China

(43:15) - Japan-South Korea Relations

(48:55) - Japan-US Relations and Defense Strategy

(55:45) - Concluding Thoughts on Leadership

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Referenced in the Show:

Tobais' website: https://observingjapan.com/

Observing Japan Substack: https://substack.com/@observingjapan

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Jacob Shapiro Site: jacobshapiro.com

Jacob Shapiro LinkedIn: linkedin.com/in/jacob-l-s-a9337416

Jacob Twitter: x.com/JacobShap

Jacob Shapiro Substack: jashap.substack.com/subscribe

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The Jacob Shapiro Show is produced and edited by Audiographies LLC. More information at audiographies.com

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Jacob Shapiro is a speaker, consultant, author, and researcher covering global politics and affairs, economics, markets, technology, history, and culture. He speaks to audiences of all sizes around the world, helps global multinationals make strategic decisions about political risks and opportunities, and works directly with investors to grow and protect their assets in today’s volatile global environment. His insights help audiences across industries like finance, agriculture, and energy make sense of the world.

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Hello listeners.

Welcome to another episode of the Jacob Shapiro podcast.

Uh, joining me again is Tobias Harris, not the NBA player, but the Japanese analyst.

He's the author of the Substack Observing Japan.

It's excellent observing japan.substack.com.

It's a substack that I subscribe to, so I'm not just blowing

smoke up, uh, Tobias's ass.

I think it's an excellent resource if you're interested

in learning more about Japan.

I often say this when I'm in front of audiences, I actually find that Japan is

one of the countries it is hardest to get.

Good information about, there's so many English language sources out there about

China, about Europe, even about Russia.

Um, but Japan is very idiosyncratic and unless you're really engaging with

Japanese sources, you can miss the nuance in Japanese politics because

the West has a, has a terrible.

Habit of just applying things that are true in Western politics to Japanese

politics and they don't map on.

So I really recommend, um, Tobias's work.

Um, we also mentioned his book, by the way, in the podcast, the Iconic Class.

It's a biography of, um, former, uh, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,

who was assassinated a few years ago.

Um, Tobias has been obviously busy because there was a huge election in Japan.

A couple of weeks ago, um, a big upset.

Um, and we recorded this Thursday, October 23rd.

I don't think we will sit on it that long because it's the, uh,

second or third day I forget of, of the new Japanese government.

Um, and we'll see if it's more of the same, but I have a sense that actually

maybe there's, there's some more going on here, um, in Japanese politics than.

The eye.

So write to me at jacob@jacobshae.com if you have any questions,

comments, or concerns.

Um, we have a ton of podcast, uh, podcast content coming

outta the next couple weeks.

I've been recording a ton of episodes this week that we will dribble

out, so I hope you enjoy that.

Some really interesting guests, even some more high pro profile

guests and we've had on previously.

So hope you enjoy that.

Take care of the people that you love.

Cheers.

And see you at

all.

Right, Tobias, again, not the NBA basketball player, but the

Japanese analyst who substack you should all be subscribing to.

I'm subscribed as well, is back to talk to us about, uh, I mean, pretty

surprising Japanese election result.

Good to see you, Tobias.

Good to see you Jacob.

Thanks for having me back.

Um, a pleasure and thank you for taking time.

I know that you are probably the prettiest girl, uh, at the dance right now.

Um, I was, I was telling listeners like I have a bevy of podcasts and

I've been traveling the last couple weeks traveling the upcoming week.

So I have not done as much prep work 'cause I like to, before a podcast, so in,

I'll be a good surrogate listener 'cause I'm gonna ask you what may feel like basic

questions, but, uh, tell the listeners what happened in Japan's elections,

um, and why it was such a surprise.

What was the expectation and what actually happened?

Well, I mean, we've really had, uh, a pretty monumental, let's say

six weeks or so now where, I mean, or I mean maybe even longer going back to

July with the, the upper house elections.

But, you know, we ended up in this situation, uh, where throughout August

we had this Will Ishiba go or will he stay and can he resist the pressure?

And they went back and forth.

And then finally, the LDP.

Did its election postmortem and said, you know, actually there were

a lot of things that, you know, he failed to do that contributed to the

party's loss and it basically became inevitable that he was gonna leave.

So early September, he announces that he's gonna resign, opens the way for

the second LDP leadership election in as many years, and we ended up getting.

You know, compared to last year where it was really almost like

a four or five week, you know, nine candidates crisscrossing the

country, having lots of events, and this year was much more subdued.

I mean, in part because, uh, you had five candidates instead of nine.

They were all candidates who ran last year.

They were all familiar.

And I think there was a sense too that in contrast last year when you hadn't had.

I think there was a recognition that things were more complicated,

that it was hard to make, uh, overly ambitious promises.

Uh, just keep that in the back of your minds for a second because I, I

think we'll have to come back to that.

Mm-hmm.

You know, kind of a sense of, well, you know, we're gonna be, we're competing to

lead a party within minority government.

And so I think there was a sense, you know, it was more subdued.

It was a little more, you know, the, the sense of.

Constraint and difficulty I think was higher.

And so it was a, a shorter campaign, but it did end up being surprising

because, uh, in contrast to expectations, and if you look at the betting

markets, and if you looked at the polls, it certainly looked like Jiro

was, was gonna win this time around.

And what you ended up getting instead was a fairly surprising victory by t

the, uh, right wing, uh, candidate.

And she prevailed on October 4th.

And you would think, okay, well in the past you win the LDP leadership

election, that means you're gonna be on track to become Prime Minister.

And actually what happened instead was a pretty dramatic scramble.

Uh, first the LDP ended, or, or rather, its coalition with the Buddhist

party cume to ended after 26 years because they, uh, did not like the

terms that Takeuchi was offering.

And that meant that the LDP was gonna have a pretty big hole to make up.

Did win the premiership and it also gave a group of opposition

parties a window of opportunity to try to organize a counter campaign

to elect their own prime minister.

So you had this like mad scramble over the course of 10 days and in the

end the LDP did pry away one of the opposition parties, each noi and had

enough votes to secure's election.

That happened Tuesday.

So that's

six.

Uh, wild period for Japanese politics.

Yeah.

And probably, I mean, I don't know, you'll, you'll tell me whether we should

get used to this, this, this is sort of what Japanese politics was like

before, um, Abe dominated the scene.

Is that a fair characterization?

Um, not, not entirely.

I mean, there have been periods, I mean, the period that this.

I mean, the last couple weeks most closely resembled, I mean, this was

sort of before my time, but you know, really the, the early to mid nineties

where, you know, the L DP in 1993 lost its majority, you ended up getting

this seven party opposition coalition taking power that didn't last that long.

Then you got this weird LDP LED coalition with the socialist and we

all, that's, that's on everyone's mind because the prime minister who led that,

uh, uh, mariama, he died last week.

So everyone was sort of thinking back to these moments.

So you've had moments of.

More or less fragmentation.

Um, you know, 'cause what really happened in the, you know, the, the first

decade of this century was uncertainty.

That really had more to do with the fact that Japan was exploring, uh,

possibly having a two party system.

And sort of the tensions that competition that came with that.

Uh, not so much the fragmentation, but what we're really experiencing now

is a sense that there's actually no.

There does not seem to be a political force that is capable

of mustering a majority.

And as a result you have, you know, the LDP is short of majority.

You have this group of opposition parties, none of which is able

to really command a majority.

Uh, and so power is more diffuse.

There's a lot more bargaining, there's a lot more negotiation

that has to go on to govern.

And that situation seems likely to continue.

I mean, I guess we, you know, we'll talk more about, you know, whether

Takeuchi has the, uh, the mojo I guess to break, to break that.

But for the moment, I mean, that fragmentation really is, uh, the

reality that Japan faces now.

Yeah.

So before we dive into that, I do, I, I think we would be remiss if we didn't

pour one out for, um, Shigeru Ishiba.

I, I think, I think from reading you that you're sympathetic to him.

I'll tell you that I have a little, I've had a little bit of

trouble being as objective as I usually am because I just like him.

Uh, like I've, I've liked him from the very beginning.

Um, he, he seemed like an underdog.

He seems to be a really thoughtful, um, you know, figure.

And he always, I mean, you, you talked on one of our podcasts about he.

He, he seemed from the very start as like a tragic figure.

Somebody who was even aware that he was not gonna get to the finish line

of all the ambitious goals that he had.

And you, you put out a really, um, nice piece about him as an idealist,

uh, versus the bureaucratic power element that is in Japanese politics.

So before we turn to Akai and, and all the fun things that are happening, um,

why don't I just set you up there to talk about, to say goodbye to Shige

Yeshiva and to talk a little bit about that, that contrast in idealism.

And, and, and, and bureaucratic politics because it does seem to be very present

and it's gonna be very present in Japan's relations with the US in relations with

China, even in, in domestic policy.

Yeah.

I mean, you know, it was unfortunate.

You know, it's, it's, um, you know, as, as Mark said, you know, leaders don't,

you know, you don't get to pick the circumstances that you find yourself in.

And, you know, he, uh, you know, was obviously someone who.

You know, he really thought for a long time about the kind of country Japan

should be and that he wanted it to be.

And you know, in some ways he wanted, you know, he wanted it to be a kinder

country, a you know, a country where, you know, there's more, uh, emphasis on,

uh, trust and, uh, solidarity and, uh.

Cooperation and, you know, just, uh, uh, you know, wanted to sort of smooth over

the rough edges of political conflict.

And, uh, you know, I'd like to think of him and, and some of the other parts

of, you know, his part of the party is more of, they're, they're one nation

conservatives, you know, that they wanna, you know, they wanna speak for

the entire country and they don't wanna stoke division, they wanna heal division.

And, you know, he.

In some ways that made him actually well suited for the moment that he faced.

Because, you know, within weeks of taking office, he ended up as

the head of a minority government.

And it was a government that had to do a lot of negotiation.

You know, if he was gonna get anything done, he had to

talk to opposition parties.

And he actually, I mean, to his credit, actually did a, um.

A reasonable job at it.

You know, I mean, by one metric, you know, he could have easily, uh, wound up

facing a no confidence motion because, you know, the opposition parties, you know,

had enough votes to pass one in theory.

Uh, and ultimately he made enough deals and found a way to work with, uh, you

know, sort of one partner and then another that he basically pushed off.

Um.

A no confidence motion.

And so in that sense, you know, he, he, he kind of won a game.

It wasn't the, the ultimate game of survival, but he

did, he did manage that one.

But I mean, ultimately this was, you know, he inherited an LDP that

had really lost the public's trust.

Uh, he inherited a political system that really is actually,

I think going through quite, um.

Quite significant period of transition and, and in some ways

it's Japan converging to other democracies where you are seeing,

I think, a pretty big disconnect between the old and the young and.

You know, that that is causing, I think all sorts of weirdness

and all sorts of changes.

And I think it really contributed to some of the problems the LDP has had

and that it feels very outta touch.

And, you know, here's someone who, you know, he had been in politics since,

you know, the 1980s and, you know, came from a very, uh, you know, really

wanted Japan's forest most rural.

Pres, you know, very out of touch with young urban voters

and the issues they faced.

And so, you know, just like, did not really seem to be, the man for the

moment did not really seem to have the answers, you know, to the policy

issues that the country was facing.

You know, the economic problems that people are facing.

Um, and just, you know, not.

Not a character able to generate excitement.

And ultimately I think that ult, you know, that ultimately is what did him in, you

know, he didn't pick the circumstances.

Um, he did the best he could.

I think he also, we should say probably did, you know, really as best he could

in talking with the United States, you know, given, um, you Trump was gonna

demand what he was gonna demand and, you know, that he was gonna have to make

some kind of deal and it was probably gonna be a deal on more favorable terms.

Uh, for the United States than, uh, for Japan.

And so, you know, again, did the best he could, I think, given the

circumstances, um, you know, but ultimately, you know, probably a man,

not the right man for the moment.

Uh, ultimately, and I think, uh, you know, that that really is what led the party to,

to move on from him, I think in the end.

Do you think he has a career going forward, or is this it?

Have we seen the last of him?

Uh, I, I don't.

Have a comeback in him.

You know, it's, um, I mean, you know, I mean this is, this is May, maybe this

is a transition to talking aboutI, but I mean, it's pretty remarkable actually.

She's the first Japanese prime minister born after 1960, and she was born in 1961.

So, you know, there's really been this stubborn feeling of generational change,

you know, waiting for, um, you know.

Uh, you know, leadership that is closer to the issues that a lot of

voters are facing, um, that have come vague in a different time.

You know, and even, you know, and even Takai being born in 19, you

know, she entered pol, you know, she was elected to diet in 1993.

So, you know, same year Abe was elected, same year Kishi, Kiva was first elected.

So, you know, it's, it's, um, you know, there is a feeling that, you

know, when is, when are you really gonna see generational change?

When are you really gonna see, um.

You a shift to a generation that really has come of age in, you

know, the post economic bubble world, the post cold war world.

You know, you're still waiting for that move.

Um.

That hasn't quite happened yet.

Yeah.

I mean, to put that into reference for our US based listeners, Barack

Obama today is 64 years old.

Uh, so it's, it's quite a thing that we're describing, uh, you know, that

Oh, we're, we're embracing a younger generation for somebody who, uh, I mean,

compared to Donald Trump, she's a spring chicken, but I mean, she's still somebody

who's, who's a relatively old, um, we should also say she's the first female

prime minister, um, in Japan's history.

Is is there anything you wanna say about that?

I mean, that feels.

Pretty notable in a society that has a, maybe a stereotypical reputation,

but a reputation for being fairly patriarchal and for women not sort

of being at the front of the pack.

And here is takai, not only at the front of the pack, but like seems

to be the firebrand seems to be the one that, uh, has ideas that is,

that is strong, that is gonna move.

It's, it's a very interesting subversion of what you would

expect, I think from the stereotype.

Well, given that the LDP has provided virtually all of

Japan's prime ministers back to 1955, I mean, it was gonna have to be someone,

uh, some, someone in the ldp, you know, the odds were better than not.

Um, you know, the, the thing about the LDP know the L dp, as of now, uh, among its

diet members, fewer than 10% are women.

So, um, you know, it is still a party that is, uh, you know, very dominated by men.

Um.

I mean, the other unusual thing about her, um, is that, I mean, she really comes from

a, you know, relatively modest background.

You know, she's not a hereditary politician.

She's not a diagnostic politician.

She's not, you know, the relative child grandchild of a prime

minister, other senior politician.

I mean, she really, uh.

Unusual in that way, in that she, you know, came from, you

know, pretty humble background.

Um, you know, her parents basically said like, we don't want you even, you know,

she could have gone to, you know, an elite school in Tokyo and her parents

told her not to, you know, stay closer to home, go to, you know, a pretty, um,

you know, not a pretty wellknown college or anything like that, and mm-hmm.

But she, you know, really clawed her way into politics on her own, her own

kind of strength and her own ambition.

Um, and.

You know, I, I, you know, you can't really tell the story of her career

though without her relationship with Abe.

And, you know, Abe really was her patron.

And, you know, the first time she became a cabinet minister was when he became

Prime Minister for the first time in 2006.

And, you know, she was really part of, you know, his circle of.

You know, she was very devoted to him and supported him and, you know, and

he in turn, uh, helped her advance.

And, you know, and that's, look, I mean, for men or women,

you know, you need patriots.

You need someone who is helping you, uh, who is helping you along.

But I think for, you know, for a woman, a woman, particularly

in the period in which she.

Has, you know, her career has unfolded.

I mean, it's hard to imagine it happening, you know, in the absence of a powerful

patron like Abe, you know, particularly because she's not a hereditary politician.

I mean, when you look at like, um, you know, one of the other

more prominent female Japanese politicians, so, uh, Obuchi.

Yuko, okay.

Her father was a prime minister, you know, and she's, um, you know,

that, that certainly helped her.

You know, it's like, so, you know, not having those resources, um.

She, you know, needed, needed that kind of, uh, support.

And so, you know, she was loyal to Abe and Abe repaid that loyalty in return.

Um, and it certainly helped her be in a position for, you know, as he.

Receded, you know, first as he stepped back from the premiership,

and then as he, you know, as he, you know, was assassinated in 2022.

I mean, she was well positioned to emerge as the leader of that

part of the party, you know?

Mm-hmm.

That having been, you know, trusted by him, close to him.

Uh, and then when she ran for the leadership in the first, for the

first time in 2021, basically having him as her campaign manager, uh.

That, that went a long way, I think, to position her, you know, as the heir to his

movement, uh, versus some of the other, uh, you know, maybe male contenders.

Yeah.

Um, when you were first talking, it sort of sounded like maybe there was a Thatcher

comparison to be made, but I don't know, with the, with the Abe patron ship, it

doesn't sound like there is, and I'm, am I also reading you correct that we

shouldn't read into her election as any kind of fundamental change in like gender?

Of Japan itself.

She's more of an exception than, than she is some kind of, you know,

shattering of a glass ceiling.

Is, am I being too cynical?

Uh, I mean, you know, it's, it's a meaningful achievement,

but clearly it was something that, you know, really, you know, well,

and, and look, I, I don't wanna.

Downplay her own political talents.

You know, I think she, um, you know, has a genuinely strong devoted following and

it made it po I mean, made this possible that she really does have, you know,

real supporters on the grassroots who, you know, really, uh, I think genuinely

are affectionate for her particularly.

You know, like you look at these like rally she has, I mean, she really

has, I think, a very strong following.

I think she has, um.

Extra work ethic.

You know, this is something that, which probably actually is like a Thatcher, a

Thatcher comparison that maybe is apt. But you know, she just, you know, I think,

um, you know, there's a sense that she's gonna out hustle her, her opponents, you

know, she's gonna work harder than them.

She's willing to put in the hours.

Uh, you know, Ishiba, you know, after she won, I teased her, um, you know, about.

Making sure she remembers work life balance.

Like, you know, she's, I mean, but she's, you know, like has real ability.

She's, you know, I think she's a, uh, yeah.

Has extraordinary command of policy details.

I mean, you watch her give these press conferences and it's just, you

know, like her ability to just sort of reel off facts, you know, um,

almost without coming up for error.

I mean, it's like, it's almost, it's, I mean, it's.

You know, when I watch them, I mean, you, you just realize like, wow,

she's just like going on and on.

I mean, really knows, um, you know, knows the issues extraordinarily well.

Um, you know, so is formidable in her own right.

And I, and I, and I wanna stress that, you know, this is not just

like, oh, well, you know, she was just given this thing and didn't earn it.

I mean, there were, you know, she has real talents that, uh.

And so essentially she was, uh, given the opportunity because she had those talents.

She didn't have the talents.

I don't think she gets where she's now.

So, um, yeah, you know, I, I wanna, I wanna make sure that that is clear.

Um, but you know, she, um.

In terms of, you know, is this the glass, glass ceiling shattering?

I mean, you know, the, the real challenge, you know, again, you know, LDP has

only, you know, you know, only 10% of its national lawmakers are, are women.

So there's some work to do just because, you know, it's a parliamentary system.

So how do you get ahead?

I mean, you have to serve the time.

You have to, you know, be around, you have to climb the ladder and if you're

not getting on the ladder in the first place, you know, that's very hard to do.

And I think one thing she's gonna do, um.

To help women climb the ladder, so.

You know, of those 38 women in the diet, uh, from the LDP, more than,

more than 25% of them are now in government posts of one sort or another.

So, you know, she's gonna really, you know, I think she really is

trying to cultivate kind of the next generation of female leaders within

the LDP and give them, you know, give them those opportunities to move up.

Uh.

So, you know, it, it certainly, I, I think the, you know, whether it's

the glass ceiling, you know, has been shattered or just, you know, maybe, maybe

it's the wrong metaphor and it just.

You know, the, the door doors, more doors are opened or the

bar is lower, or whatever it is.

I mean, I, I think

No, I, that, that's a great point.

More, more doors are open for women than ever before in Japanese politics.

And I mean, they weren't open at all.

So, I mean, it's, it's something that's pretty remarkable.

Yeah.

I mean, look, and also look, she, you know, we now have the first, uh, female,

uh, finance minister, haven't had a female finance minister before, so, you know.

Things there are opportunities.

And I, and I think she's working on creating those opportunities.

And so, um, you know, she has generally, I mean this, this, during

this leadership campaign, she, I think talked it up a little more.

But, you know, in pa in the past has generally not tried

to make a lot of, you know.

Trying to get a lot of political credit out of being, you know, the, you know,

a candidate to become the first female Prime Minister was generally not how, you

know, she did not wanna win on that basis.

You know, she wanted to win because of her ideas and her talents and her skills.

Um, and I, you know, ultimately that is why she won.

I don't think, I don't think she won necessarily because people were,

you know, were drawn to vote for her just because, uh, you know, she'd

be the first female prime Minister.

But, um.

That did seem to be played up a little more during this leadership

campaign than in the past.

Mm-hmm.

Um, one of the, the interesting things, or one of the things that

makes her different also is that, uh, she's coming into power with.

Far higher approval ratings than any of her predecessors.

Um, so I mean, maybe Japanese politics is still, you know, maybe the LDP can't

command majorities and things like that, but she at least seems to have a honeymoon

period that she's gonna walk into to, to, what do you ascribe that and do you

think, is there any stain power to that?

I, when, when Abe was assassinated, I, I wondered if there wasn't gonna be some

kind of groundswell of support for his policies that never really materialized.

Like it didn't really.

Move things forward.

Japan just continued in, in this direction.

Um, but she seems to have a bigger mandate than anybody that proceeded

her, aside from Abe, or at least you know, anybody who has tried to do

anything in Japanese politics since Abe.

So can she do anything with that?

Is she stuck with, um, the LDP not having the same broad appeal that it did before?

Like how do you think that plays into, to her next moves?

Um, I mean, you'd certainly, it's certainly better

to start with, with higher approval ratings than not.

I mean, I, I, you know, so, um.

Off the bat, it's, it's a better position to be in than where her immediate

predecessors were starting from.

And, you know, I think there's a few factors to that.

I do think there's, um, you know, some of it is just a, you

know, I think people are, uh,

gratified to see the first female prime minister.

And so I think there's, there's a bit of a, you know, kind of maybe like

a halo effect from being the first female prime minister and historic.

Moment for Japan.

Uh.

The thing we are seeing is young voters, um, are drawn to her and,

um, on Blue Sky this morning I was kind of going back and forth with

some other Japan politics watchers.

Just trying to, just trying to like, like, why, like why are we seeing this?

I mean, and because it's not just why are we seeing such strong support

from the young for her, like in.

That came out yesterday.

I mean, her support from voters under, under 40 is 80%.

Ishiba was 15%.

So like, that's, that's weird and unusual.

Um, but the same voters.

Those same under 40 voters are the same voters who, you know, in July

were voting for, you know, this, you know, populous, right party santo,

you know, the same voters who are voting for the populous, right.

Uh, democratic party for the people.

I mean, so, uh, you know, is it that young voters just are more right wing?

Is it that, um, you know, uh, young voters are just more online?

And, you know, there is, you know, this sort of, uh, culture, uh, you know,

sort of right wing culture online.

And so there's sort of a, a bent to the information they're, they're

receiving about politics online.

Is it that, um.

You know, is it, and, and I think, you know, there might be another, you know,

more of like a vibes rather than ideology way of thinking about it, where, you

know, Abe had pretty robust support from the young when he was Prime Minister and

you know, I thought some of it was, um.

You know, some of it was just, you know, omics was good for young people, you know,

if you were leaving school and entering the job market, you know, those were

pretty good years to, to be doing that.

You know, wages were finally going up.

Um, you know, you basically, uh, you know, the, the jobs to the,

the, the worker to jobs ratio, uh, was, was very favorable for workers.

You know, you had your pickup job.

Mm-hmm.

Um, so those were, you know, not, not bad years to be a young person, but

also, you know, to what extent was it.

You know, voters respond to energetic leadership, you know, and, and I

think it also explained why Zubi was as popular as he was back in the day,

that, you know, uh, it's not even so much about what is this leader

actually saying they're gonna do.

But, you know, a leader who presents figure, a leader who presents energy,

a leader who you know, uh, is.

Speaking directly to the people who you know, you can go see.

They have, you know, energy at their rallies like that,

like people respond to that.

And, you know, I think young voters in particular seem to be responding to that.

So, you know, it's probably some mix of all the above.

You know, some of it probably is, you know, young people

are maybe more conservative.

And we've seen this maybe in, in other, uh, in other democracies.

Um.

But I think in contrast to Ishiba, in contrast to Ishida,

uh, she looks more energetic.

She looks like someone who, you know, is gonna provide dynamic leadership.

It's not just gonna be, you know, oh, old LDP is just like sitting

here, you know, twiddling their thumbs, not really doing anything.

And so it's possible that it's, it's a response.

To that, um, mm-hmm.

As much as anything else.

I mean, and the last thing actually, when we look, you know, Abe was

always more popular than his policies.

You know, his, his approval ratings were pretty robust

kind of throughout his tenure.

Um, but he generally pulled better than the things that he wanted to

do, which means that, you know, for Kochi, I mean, that maybe is

a cautionary tale, uh, not to, uh.

Not to interpret high approval ratings as necessarily a

mandate to do whatever you want.

And, and that was something I think Ave was always sort of careful about, you

know, and sort of picking his battles and, um, knowing when to push ahead and

when to compromise and when to pull back.

And, and that's, you know, the secret to longevity in some ways, um, is being

able to read those opportunities and.

Kind of have, have an ability to sort of intuit where the public's mood is.

Mm-hmm.

Um, well that's a good segue.

So policy-wise, what are we expecting from her?

I know that she's, uh, my, in my brief look at this, she's talked about,

uh, continuing omics in a weird way.

So maybe we're talking about, I mean, Japan it looked like was finally.

Starting to raise rates, uh, are we gonna go back to that sort of thing.

And then there's the question of relations with the us There's the

questions of relations with China.

There's the question of rice prices, which they've been down for a couple weeks, but

we're still at, you know, extreme highs.

Although I saw something from, I think her new agricultural minister that they

were worried now about an oversupply that would kill farmers next year.

So like, you know, if you're damned, if you do, damned if you don't,

um, take, take us through, uh, the policy landscape for her and, and

what changes we should expect, if any, uh, as a result of what she.

What her priorities are gonna be.

So she has taken office sounding very ambitious, you know,

very, you know, not, you know, not wanting to, uh, you know, in some

ways, you know, wanting to overcome the political constraints she faces.

And that's, I mean, that's why, I mean, there's, there's gonna be

this tension, uh, in her government.

And we're, I mean, at least we're really seeing this at the start where.

She, she has things she wants to do, you know, she is, um, you know, you

can call her an AIST or a neo aist or whatever, which, I mean, really what,

what it fundamentally means is, you know, at least what I mean, I think

about it as you know, Japan faces a.

World and increasingly dangerous world.

And it is the responsibility of the Japanese states to defend the

lives and liberty and property of the Japanese people from

the dangers that are out there.

And that was very much like how Abe approached things.

And it is even more, I think, how she.

Thinks about what needs to be done.

And so, I mean, everything is through that lens of, you know, she talks about

economic security, she talks about food security, she talks about energy security.

She talks about national security.

I mean, all of this, I mean, fundamentally that is, um, how she,

you know, the lens through which she is viewing what has to get done.

Uh, but that.

Agenda then has to compete with the fact that yes, she has a coalition

partner, hin Kai, that one that shares a lot of these goals.

Uh, but between the two of them, they're still just short of a majority.

Uh, you know, they, so they still have to find some other group or grouping.

Is willing sign on to whatever they wanna do.

Um, and I mean, she did manage to, to add a few of those votes in the

lower house to, to win, uh, the premiership on the first ballot in

the lower house, um, on Tuesday.

So, you know, those votes maybe are getable, uh, but ish Noka is,

uh, potentially a meial partner is a partner that has decided that

it doesn't actually wanna be it.

Coalition partner outside of the cabinet.

So it faces, uh, lower barriers to exit.

It is in a position to, you know, if they don't like what she's

doing, um, they can, they can pull the plug and just say, we're out.

You know, you're, you know, this, this isn't working for us.

So, um, you know, it is a more precarious position.

Um, you know, maybe a slightly better position than Ishiba had been in

where, you know, he had this, you know.

DPS longstanding coalition partner called, but uh, they were still

short of a majority and had to negotiate and had to, you know, peel

off, uh, you know, some opposition party or another to do anything.

And it was time consuming and it was not the easiest way to govern.

And I think it led Ishiba to scale back his ambitions.

Um, so I think Akai has taken the lesson, don't scale back your ambitions, but you

still have real political constraints.

And I think real, um.

To getting things done.

Mm-hmm.

And so she's gonna have to, you know, navigate that.

You know, how do you convert your ambitions into reality, uh, when, you

know, it may not take much for, you know, the, those, the political reality to, to

really, uh, to really bite, bite back.

Yeah.

What, what do you think she's gonna do in terms of.

Of fiscal policy.

'cause I mean, I saw that, that quote that you you put of hers when she

said, the goal of fiscal policy is not just to balance the books, it's about

leaving a growing Japan to the future.

Um, and then some flowery language afterwards.

Um, so what do we think that means, uh, in practical terms?

Like what do you think are the fiscal moves that she's gonna push?

So, I mean, like, this, you know, really

comes back to this idea of, of.

You know, building a strong state and you know, and to have a strong

state, you need a strong economy.

Uh, but all of that, I mean, that really was, you know,

was kind of the Abe approach.

And so she's continuing that.

And you know, the thing to understand is that, you know, Japan's modern

monetary theorists, you know, this idea that deficits don't matter and

that you can, uh, you know that, that.

The fiscal limits that more conventional economics, as you know,

all governments face, uh, are, are not as, uh, binding, uh, Japan's modern

monetary theorists are on the right.

They're not on the left, you know?

Mm-hmm.

Because ultimately, these are the, these are the people in Japanese

politics who, you know, there are things that have to get done.

And, you know, probably top of that list is defense spending.

You know, Japan has to spend more on defense.

It has to have more autonomous capabilities, and we're not gonna let

those penny pinchers at the finance ministry tell us we can't do it.

You know, like that's why that quote stood out to me.

And that was, that was, and that wasn't talking to you?

That was her finance minister.

But it echoes the kind of, but it echoes the kind of things that

we've heard from, um, from her.

Before, I mean that's why I thought it was, it was useful, but just as

like a single phrase that really captures, I think the attitude that,

you know what, there are things we need to do and we're not gonna

let the finance industry stop us.

Um, and you know, that.

Is the mindset.

And so, you know, so last year when she ran for the leadership and didn't

win, you know, she, I think she leaned much more into deficits, don't matter.

We can spend more, we can, you know, like we can, we can deal with this

and there are things we have to do.

There are strategic investments.

We have to, and we're not gonna let that stop us.

She, you know, and also, um, was much more explicit in.

Against the DOJs plans to normalize, you know, raise rates and, and all of that.

I think this year she scaled that back somewhat.

And I don't know, you know, I don't know to, you know, to what extent that

was, you know, well, maybe I should moderate a little bit to try to win.

Or the fact that, you know, the bond market has been speaking

this year rather loudly and, um.

You know, maybe being cognizant of, you know, not wanting to trigger kind of

adverse market reactions and being maybe a little more cautious about her language.

But I, you know, fundamentally, I mean, look, I think her philosophy is Japan, uh,

Japan, the, the fiscal constraints that many worry about are not as binding as

something, and there's more room for it.

And, um, you know, there's, there's certainly a bias towards, uh, spending.

More if there are needs that have to be funded.

And so that's the, that's the inclination, you know, you know, practically speaking,

um, you know, she still has to work with HIN to pass a budget, you know, and so

Ian's preferences are gonna shape things.

Um, you know, and there is, there is a slight difference between Ian's

mindset and I think hers where, so I did an interview the other, the

other day, and I talked about her as basically like a military Keynesian.

Um.

Ishin is actually kind of more conventional neoliberal, like small

government deregulation, finding ways to, you know, like one of the things

they demanded the LDP promised to do was create, um, basically Japan's answer to

Doge to review, you know, inefficient spending and, you know, find cost savings.

And so.

You know, so they're not necessarily free spending.

I mean, they have things that they want the government to spend

on, but you know, they want, um.

They think there's ways of, of getting savings, you know, by making,

making the government more efficient.

Um, so, so that's, I mean, you know, there's, there's a slight tension there

in terms of, you know, kind of the mindset and the approach between the two parties.

Hmm.

Um, it's funny, I was, I was, one of the events I did last week, there were some.

Some folks in the American aquatics, fisheries space there.

And, uh, after, after my presentation, one of them sat down next to me

at dinner and said, so tell me why is the yen so weak against the

dollar and when will it change?

Uh, and he might even be listening right now.

Uh, I wouldn't be expecting much strength from the yen if what

Tobias just, uh, said is correct.

Um, maybe let's talk a little bit about foreign policy.

Um, Abe, it's funny, like if, if you.

If you followed through on what Abe said, you would've thought that it was gonna

bring Japan into and China into great power conflict sooner rather than later.

But he was also a masterful diplomat with Xi Jinping.

Arguably Japanese Chinese relations were, I don't know, better than

they have been in, in a generation.

I maybe I'm, I'm speaking, uh, out of turn there, but, um, what do

you, what do you think is gonna be, um, Takeuchi's approach with China?

Because that's obviously the dragon in the room that she's.

I mean, in some ways the, the, the constraints and the challenges

that every Japanese prime minister has to face in China are the same.

You know, where, you know, the military threat is real, you know,

the threat of, um, tension over territory, territorial disputes is real.

Uh.

The sort of risks of, you know, overdependence on China, of Chinese

overproduction of Chinese, uh, you know, intellectual property, theft of Chinese.

Now, you know, increasingly, you know, Chinese competition in, uh,

sectors that Japanese Corp, you know, companies have had, you know.

Market share to themselves.

You know, not just domestically, but also just, you know, all over, you

know, all over Southeast Asia and all over, you know, all over the world.

Um, you know, thinking specifically of the, of the auto sector now, um,

you know, it's, it's, you know, there are real challenges, but there's

also, you know, a mindset of, you know, we live next door to China.

We don't have, you know, the luxury of an ocean to separate us from China.

Um.

They're big.

We're dependent on them.

You know, we sell to them.

We need, increasingly, we need their tourists to come.

I mean, there's, you know, there, there's a, you know, a feeling that,

you know, Japan can't entertain thoughts of decoupling, you know, the, the fan,

you know, it's a fantasy for Japan.

And so, you know, and Abe in the, there was a.

Of that where he talks about China and put it, I mean very like, just in very

clear terms about, you know, to be a statesman in Japan means, you know, yes.

Acknowledging the threats of China, countering the threats of China, you know,

approaching China position of strength.

But ultimately the test of, of being a Japanese statesman is being able

to talk to China too, and mm-hmm.

So I think, and I thinki understands that, I think there was a moment

on the campaign actually where she might've even explicitly cited, you

know, either those words or, you know, something else Abe said to that effect.

Um.

And so, uh, you know, she certainly understands the challenge has, she's

not someone who, you know, is gonna push for decoupling, but she's also someone

who, uh, is, is at least as cognizant of the security challenges, if not

more so than pretty much anyone else.

And so, uh, you know, there's, there's, you know, walking, walking

that tight rope is gonna be hard.

Um, you know, things.

There's been sort of cautious progress in just even just reopening

political communication between Japan and China over the last year or so.

Um.

That is, you know, preserving that is going to be hard.

Um, you know, and, and it's, it's really, it a bilateral relationship too, where

every time you feel there's progress, you know, there's something they stumble over,

you know, so it's, there was this issue where China had stopped importing, uh.

Fisheries products from Japan because of, you know, that, that,

uh, treated water from the, you know, the Fukushima Daichi nuclear

plant had been dumped into the ocean.

And they said, well, you, you know, this is, this is dangerous

and therefore we're not importing any, any fisheries from Japan.

And so they finally made progress on that.

Um, but then now you've had this issue with.

Um, you know, attacks on Japanese nationals in China and, you know, concern

about the safety of Japanese nationals and, you know, Japanese nationals

being arrested and espionage charges.

And so that's turned into, uh, an issue.

And you've had, you know, Chinese development near the dividing

line in the East China Sea.

That's an issue, you know, so you just have, you know, just like

there's, there's always something, there's always something that seems

to be, uh, kinda complicating those efforts to put, you know, relationship

on a little more stable footing.

And, um.

She's gonna have to navigate those.

But, you know, I, I don't, you know, that's not unique to her.

You know, she has, um, you know, and the issue with her maybe is, you know, look,

she, what she has talked about Japan's wartime past, I mean, she, uh, is firmly

in, you know, what you might call, uh, a more revisionist camp and, you know,

downplaying the significance of, of that history, uh, you know, wanting, you know,

the, the kind of watch word for, for.

School of thought is, you know, the Japanese have to feel proud of

their history and, um, you know, the potential for that being a

source of friction with China and also with South Korea is very real.

Uh, she's someone who has been a regular visitor to Yasuni Shrine in Tokyo.

Um, she has not said whether she will go, um, as Prime Minister or not, but you

know, it's certainly a live possibility.

And, you know, these are, these are things that have to be, um.

Have to be mindful of them as, you know, potential irritants, you

know, in, in that relationship.

Yeah, I, I take your point about, I mean the, the Japan

China relationship is sort of locked in, um, the one that feels like

it has, at least to me, that has a lot more potential for volatility.

You, you just alluded to, and I think we should spend a little bit of time on

it, which is South Korea, um, you know.

Back in 2019, we were talking about really a mini trade war between Japan

and South Korea, and between revisionist Japanese government and a dovish South

Korean government that didn't like any of what was going on, you had a

real breakdown, um, in ties there.

I think one of the things that the Biden administration did that it has

not been given enough credit for is the way it's stitched Japanese and

South Korean relations back together.

It was one of their huge foreign policy successes from my point of view.

Um, but man, if you have Akai the way that you're talking about her,

then you have President Lee in South Korea, who he's been very pragmatic.

But his ideological credentials are towards the dovish side, towards the left.

And then you've got, I've, I've made this joke on the podcast a couple

times, but you know, we've heard from Venezuela this year, we've heard

from Iran, we've heard from just about everybody except North Korea.

And I did see that North Korea tested what a missile or

something right after Taishi won.

Um, so talk to me a little bit about that, because that seems to be the, I should

also say, you know, South Korea, uh, president Lee just a couple of days ago.

You know, gave a presentation at a big, um, some kind of, uh, you know, expo for

aviation and, and military hardware and things like that, and basically said,

yeah, we need to be self-reliant on defense by 2030 we're gonna throw a bunch

of money in r and d into making sure that South Korea is a self-reliant, you

know, military powered by 2030 and we're gonna export to the rest of the world.

If I was Daiichi or somebody at Takeuchi's government, uh, I think I

would sit up in my chair a little bit to hear that the South Koreans are

talking about that, uh, and sort of.

Being able to talk about o uh, getting rid of the US security

umbrella, not because the US says it, but because South Korea says it.

Um, also, funnily enough, I'm literally having a, uh, a podcast this

evening with a South Korea analyst, so I will invert this question for

them when I talk to them later.

But, but curious how you're seeing Japan, South Korea relations and

whether, whether I'm right and sensing that that's the place where we should

be looking for the most volatility.

I mean, there's certainly.

There's certainly a risk.

Um, you know, the, the combination of left wing Korean president and

right wing Japanese Prime minister.

I mean, the last time we saw that combination, as you alluded to,

right, uh, did, did not go very well.

Um, you know, there is an but that also means there's an opportunity, you

know, that if Taishi is able to be more pragmatic about South Korea in a way

that we have seen, we be pragmatic.

Um, you know, there's a, there's a real opportunity to, to.

Make this a more durable partnership where, you know, there is a recognition

actually that South Korea and Japan, uh, many ways are the same boat know, um.

The, the reliability of the United States as, as an as, uh, an

ally to both is not what it was.

And, you know, they both are dealing with a China threat and a North

Korea threat and a Russia threat.

And, you know, face, you know, the similar challenges of being, you know, essentially

on the front lines facing three nuclear armed authoritarian countries.

That, you know, countries that are increasingly drawing together.

And so there's an opportunity, you know, and if Akai is willing to take

it, um, it could be a huge moment.

And I will say that her initial comments about South Korea, uh,

have, have been more encouraging.

I mean, I, you know, I think acknowledging the importance,

acknowledging, acknowledging the value of what has been done, uh,

in, you know, in recent years and.

So at the very least there's a, you know, there's a chance for hope.

Um, her, you know, I will say her, she, so Takai just appointed her a new national

security advisor, which was somewhat unusual in that the new one, the current

one had just taken over in January.

And it's not necessarily something changes just because Prime Minister,

but she picked her, her guy, and he met his South Korean day.

The day he took over.

So in Tokyo.

So, um, there's, you know, potentially a real, um, you know, a real possibility

that, you know, actually she, she recognizes the strategic value, you know,

Japan needs all the friends it can get, and that, uh, building on the work that is

done with South Korea, uh, is worth doing.

The question is though, you know, what happens when, um.

When something happens, you know, when, uh, you know, does she go to Yasuni?

Does she, um, you know, say something about some history issue at some

event that gets South Koreans upset?

Or, you know, like with Hae, you know, it was, you know, there's lawsuit,

you know, lawsuits in Korean courts.

I mean, I, I'm, I haven't checked to see what Korean activists are doing

lately, but, um, you know, do you have something coming from that direction?

Um.

You know, when is there an anniversary and Kochi says something, or Lee

says something, and you know, you get sort of a war of words on that front.

Or some Korean goes toto or you know, Japanese cabinet

ministers go to Takima day.

You know, it's like, you know, when you have, you know, it's, it's good

that they're saying the right things.

Now the question is, when the stress test comes, what happens then?

Is there gonna be enough commitment to, you know, actually there's a lot

of strategic value in this, you know, and we have to get through this.

Um, you know, is there going to be enough, um, commitment on both sides

to push through that when it happens, or do they fall back sort of into the

familiar cycles of recriminations?

And for you, so.

You know, that's really gonna be the test.

And then the last big one is the United States.

Um, I, I was struck at.

How, I mean, you're right that Ishiba, you know, did what he needed to do

in the context of the United States.

He also had some pretty strident commentary on how Japan needed to

become more self-reliant itself and that the tariffs were something like

a national security crisis for Japan.

Um, and I, I feel like I could see this going to one of two ways for Taishi,

either no, like the Japan needs to be arm in arm with the United States

because it needs to do all these things.

Or Japan will not tolerate being treated like a second class

power by the United States.

It also needs to be able to be self-reliant from that point of view.

So.

Early indications suggest that relations will be good.

And we know that President Trump has fond memories of Abe and just the

whiff of Abe in Japanese politics will probably, you know, make Trump.

Willing to make some concessions or at least be nicer than

u the US was under Ishiba.

But how, how do you see Japan, US relations from here?

And if we're, you know, let, let's, let's use President Lee's metric by 2030.

Like what do Japan US relations look like?

Do you think they're back on steadier footing?

'cause we've gotten through this round of trade re recriminations, or are we looking

at something fundamentally different?

And, and what role does someone like Taaka Ichi play in that evolution?

Uh, so, you know, the, the first thing about

her, and this comes back to.

We talked about earlier that, you know, her first cardinal principle

is that, you know, Japan needs to be more independent and needs to be more

capable on its own and essentially standing on its own two feet.

And, you know, it can't look, can't look to Washington for its defense.

Uh.

At the most basic level.

And so she's someone who does wanna spend more on defense, not to make

Japan a better ally in the United States, but to make Japan, I mean,

essentially to be a better ally by being able to defend itself on its

own, to have capabilities on its own.

And, um, you know, I, I certainly think, uh, you know, I, I don't

think they're under any illusions in Tokyo about, you know, the

reality that, you know, the, the.

This is not the alliance that it was in the past.

You know, the United States is looking more inward.

It is more focused on its own problems.

Uh, you know, it is more focused on its own backyard.

It is not thinking nearly as much about, uh, the region.

Um, I mean, I'm, I'm struggling to think about what even the principles

of US Asia policy are at the moment.

Um, and that Japan has to be.

It has to be more capable.

It has to be prepared to think about plan Bs.

And that does be, this does not mean that therefore Japan is going

to say, alright, Yankee, go home.

Like we're done with you.

Like I think, you know, obviously they view Japan security is better with

the United States committed to the region and invested in Japan's security

and invested in regional security.

Uh, but I think the position is they can't take that for granted.

Anymore.

They can't assume that that's, you know, you know, if the United States

is gonna be, you know, in the event of a Taiwan contingency that the

United States is gonna be there, you know, that they just dunno.

And so, um, you know, I, I think, you know, so it does come back to first

we need to be stronger ourselves.

Um, but of course, like, let's work with the United States.

Let's have, you know, a good relationship at a personal level.

You know, and I think in the near term, uh, you know, you know, Trump's gonna

be in Japan next week, I think, you know, I'm sure they will, they will.

I, I'm sure it will go better for her on a personal level than it did

for Ishiba where Trump didn't seem to actually know Ishi Bo's name.

Um, you know, I think the mutual affection that Koichi and Trump have for

Abe will go a long way, I think to, um.

To at least getting that, that personal relationship off on the right foot.

Um, but does it change kind of Trump's thinking about the world

and what US priorities are?

I, I don't think so.

Um, so, you know, the, you know, given that reality, um, you know, there

is gonna be a greater emphasis on.

And there's gonna be a more willingness, you know, greater willingness to push

for, you know, more defense spending and not just to make the United States happy.

I mean, I think, you know, Akai, you know, in her first press conference,

you know, said we're gonna move faster to get defense spending to 2%

of gdp, and then of course, lay the groundwork for going beyond that.

Uh, that's gonna sound good next week when she's meeting with Trump.

But she's not doing it.

Just, you know, just for an audience of one.

I mean, this is like a real, this is a real priority.

And so, um.

You know, that, that I think, um, you know, is really where she is.

Um, you know, where are things in 2030?

Um, you know, Japan is gonna be spending more on defense.

I don't, I don't know how they get there because there are some real

hard constraints about how you pay for it and building up a political

consensus around paying for it.

Um.

Know, it's, it's been hard enough figuring out how they were gonna pay,

you know, for defense spending at 2% of GDP, but you start talking about 3% of

GDP, or three and half percent of gdp, you know, the money's gotta come from

somewhere and, uh, you know, they are gonna run into some fiscal constraints.

You know, like you can't just wave away the fact that interest rates are rising.

Um, some, something's gotta give in this situation.

So I, I dunno, you know, how they get to that.

Um, but.

You know, they're gonna push in that direction.

It will be, I suspect by 2030 higher than 2% of GDP.

Um, you know, they're gonna keep acquiring new capabilities.

They're gonna, you know, keep looking for ways of, you know, being able

to, uh, you know, defend Japan's, Japan's interest on their own.

Um, you know, I suspect the United States will not have

pulled it troops outta Japan.

So there will still be an alliance.

There will still be cooperation with the United States, but Japan.

When it comes to, you know, its own territorial defense?

Yeah, I mean, the adage that all politics is local, um, ultimately

is probably the most insightful thing you could say about politics because I

mean, as, as you sort of already alluded, it'll be up to her whether she can pull

the population along with her, because the only answer to that fiscal constraint

that you're talking about is growth.

And Japan is gonna have to have a cultural and socioeconomic moment

where they decide to stop sleeping and say, Hey, we need like.

Maji 2.0, it needs to be full, full on, like changing completely everything

because if you don't, like, you're probably, you know, you're just shuffling,

shuffling deck chairs on the Titanic.

Really.

And it's funny, I mean, Germany.

Which is tied to Japanese history for, you know, what happened in, in World War.

War II is in a very similar position, like Germany has lots of legacy advantages

and things like that, but also has serious demographic issues, less fiscal

constraints than than Japan has, but needs a full societal effort if it's

going to overcome some of its challenges.

And I, I feel that way about Japan in some ways too.

Um, Tobias, I'll get you outta here on this.

What, what have I not asked you?

What should I have asked you, um, that you think you wanna get home

to the readers before we leave?

Or if, or if we covered it?

You can say, great job Jacob, and we can leave it there.

No, no, I feel this is, I feel like we, you know, like for this

precise moment in time, you know, we're on, uh, the second full day of, of Akai,

you know, there's a lot of questions.

There's a lot, um, we don't know yet.

And, um, you know, how she, you know, fundamentally, I mean the, the question

that we have circled around with is, you know, can she do the thing that

I think Abe really learned to do?

And if you read my.

You read my book?

This is, you know, it's right behind

his shoulder.

It's available on Amazon.

It's an excellent read.

I'm not just saying that.

I loved it.

It was great.

I mean, the thing that he really learned to do, and

particularly learned between his, you know, unsuccessful first premiership

and a second was how do you balance, you know, those, those big ideals,

those big ambitions with political reality and sort of, you know, doing

the, the, the way, the, the balance.

You know, that, how do you, you know.

How do you move towards your ideals, but, um, without losing

sight of political realities.

And that is something that she's gonna have to learn pretty quickly.

And, uh, maybe, maybe she'll be able to do it.

Uh, maybe she know, she, you know, learned at, you know, you know,

learn from, from following Abe and, and watching him and being around

him and, and seeing how you do that.

Um.

But it's, you know, it was something that, that Abe learned

the hard way, essentially.

You know, he really had to, you know, essentially go through the crucible of

having a government fall apart around him, um, before he really learned.

And so, you know, she, she doesn't have a lot of time to figure it out either.

So, we'll, we'll see how this works.

Um.

But it's, you know, it's not gonna be easy, I think.

Alright, well if it was easy, everyone would do it right.

Tobias, thanks so much.

It's good to see you, man.

Thank you, Jake.