Project 2025 and the Post-Constitutional Presidency
Episode 1 • 12th January 2026 • Beneath the Cypress and Star • BlueRidge Pundit
00:00:00 00:35:54

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Summary

What does a post constitutional presidency mean for democratic accountability? This episode examines Project 2025 executive power proposals, Russell Vought’s influence, and the tension between presidential control and institutional restraint. Its central argument is that force without oversight can weaken legitimacy at home and strategic judgment abroad. The phrase describes a contested political diagnosis, not a formal change to the Constitution.

Key Takeaway

  • Project 2025 is a policy blueprint; its recommendations do not, by themselves, change the law.
  • Presidential power must be evaluated through specific decisions, authorities, and checks.
  • Control of the administrative state connects budgets, personnel, regulation, and public accountability.
  • Foreign-policy strength also depends on clear objectives, credible alliances, and restraint.

What Is Project 2025?

The Heritage Foundation’s Mandate for Leadership gathers proposals from numerous conservative contributors. A search for a Project 2025 author therefore has more than one answer: Vought wrote its chapter on the Executive Office of the President. That chapter advocates stronger presidential direction of executive agencies. Our examination of Russell Vought’s ideology explores the political beliefs behind that institutional program.

Presidential Power and Institutional Limits

In The American Mind, Vought argues that established precedents have departed from the founders’ constitutional design. He presents radical constitutionalism as restoration. WBUR’s discussion of his approach explains why critics instead fear an erosion of checks on the executive. Those competing interpretations should not be confused with a court’s finding about a particular action.

Budget authority makes the debate concrete. Follow Vought’s government-shutdown strategy alongside DOGE, government data, and institutional oversight. The dispute over Musk and judicial independence asks who can challenge executive decisions. Our accounts of the Hannah Dugan charging document and the Wisconsin judge case update distinguish allegations and procedural developments from established guilt.

Force, Diplomacy, and Strategic Judgment

The episode uses Sun Tzu and Machiavelli as interpretive lenses for questions of restraint, preparation, and legitimacy. Summaries from SoBrief on The Art of War and SoBrief on The Prince provide background. The comparison is an argument about statecraft, not evidence that either writer anticipated today’s policies.

Its foreign-policy discussion spans Venezuela, Iran, Syria, Greenland, Ukraine, and Gaza. Each situation requires its own evidence about objectives, civilian consequences, and authorization. Related examinations of NATO consultation and European security and U.S. boat strikes in Latin America help separate alliance obligations from unilateral action. A common concern runs through the discussion: visible displays of strength do not automatically produce durable security.

Following the Constitutional Questions

Domestically, National Guard deployment authority and federal intervention in Chicago show why legal status and operational purpose matter. The longer view in Trump and American power from 1989 to 2024 complements executive power and global backlash. For other institutional safeguards, consider presidential succession and Section 2 voting-rights litigation. Together these cases invite scrutiny of what government does, who authorizes it, and how the public can demand accountability.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q1: What is Project 2025?

It is a conservative policy and transition initiative associated with the Heritage Foundation. Its published recommendations must be distinguished from enacted laws and implemented policies.

Q2: What does post-constitutional mean here?

It describes claims that constitutional constraints have been displaced or weakened. Vought and his critics use that diagnosis differently; the episode examines the disagreement.

Q3: Why focus on the administrative state?

Agencies turn political priorities into budgets, regulations, and services. How they are directed and reviewed affects everyday government accountability.

Q4: Does a Project 2025 proposal establish legal authority?

No. A proposal is not a statute or judicial decision. Evaluating an action requires its specific legal basis and relevant institutional checks.

Q5: How does foreign policy fit this discussion?

The episode asks whether centralized decision-making encourages action without sufficient deliberation, and whether oversight can improve both legitimacy and strategic outcomes.

Related Episodes

Sources & Further Reading

Transcripts

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Today, we are undertaking what I think is a truly massive mission.

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It's a big one.

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It really is.

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We're taking the U.S. foreign policy approach of the last few years,

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specifically the high stakes, high impact decisions,

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and the rhetoric defining the Trump administration.

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And we are running it through to the oldest, heaviest,

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and most respected strategic filters in history.

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Suns is the art of war, and Nicolomaki Valley is the prince.

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Exactly.

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These are the foundational texts of statecraft.

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That's right.

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And our goal here isn't to look at political affiliations or anything like that.

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This is meant to be a purely rigorous strategic analysis.

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Right.

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We want to move past the daily news cycle,

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past the administration's own rhetoric,

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and look squarely at the actions themselves.

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The military strikes,

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the diplomatic maneuvers led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio,

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the Treaty Abandonment,

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and ask that fundamental question

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that all classical strategist pose.

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What is this strategic statecraft?

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You know, designed for long-term stability and national strength.

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Or is it something else?

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Is it merely short-term spectacle,

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designed for, say, an immediate domestic effect?

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And our source stack for this deep dive is,

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well, it's immense, and at times, frankly,

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it's pretty shocking to go through.

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We've collected a huge volume of contemporary news reports,

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detailing military strikes across seven different countries in 2025 alone.

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We're going to deep dive into these really controversial peace plans

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that were pushed for Ukraine and Gaza,

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we're analyzing the aggressive pronouncements on international law,

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and tying all of this back to those distilled,

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timeless principles that you find in the art of war and the prince.

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And here's the paradox we have to wrestle with right out of the gate,

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because I think it defines the tension in this entire deep dive.

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Okay.

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Donald Trump publicly claims the title of President of Peace.

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He's boasted to the world that he ended eight wars in eight months.

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Which is a bold claim, a very declarative claim.

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It's a huge claim.

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It positions his administration as this great global de-escalator,

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someone who prioritizes negotiation and stability above all else.

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And it's a stunning claim.

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You're right, particularly when you hold it up against the raw data.

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We're looking at data collected by nonpartisan conflict monitors.

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Like ACL Dow, for example.

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Right, ACLED, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project,

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reported that the US had carried out or been a partner to an astonishing

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622 overseas bombings using drones or aircraft in just the first eight months of 2025.

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622.

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In eight months.

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And that volume of kinetic activity spans seven different countries.

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So that is the fundamental tension, isn't it?

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On one hand, you have this aggressive military

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adventurism.

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You have the systematic abandonment of longstanding treaties and

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actions that have been called this serious legal question.

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And on the other hand,

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you have rhetoric celebrating global peace.

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So we have to examine how these actions stack up against, you know,

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SunSoo's classic emphasis on strategic restraint and winning without fighting.

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And then Machiavelli's unwavering insistence on prudence,

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on institutional stability,

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and the long-term maintenance of state power, which he called Vertu.

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Before we jump into the bombings,

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let's just take a moment to really establish those filters,

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because I think that's a critique we've had before,

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that we can sometimes rush through these core concepts.

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So what are the non-negotiables for classical statecraft?

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Let's start with SunSoo.

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For SunSoo, the absolute non-negotiable is efficiency and restraint.

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His entire philosophy is founded on this concept of the towel,

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which means aligning your strategy with the natural,

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inevitable flow of events.

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So not fighting against the current?

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Not fighting the current.

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If you have to fight a long, costly, destructive war,

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you've already failed in his eyes.

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The highest art of war, he writes, is to subdued the enemy without fighting.

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His definition of victory is almost

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like water flowing downhill naturally just seeks the path of least resistance.

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So maximum impact with minimal action?

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Precisely.

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It's about emphasizing intelligence and deep preparation over raw kinetic force.

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Okay, and what about Machiavelli?

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He's guiding a prince,

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insecure, and then maintaining power.

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What's his non-negotiable?

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Machiavelli is, well, he's known for being pragmatic, yes.

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But he insists on prudence,

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and prudence requires careful calculation.

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It requires focusing on maintaining internal order,

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respecting the property and honor of one's subjects,

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and critically avoiding hatred.

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Avoiding hatred, that seems key.

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It's everything to him.

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A prince might be feared, he says,

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but hatred guarantees resistance and internal instability,

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which ultimately leads to ruin.

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And central to the stability of the state is what he calls virtue,

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which isn't moral virtue.

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It's about the prince's ability,

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his strategic capacity,

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and the effectiveness of the state's institutions.

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So if you start eroding your own laws.

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You weaken your virtue.

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You weaken the very foundation of your power.

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Excellent. Okay, so armed with those rigorous definitions,

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efficiency for Sunsu,

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prudence, and institutional stability for Machiavelli,

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let's unpack this.

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Starting with the sheer scale of that kinetic activity.

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As we mentioned, Sunsu demands that war be a last resort,

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something you achieve through deterrence and preparation.

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The application of kinetic force,

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you know, a bombing should only be to cement a victory you've already won

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through intelligence.

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Right, not to substitute for a lack of strategic positioning.

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Exactly.

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That's absolutely right.

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Sunsu views the unnecessary destruction of resources,

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whether that's human lives,

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financial capital, or infrastructure,

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as the ultimate strategic failure.

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He warms against protractive campaigns

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because they just exhaust the state.

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And when you look at that number,

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622 bombings distributed across seven countries.

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Venezuela, Nigeria, Syria, Iran, Yemen, Iraq, and Somalia,

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in just eight months.

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The sheer volume suggests the very things Sunsu warned against.

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It suggests that forces being used as a substitute

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for deep long-term strategic positioning.

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It's a sign of weakness, not strength, in his framework.

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It looks less like a game of strategic chess,

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and I don't know, more like tactical punching

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across multiple continents simultaneously.

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A very good way to put it.

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So let's focus on Somalia as a key case study

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for this high-volume kinetic approach.

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The US has dramatically, I mean,

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dramatically intensified air strikes there,

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targeting ISIS and El Shabbat.

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The intensification is staggering.

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The confirmed 111 strikes this year alone,

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according to monitors,

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surpasses the combined total carried out by the Bush,

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Obama, and Biden administrations over many, many years.

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So this isn't just a small increase.

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This is a radical strategic shift.

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It's complete change in philosophy.

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It suggests an almost frantic effort to use air power

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to resolve a complex, long-running,

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and very messy insurgency problem on the ground.

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And the rhetoric surrounding this

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is far from restrained, isn't it?

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When announcing the strike that targeted

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ISIS Somalia operatives,

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the administration's public statement

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was this blunt high-impact declaration,

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we will find you and we will kill you.

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And while that may sound decisive,

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you know, for a domestic audience,

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it actually reveals a strategic reliance

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on direct engagement and destruction.

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Sun Su teaches that the wise commander

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makes many calculations in his temple

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before the battle is even fought.

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The goal is to win the war before a single shot is fired.

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So this focus on speed and volume,

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this boast of immediate kinetic action.

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It completely bypasses that strategic imperative.

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It bypasses the need to achieve objectives

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through intelligence and preparation.

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Instead, it leans heavily on immediate destructive force,

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which is essentially an admission

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that the underlying strategic positioning

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was insufficient to begin with.

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So if the enemy is subdued by fighting,

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it implies a failure in the preparation phase.

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The speed and the volume of the strikes

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are the strategic critique here,

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not necessarily the targets themselves.

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Exactly, it's the substitution of raw power

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for clever positioning.

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And we see that same, impulsive, reactive,

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and frankly explicitly emotional approach

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in the Syria case study.

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Right, after two US soldiers and a civilian interpreter

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were killed by Iranian-backed militias,

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the US launched what was called a massive strike.

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Operation Aka strike.

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Hitting over 70 targets with more than 100 precision munitions.

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The huge operation.

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But the key part was the framing.

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The defense secretary, Pete Higgseth,

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made headlines by framing this action

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not a strategic deterrence, you know,

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the kind of pulled calculated response Sun Su would approve of.

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But as an explicit declaration of vengeance

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on the group responsible.

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Vengeance, that one word is a direct contradiction

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of Sun Su's core principles.

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The Tau principle insists on aligning strategy

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with the natural flow of events

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and explicitly avoiding warfare driven by emotion,

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by anger, or by vengeance.

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He actually warns against that specifically, doesn't he?

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He does.

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Sun Su warns that a state should not mobilize

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its army out of anger.

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So to frame a large-scale military action

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as explicitly for vengeance implies reactive warfare,

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where emotional satisfaction takes precedence

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over strategic necessity.

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It's not about achieving an objective anymore.

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No, it's about feeling good.

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Classical statecraft demands war be cold, calculated,

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and aim solely at achieving long-term objectives efficiently.

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This is the opposite.

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It also gives your adversary incredible insight

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into your decision-making process.

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If they know anger is your trigger,

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well, they know exactly how to provoke you

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into overextending your forces.

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Precisely.

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It turns the war from a strategic chess match

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into an emotional brawl, which is always, always expensive

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for the state that loses its cool.

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Moving to Nigeria, we see a really interesting case

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where military force appears to be used not just

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for tactical gain, but specifically

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for ideological and domestic messaging.

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The Christmas Day strikes.

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The Christmas Day strikes against Islamic state forces

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in Northwest Nigeria, where, according to reports,

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allegedly delayed specifically to deliver a message

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to groups he alleges are targeting Christians.

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This is a deep strategic flaw when you view it

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through Suns' lens of efficiency.

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The Nigerian government, they praise the attacks,

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but at the same time, they simultaneously

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denied the administration's specific allegations

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of a Christian genocide, pointing out

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that the violence affects everyone.

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They pointed out that the regional violence affects both Christian

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and Muslim communities indiscriminately.

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So by prioritizing this ideological, symbolic,

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and religiously charged motivation,

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the administration potentially compromises

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its actual strategic goal of regional stability.

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An independent monitor crystallized the critique

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by suggesting the level of thought

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might have been astonishingly simple.

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The quote was, we'll do something about Christians.

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It's Christmas Day.

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Let's do it.

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Which just sounds so impulsive and performative.

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It does, and this is where we really need

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to bring in the Macchivellian friction point.

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Because you could argue, if the strike lacks strategic depth

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abroad, but it successfully serves

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a domestic political purpose, solidifying

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the support of a key voting block

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by appearing to be religious and decisive,

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isn't that Macchivellian prudence in action?

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It's a great question, and I think that

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is the core tension when you do explore.

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Macchivellian absolutely notes that everyone

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sees what you seem to be.

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Few have experience of who you really are.

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So the strike viewed purely domestically

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might be a success of political appearance.

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But does that appearance hold up against the test

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of prudent statecraft?

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It fails the moment the action creates

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more problems than it solves.

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Macchivellian insists that true prudence

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requires effective governance that actually curbs

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the underlying conflict.

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Not just looks like it does.

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Not just looks like it does.

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If the strike doesn't curve the actual complex inner communal

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violence and is primarily driven by ideology and timing,

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it's merely spectacle.

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And spectacle in the long run costs resources

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without delivering durable power.

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It might win you the news cycle for a day.

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But it doesn't win the peace.

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It doesn't win the peace.

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It demonstrates that the administration

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prioritized the short-term benefit of appearance

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over the long-term strategic efficacy

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required by both Sunsu and Macchivellian.

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So the pattern that's emerging here is pretty consistent.

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We're seeing a prioritization of high-impact,

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emotionally charged, rapid military action

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in multiple theaters, even if the strategic coherence

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or the proportionality is questionable.

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And leveraging the spectacle of the strike

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for ideological or domestic political messaging.

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Right.

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And this pattern of prioritizing spectacle and force

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inevitably brings us to Macchivellian's

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central warnings about how to maintain power.

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Exactly.

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He says a ruler must balance fear and love,

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but above all else must avoid hatred.

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Prudence requires careful calculation

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and absolute respect for the property

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and honor of one's subjects.

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Or in the international sphere, sovereign nations.

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If you violate these principles, you guarantee resistance.

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The US military action in Venezuela

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serves as a, well, a chilling test case

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for this definition of prudence.

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Here really is us.

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The operation, targeted Venezuelan shipping

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and dock facilities, it included threats of kidnapping.

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And it was globally condemned as an act of aggressive war,

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which was primarily justified by the state

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goal of drug interdiction.

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The list of violations and credibility

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damage arising from this operation

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is severe and it's extensive.

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The UN Secretary General publicly condemned the action,

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calling it a dangerous precedent for international behavior.

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And the strikes themselves were not minor.

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They were kinetic and deadly.

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Incredibly so, including attacks on over 30 vessels

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and killing at least 95 people.

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And we have specific documented reports

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that push this from just aggressive military action

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into a real ethical and legal minefield.

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Human Rights Watch accused Washington

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of extrajudicial killings and they cited

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the documented use of a double tap strike.

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Can you just explain what that is?

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It's where survivors clinging to debris

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after a first attack were intentionally targeted

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and killed in a follow-up strike.

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So targeting first responders or survivors?

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Yes.

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This is a profound failure of classical state craft

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on multiple levels.

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From a Sun-Soo perspective, this action

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is the definition of reckless escalation.

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Sun-Soo demands that force,

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when you use it, must minimize destruction

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to facilitate the easy incorporation

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of the defeated population into the post-war order.

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A double tap strike explicitly designed

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to eliminate survivors is the epitome

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of maximizing destruction and guaranteeing

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long-term, deep-seated resentment.

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And the geopolitical fallout from this was immediate, wasn't it?

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This aggression drew a deeply problematic reaction

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from a key adversary, Russia.

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Yes.

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Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev

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condemned the action as illegal.

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But then crucially, he acknowledged

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that Trump was acting to protect U.S. interests,

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and then he went a step further.

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He used it as a justification.

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He did.

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He said this action justified similar hypothetical kidnappings

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of other heads of state.

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And he specifically mentioned the German Chancellor.

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That strategic folly in its clearest form.

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Absolutely.

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Aggression that not only fails to subdue your immediate enemy,

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but actively provokes or justifies similar future aggression

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by rival major powers is a complete failure

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to manage the global chess board.

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It confirms the fears of great power conflict,

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and it essentially sanctions aggression

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under the guise of American interests.

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I think we need to push back on the Machiavellian angle

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here for just a second, because we heard

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a German far-right party spokesman argue

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that strength, not academic ethics,

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is what counts on the international stage.

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So if the U.S. goal was truly access

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to oil and rare earth minerals, just disguised

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as drug interdiction, a classic 19th century imperialist

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maneuver, doesn't Machiavellian argue

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that the use of deception and ruthless strength

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is sometimes necessary for the prince to expand his power?

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He does permit ruthlessness, but here's the crucial distinction.

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Only if it serves long-term stability

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and, again, avoids generating hatred,

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the goal is always durable power.

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If the underlying rationale is wealth extraction disguised

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as law enforcement, the eventual exposure

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of that mode of guarantees hatred and instability

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in the entire hemisphere.

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Which then requires more force to contain.

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Exactly.

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It requires a continuous expensive military commitment

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to maintain control.

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That's the definition of imprudence.

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A truly prudent Machiavellian ruler would calculate

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the cost of that guaranteed hatred

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against a short-term gain of the oil.

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And in this case, in this case,

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international law experts agree that Venezuelan action

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constituted a serious, perhaps irreparable blow

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to international principles.

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You're sacrificing the U.S. claim

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to global moral leadership for immediate material gain.

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That trade-off is ruinous for long-term influence.

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And the impulsive rhetoric on top of it all

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just exacerbated the situation.

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Trump threatened further interventions

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in Colombia and Mexico imposed a blockade

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of sanctioned oil tankers, actions

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that blur the line between pressure

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and an outright act of war under international law.

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It creates a state of perpetual, volatile friction.

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Machiavellian demands the prince's established order,

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continuous threats and acts of near-war create disorder,

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which just drains state resources and reputation.

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Now let's pivot from there to Yemen,

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where the near-daily strikes under Operation Rough Rider

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escalated dramatically against the Houthi movement.

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This brings us right back to Sunzou's concept

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of ethical warfare, which places a high value

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on proportionality and restraint.

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It emphasizes minimizing destruction

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and minimizing casualties for the sake of long-term peace.

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And the outcome in Yemen shows a clear

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and, frankly, a tragic failure to meet that standard.

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It does.

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The strikes resulted in shockingly high civilian casualties.

441

::

The Houthi run health ministry reported 123 people

442

::

killed by April, and they said most of them

443

::

are civilians alongside extensive destruction

444

::

of critical infrastructure, ports, airports,

445

::

even migrant holding centers.

446

::

And what's critical for our analysis here

447

::

is the shift in policy towards these aggressive persona

448

::

strikes, personally targeting senior Houthi leaders.

449

::

This reflects what our sources suggest

450

::

is a higher, explicitly accepted tolerance for risk

451

::

and for civilian harm, which is consistent

452

::

with defense secretary Hegsett's policy

453

::

of aggressive engagement.

454

::

And we have a stark, almost unbelievable anecdotal example

455

::

of this disregard for collateral damage.

456

::

It was revealed in that signal chat scandal

457

::

that surfaced in the press.

458

::

Right, with a national security adviser.

459

::

Mike Waltz, yes.

460

::

He was reportedly discussing the killing

461

::

of the Houthi's top missile guy and his message stated,

462

::

we had positive idea of him walking

463

::

into his girlfriend's building, and it's now collapsed.

464

::

It's now collapsed.

465

::

That single strike reportedly killed over 30 other people.

466

::

That statement, it's now collapsed.

467

::

It just, it speaks volumes about the prioritization.

468

::

This incident is a textbook contradiction

469

::

of Sunsu's ethical warfare principles,

470

::

which require that reasonable precautions

471

::

be taken to spare non-combatants.

472

::

It shows a prioritization of target elimination

473

::

one life over the lives of more than 30 non-combatants

474

::

who happen to be in the building.

475

::

Sunsu teaches that minimizing harm

476

::

facilitates post-conflict peace building,

477

::

leveling a building with dozens of non-combatants inside

478

::

to eliminate one target is the absolute antithesis

479

::

of prudence and ethical restraint.

480

::

It guarantees future conflict.

481

::

That shifts the conversation from strategic failure

482

::

to a kind of ethical breakdown,

483

::

or at least a radical redefinition

484

::

of what proportionality means.

485

::

And the sheer number of these actions in Yemen,

486

::

in Venezuela, it raises huge constitutional questions

487

::

here at home about compliance with US federal life,

488

::

specifically the 1973 War Powers Resolution.

489

::

And this is where Machiavelli's institutional warning

490

::

becomes most potent.

491

::

The War Powers Resolution requires the president

492

::

to notify Congress within 48 hours of deploying troops

493

::

and to terminate military action within 60 days

494

::

unless Congress explicitly authorizes it.

495

::

And the ongoing large-scale operations in Yemen and Venezuela

496

::

raise very serious questions about whether these requirements

497

::

are being met or if they're being deliberately circumvented.

498

::

Why does violating this specific federal law

499

::

matter so much to a discussion of classical statecraft?

500

::

Because Machiavelli values institutional stability

501

::

above almost everything else, he argues

502

::

that nothing brings more honor to a new ruler

503

::

than the new laws and institutions he introduces.

504

::

By bypassing the War Powers Resolution,

505

::

the administration is effectively eroding

506

::

a constitutional check on executive authority.

507

::

And while that might grant the executive short term

508

::

unchecked power to wage war,

509

::

Machiavelli would view this as fundamentally weakening

510

::

the state's internal order and its long-term authority.

511

::

The state's virtue, its strategic capacity,

512

::

is built on the rule of law.

513

::

When those legal constraints are treated as optional,

514

::

you introduce instability that weakens

515

::

the very foundation of power itself.

516

::

So when we turn from military action

517

::

to alliance management, Machiavelli's advice on credibility

518

::

is equally, if not more, pertinent.

519

::

He warns against relying on foreign powers,

520

::

and he stresses the importance of a strong, independent military

521

::

and establishing lasting, reliable institutions.

522

::

A prince's word has to be trusted.

523

::

And this is where the confrontation with Denmark

524

::

over Greenland becomes such a critical liability.

525

::

Right.

526

::

Trump's open pursuit of acquiring Greenland, threatening

527

::

to take it the hard way if a deal couldn't be made

528

::

the easy way, sets the US on a direct collision course

529

::

with Denmark, a founding and crucial NATO ally.

530

::

The threat was not subtle at all.

531

::

And European leaders immediately

532

::

grasped the potential gravity of this, didn't they?

533

::

They warned that such a unilateral provocation

534

::

would have serious systemic consequences

535

::

for NATO solidarity.

536

::

It could even force Denmark to invoke NATO's article four

537

::

for consultation, or, in a worst-case scenario,

538

::

even article five for collective defense,

539

::

if they felt physically threatened by the United States.

540

::

An ally invoking article five against the leader of the alliance.

541

::

It's almost unthinkable.

542

::

It is.

543

::

And the historical parallel that experts cited here

544

::

is profoundly revealing and highly disturbing.

545

::

This unilateral provocation echoes the Soviet Union's use

546

::

of force against its own Warsaw-packed allies.

547

::

Like Hungary in 56.

548

::

Exactly.

549

::

Invading Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

550

::

Historians noted that the Soviet actions ultimately

551

::

led to the alliance's decline, because member states

552

::

could no longer trust the major power

553

::

to respect their sovereignty.

554

::

So the fear wasn't just about losing Greenland.

555

::

It was about setting a catastrophic precedent

556

::

within NATO that the major power within the alliance

557

::

might just turn on a smaller partner

558

::

for its own unilateral gain.

559

::

That's it, exactly.

560

::

It sacrifices long-term trust for a short-term desire.

561

::

And the irony, as so many experts pointed out,

562

::

is that the US already has bases in Greenland.

563

::

We could easily expand them with Danish cooperation

564

::

and just basic, diplomatic goodwill.

565

::

But instead, this aggressive, posturing, and rhetoric

566

::

creates a completely unnecessary friction and instability.

567

::

It seems like the absolute opposite of strategic thinking.

568

::

Some two teaches that the key to victory

569

::

lies in cohesion and avoiding unnecessary conflict.

570

::

Why would you destabilize a crucial alliance structure

571

::

when cooperation is readily available?

572

::

It's Machiavellian imprudence at its finest.

573

::

As one historian observed, the alliance

574

::

is a lot stronger if they want to be within it

575

::

than if they're coerced by the biggest power in it.

576

::

That seems so obvious.

577

::

It does.

578

::

Coercing ally sacrifices long-term reliability

579

::

for an immediate, boastful, unilateral action

580

::

that pleases a domestic constituency

581

::

interested in geopolitical real estate.

582

::

Machiavellian says the prince must appear reliable

583

::

to maintain influence.

584

::

This action renders the US wholly unreliable.

585

::

And this pattern of aggressive unilateralism,

586

::

it extends beyond just Greenland and Denmark.

587

::

It reflects the administration's broader, tough love

588

::

approach to international organizations.

589

::

The defunding of UNESCO, the World Health Organization,

590

::

and others.

591

::

And focusing almost exclusively on bilateral

592

::

transactional relationships.

593

::

That systematic disregard for multilateral obligations,

594

::

which we also see in the non-extension

595

::

of crucial treaties, like the New Start Treaty,

596

::

which manages strategic nuclear arsenals

597

::

and is due to expire, it systematically undermines

598

::

the US's global predictability and its legitimacy.

599

::

And Machiavellian teaches that a ruler must maintain

600

::

a reputation for keeping promises.

601

::

So if you abandon treaties and threaten allies,

602

::

you create a reputation for being capricious

603

::

and unreliable, which weakens the state's long term

604

::

strategic advantage, even if it feels powerful

605

::

in the short term.

606

::

Sunsu and Machiavellian both agree on this.

607

::

Predictability and reliable institutions,

608

::

both internal and external, are prerequisites

609

::

for durable state power.

610

::

And when you discard global norms in international law,

611

::

as we saw so explicitly in the Venezuel operation,

612

::

you just hemorrhage credibility.

613

::

And credibility is the cornerstone of influence.

614

::

When the US becomes unpredictable,

615

::

it creates a vacuum of leadership

616

::

and it creates incentives for rivals

617

::

to test established boundaries.

618

::

So if war is judged by Sunsu's efficiency

619

::

and institutional prudence by Machiavellian,

620

::

let's look at the administration's attempts at peace.

621

::

Specifically, the high stakes, high pressure,

622

::

diplomatic pushes in Ukraine and Gaza,

623

::

where Secretary-State Marco Rubio was reportedly

624

::

read in every step of the way.

625

::

A key figure in these plans.

626

::

Sunsu advises that victory is achieved

627

::

through meticulous preparation and strategic forethought,

628

::

and plans must be flexible,

629

::

like water adapting to the ground.

630

::

And what is immediately striking

631

::

about the Ukraine 28-point vision

632

::

is the emphasis on speed and coercion

633

::

over genuine sustainable negotiation.

634

::

This plan was drafted by Trump's envoys,

635

::

Kushner and Whitkopf, with significant input

636

::

from Russian envoy, Kirill Mitriyev,

637

::

who openly stated that he felt

638

::

the Russian position is really being heard.

639

::

Which alone suggests a strategic imbalance

640

::

in the negotiation from the very start.

641

::

To say the least.

642

::

And the plan was pushed with an aggressive timeline.

643

::

They wanted a signature by Thanksgiving.

644

::

And the contents were not minor adjustments.

645

::

They demanded massive existential concessions from Ukraine.

646

::

Let's detail those concessions,

647

::

because I think they illustrate

648

::

the failure of diplomatic prudence here.

649

::

Ukraine was required to yield additional territory,

650

::

which amounted to the de facto recognition

651

::

of Russia's captures of Crimea,

652

::

Karsin, and Zaparizia, and it was

653

::

all from parts of Donetsk.

654

::

Down top of that.

655

::

The plan demanded Ukraine limit its standing military size

656

::

to 600,000 troops, and enshrine a permanent,

657

::

non-negotiable, no-nado policy in their constitution.

658

::

That is essentially asking a sovereign nation

659

::

to sacrifice its dignity and its fundamental

660

::

defensive capacity and perpetuity.

661

::

It's an ultimatum.

662

::

And it was an ultimatum coupled

663

::

with the explicit threat of coercion

664

::

from its primary ally.

665

::

Senior officials learned that the US

666

::

was threatening to cut off the entire weapons program,

667

::

and all intelligent sharing.

668

::

If Ukraine rejected the proposal.

669

::

So President Zelensky reportedly warned his nation

670

::

that they faced this profound choice

671

::

between losing our dignity or the risk

672

::

of losing a key partner.

673

::

An impossible choice.

674

::

Foreign policy veteran Richard Haas

675

::

drew a powerful parallel here.

676

::

He suggested this was akin to telling Israel

677

::

they had one week to accept a unilateral Palestinian state

678

::

with specific borders, or lose American aid immediately.

679

::

And he noted that such an existential demand

680

::

could not possibly be sold by Zelensky domestically.

681

::

It was a non-starter.

682

::

Which shows a complete lack of diplomatic prudence.

683

::

It's a clear failure of classical diplomatic prudence

684

::

and a total violation of Machiavelli's advice

685

::

to avoid generating hatred among allies.

686

::

The plan rewarded Russian aggression

687

::

and demanded an ally sacrifice its dignity

688

::

and its long-term security.

689

::

Forcing an ally into humiliating existential concessions

690

::

is the fastest way to generate deep resentment.

691

::

Which guarantees that your influence

692

::

will be built on coercion, not loyalty.

693

::

Exactly.

694

::

And that type of coerced influence is fragile.

695

::

It requires constant reinforcement,

696

::

which violates Sun's principle of minimal effort.

697

::

Moving to the Middle East, the Gaza governance plan

698

::

shows a similar focus on spectacle, on speed,

699

::

and a radical disconnect from the local reality.

700

::

It started with some pretty wild rhetoric.

701

::

The early rhetoric involved Trump saying

702

::

the US would take over Gaza, level the site,

703

::

and own it, envisioning it as the Riviera of the Middle East.

704

::

That rhetoric framed geopolitical crisis resolution

705

::

less as diplomacy and more as a massive real estate development

706

::

project.

707

::

This vision was later refined into the formal 20-point plan,

708

::

featuring the US-led board of peace.

709

::

Chair by Trump himself, alongside figures

710

::

like Tony Blair and Kushner.

711

::

But Secretary of State Marco Rubio,

712

::

in one of the few recorded instances

713

::

of cautious pragmatism we found,

714

::

voiced a crucial critique that rings distinctly Machivellian.

715

::

What did he say?

716

::

He warned, you're not going to convince anyone

717

::

to invest money in Gaza if they believe another war

718

::

is going to happen in two to three years.

719

::

That's a perfect embodiment of Machivellian prudence, isn't it?

720

::

The institutional prerequisites.

721

::

Exactly.

722

::

Machivellian teaches that you must have stability, security,

723

::

and internal order before you can have investment

724

::

or effective governance.

725

::

And the reconstruction plan itself.

726

::

The core problem of the plan, Project Sunrise,

727

::

was its sheer disconnect from the political

728

::

and social realities on the ground.

729

::

The $112 billion focus on luxury resorts, high-speed rail

730

::

and AI infrastructure was immediately

731

::

viewed by Palestinians as an externally imposed vision.

732

::

Or worse, a new version of colonialism or imperialism.

733

::

Right.

734

::

What kind of mindset views post-conflict governance

735

::

as a real estate flip focused on luxury resorts

736

::

instead of basic governance foundations

737

::

like security and law?

738

::

It's the spectacle mindset again.

739

::

It's all spectacle.

740

::

The attempt to rapidly impose a governance structure,

741

::

this Palestinian technocratic committee

742

::

under the Trump-led board of peace again,

743

::

demonstrates a fundamental institutional failure.

744

::

Machivellian states that new laws and institutions

745

::

must be introduced carefully to bring honor to the new ruler.

746

::

And a rushed, externally imposed regime,

747

::

especially one perceived as colonial.

748

::

Guarantees resistance and instability.

749

::

It violates the core strategic principle

750

::

of ensuring that the local populace accepts

751

::

and finds honor in the new political order.

752

::

It's like focusing on the shiny roof of the building

753

::

before the foundation has even been poured.

754

::

This entire deep dive, it really reveals a foreign policy

755

::

approach that relentlessly prioritizes

756

::

unilateral high-impact action while expressing

757

::

a deep, deep, disdain for traditional constraints,

758

::

both international and critically domestic ones.

759

::

This approach aligns perfectly

760

::

with a broader ideological worldview

761

::

that we've seen promoting tough love

762

::

for international organizations

763

::

and suggesting that NATO allies should field

764

::

the great majority of the conventional forces,

765

::

which would free up U.S. resources.

766

::

The problem arises when this disregard

767

::

for external constraint translates

768

::

into the hollowing out of internal institutions.

769

::

This is where the internal dynamics of the U.S. government

770

::

become a strategic weakness

771

::

when we apply the standards of classical statecraft.

772

::

And Machivellian stresses that military strength

773

::

and durable power are fundamentally

774

::

founded on internal cohesion and legal stability.

775

::

A strong state needs its own robust laws

776

::

and institutions to maintain its virtue.

777

::

But we've seen consistent evidence

778

::

of the systematic weakening of those very institutions

779

::

for short-term, personal, or political gain.

780

::

We already noted the disregard for the 1973 war powers

781

::

resolution in the Venezuela and Yemen operations.

782

::

Great.

783

::

And this disregard for legal constraints

784

::

has been linked to influential conservative thought,

785

::

including from the Heritage Foundation,

786

::

that figures like Russell Vaught,

787

::

which promotes the theory of a post-constitutional era.

788

::

A post-constitutional era, what does that mean in practice?

789

::

In this world view,

790

::

statutory and constitutional constraints

791

::

on executive power are treated as optional

792

::

or obsolete or just, merely obstacles

793

::

to decisive action.

794

::

So it's not just a failure to follow the law,

795

::

it's the philosophical justification

796

::

for intentionally circumventing it.

797

::

Precisely.

798

::

And we see this prioritization of personal loyalty

799

::

over institutional expertise,

800

::

which further degrades the states for two.

801

::

For instance, tapping army secretary Driscoll,

802

::

a Yale law classmate for full-blown peace talks in Ukraine

803

::

by bypassing career State Department negotiators.

804

::

That demonstrates prioritizing loyalty and proximity

805

::

to the executive over institutional expertise and neutrality.

806

::

It does.

807

::

That move suggests that the executive values personal comfort

808

::

and speed over the long-term objective capacity

809

::

of the state apparatus.

810

::

And Machiavelli's warning here is exceptionally clear, isn't it?

811

::

Eroding the foundations of law and order,

812

::

even if it means quick military victories

813

::

or convenient diplomatic plans today,

814

::

weakens the state's ability to rule effectively

815

::

and durably tomorrow.

816

::

The internal stability of the republic

817

::

is the prerequisite for external strength.

818

::

You can't have one without the other.

819

::

OK, let's synthesize these strategic failures

820

::

against the classical texts.

821

::

We've established a consistent prioritization

822

::

of short-term, boastful spectacle,

823

::

the president of peace, the declaration of vengeance,

824

::

the Riviera of the Middle East.

825

::

All of it, over the quiet, meticulous long-term strategy

826

::

that Sonsu demands.

827

::

And the aggressive use of force, the double-tap strikes

828

::

in Venezuela, the disregard for proportionality

829

::

we saw in Yemen with high civilian casualties.

830

::

These clearly violate Sun Tzu's principles

831

::

of ethical warfare and minimal destruction.

832

::

You can't claim an effortless victory

833

::

when you are escalating across seven countries

834

::

and generating high civilian casualties

835

::

that guarantee post-conflict resentment.

836

::

It's a contradiction in terms.

837

::

And the aggressive posturing toward allies

838

::

like threatening Denmark over Greenland

839

::

and the coercive diplomacy applied to Ukraine

840

::

systematically erode the institutional stability

841

::

and credibility that Machiavelli

842

::

insists are necessary for durable state power.

843

::

The evidence strongly suggests a pattern

844

::

of force over foresight, spectacle over substance,

845

::

and a kind of ideological rigidity over adaptive statecraft.

846

::

It seems the strategy is optimized entirely

847

::

for winning the day's news cycle

848

::

and appealing to a domestic political base,

849

::

not for the long game of global influence and stability.

850

::

Indeed.

851

::

And that's the difference between achieving

852

::

a temporary ceasefire that requires an ally

853

::

to lose their dignity and engineering a durable peace

854

::

that allows your state to grow stronger

855

::

and more reliable in the eyes of the world.

856

::

So measure it against The Art of War and The Prince.

857

::

Such an approach which sacrifices institutional integrity

858

::

and predictability for immediate, high impact,

859

::

headline-grabbing results systematically

860

::

produces strategic instability over extension

861

::

and long-term decline, rather than durable national strength.

862

::

We started by asking how this foreign policy

863

::

measures up against classical statecraft.

864

::

The sources suggest a pervasive pattern

865

::

of short-term spectacle over strategy, force over foresight,

866

::

and a dangerous ideological rigidity

867

::

instead of adaptive statecraft.

868

::

And that brings us to our final provocative thought

869

::

for you to consider, building on everything

870

::

we've discussed today.

871

::

OK.

872

::

Machiavelli advised that a prince must appear virtuous

873

::

and maintain a reputation for keeping promises

874

::

to secure support.

875

::

Sonsu taught that deception appearing weak

876

::

when you are strong or concealing your true intentions

877

::

was paramount to strategy.

878

::

So appearance and concealment?

879

::

Right.

880

::

So the question is, if the US foreign policy

881

::

approach relies on overt, boastful, and consistently

882

::

publicized rhetoric, where the prince constantly

883

::

tells the world what he is doing, why he is doing it,

884

::

and who he just struck?

885

::

How much does that inherent boastfulness

886

::

in that sacrifice of deception and prudence

887

::

fundamentally undermine the long-term strategic effectiveness

888

::

of the American state on the global stage?

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