Artwork for podcast The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove
Episode 326 - Super Imperialism
8th February 2022 • The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove • The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove
00:00:00 00:54:19

Share Episode

Shownotes

In this episode we discuss:

My summary of the ideas in Michael Hudson's book "Super Imperialism".

To financially support the Podcast you can make:

We Livestream every Monday night at 8:00 pm Brisbane time. Follow us on Facebook or YouTube. Watch us live and join the discussion in the chat room.

You can sign up for our newsletter, which links to articles that Trevor has highlighted as potentially interesting and that may be discussed on the podcast. You will get 3 emails per week.

We have a website. www.ironfistvelvetglove.com.au

You can email us. The address is trevor@ironfistvelvetglove.com.au

You can send us a voicemail message at Speakpipe

We have a sister podcast called IFVG Evergreen. It is a collection of evergreen content from the weekly podcast.

Transcripts started in episode 324. You can use this link to search our transcripts. Type "iron fist velvet glove" into the search directory, click on our podcast and then do a word search. It even has a player which will play the relevant section. It is incredibly quick.

Transcripts

Speaker:

We need to talk about ideas.

Speaker:

Good ones and bad ones.

Speaker:

We need to learn stuff about the world.

Speaker:

We need an honest, intelligent, thought provoking, and entertaining

Speaker:

review of what the hell happened on this planet in the last seven days.

Speaker:

We need to sit back and listen to the Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove.

Speaker:

I do listen now.

Speaker:

In this episode, I'm going to attempt to explain money, and how it works, and how

Speaker:

it is washing around the world, and how that's causing enormous Advantages for

Speaker:

some and disadvantages for others, and we'll try and understand it a bit better.

Speaker:

And, uh, so the first thing I want to talk to you about is just

Speaker:

how much money relies on faith.

Speaker:

And, and it's that faith that, that keeps it going in many respects.

Speaker:

And without that faith, the whole system could collapse.

Speaker:

I've often said to people that if I was the Prime Minister of Australia,

Speaker:

I would say to people as part of my, my policy or my speeches that I would

Speaker:

never lie to them about anything.

Speaker:

Except about matters relating to our currency because some

Speaker:

lying might be necessary to maintain the faith at some stage.

Speaker:

So, um, what you could do after this episode is have a look at a podcast

Speaker:

that was done by This American Life called The Invention of Money.

Speaker:

Just Google that and you'll find it.

Speaker:

And they tell three stories in that podcast and this is one of the

Speaker:

podcasts that really had a major effect on my thinking about money.

Speaker:

And, uh, really good podcast, so they talked about three different, um,

Speaker:

stories in relation to money, and some of you have heard this before,

Speaker:

so sorry to repeat myself, but it's worth thinking about in terms of,

Speaker:

uh, the overall concept of faith.

Speaker:

So the first story was in relation to, um, the island of Yap, and, uh, on

Speaker:

the island of Yap, they had a currency which was In the form of these giant

Speaker:

limestone circles and, uh, that were carved out and were located around the

Speaker:

island at different points and they were in different sizes and the bigger

Speaker:

ones were more valuable than the smaller ones but many of them were far too big

Speaker:

to actually move and those, um, carved out circular limestone structures were

Speaker:

used as currency on the island so, um, a big one, for example, might be used.

Speaker:

If a warrior had, uh, died in a battle and they wanted to recover

Speaker:

the warrior's body, then a tribe might, uh, transfer to another

Speaker:

tribe a particular limestone circle.

Speaker:

And the strange thing is that that limestone circle might not actually

Speaker:

physically transfer in possession.

Speaker:

Like, it would be situated on a certain hill, and by

Speaker:

agreement they would say, Okay.

Speaker:

It no longer belongs to Tribe A, it belongs to Tribe B, and in return, they're

Speaker:

going to return the body of a warrior.

Speaker:

Or there might be other things that, uh, of major importance, where they

Speaker:

wanted to trade between tribes or resolve conflicts, and they would

Speaker:

do so by transferring ownership of, These limestone circles and, um, one

Speaker:

story was of how, uh, the limestone is actually not found on the island of Yap.

Speaker:

The workers have to travel to a different island in order to carve out these.

Speaker:

Stones and then bring them back.

Speaker:

And on one occasion they were bringing one back and they got

Speaker:

close to shore and a storm had come up, caused the boat to sink.

Speaker:

And of course the limestone, um, circle sunk to the bottom of the ocean.

Speaker:

But they were close enough to the island of Yap that the, uh, that the guys who who

Speaker:

constructed it were able to swim ashore.

Speaker:

And they said, you know, well we made it, but it's, it's over

Speaker:

there in the bottom of the ocean.

Speaker:

And, uh, the people said, no problem.

Speaker:

Uh, we believe you, we know that you did it, and we know that it's sitting

Speaker:

there, and we can still use it.

Speaker:

And, and in trading between tribes, uh, one of the limestone circles that

Speaker:

was traded was the one that lies under the ocean, over that way, um, and,

Speaker:

and they would trade it as per normal.

Speaker:

Now, we may think to ourselves, gosh, what a primitive, stupid system, um,

Speaker:

those dumb hillbillies came up with there.

Speaker:

And, Um, the purpose of the next two, sort of, stories, which really are

Speaker:

from western civilization, end up showing that what the apps were doing,

Speaker:

maybe, was probably a better system than what we've developed ourselves.

Speaker:

So, the, uh, the second one was in relation to Brazil, where they were

Speaker:

experiencing hyperinflation and no matter what they did, they could

Speaker:

not get Inflation under control.

Speaker:

And some economists were called in and sure they made some changes in terms

Speaker:

of, of government spending and whatnot.

Speaker:

But what they really had to do was restore faith in the currency and um,

Speaker:

you know, rampant in hyperinflation.

Speaker:

You know, people would go to a shop to buy bread and milk and whatever, and.

Speaker:

In the shop, there would be people adjusting the prices feverishly

Speaker:

in the shop, increasing them.

Speaker:

So you sort of raced ahead of the person with the machine, uh, trying

Speaker:

to buy something at the slightly lower price before they got to it.

Speaker:

So, um, so anyway, what they did to try and regain faith was they created a fake,

Speaker:

uh, sort of currency called a, a URV.

Speaker:

And they said, uh, one bottle of milk, for example, is worth one URV.

Speaker:

So when you looked in the sh in the, uh, in the shop, um, the, uh, the

Speaker:

price tag on the bottle of milk was one URV, and that wouldn't change.

Speaker:

The next day it was one URV and the day after that it was one URV.

Speaker:

Each day, the, um, government would, would publish what one URV was in

Speaker:

terms of, of the actual currency.

Speaker:

And they would say, well today, One URV is worth 200 pesos or whatever it was.

Speaker:

And then the next day it's 220 pesos, and the next day it's 240 pesos.

Speaker:

So people were still having to come up with more pesos every

Speaker:

day to pay for their milk.

Speaker:

Um, but the actual price tag on the shelf of the item was one URV

Speaker:

or two URV, which remain constant.

Speaker:

And the important part of that is that people began to have faith in

Speaker:

the URV as a constant stable thing.

Speaker:

You know, they go to the shop and the milk was always one URV.

Speaker:

And so, uh, it was the peso that had become, I, I forget actually the name

Speaker:

of the currency, but whatever it was, it was, it was that, that had kept moving.

Speaker:

But the URV stayed the same.

Speaker:

And then one day what they said to people was, um.

Speaker:

Okay, um, uh, we're gonna have Cruceros and, um, uh, sorry, it was Cruceros that

Speaker:

were the currency that would change.

Speaker:

And uh, and one day they said, okay, we're gonna get rid of Cruceros and we're gonna

Speaker:

have the Rial, and the Rial is one URV.

Speaker:

And people had got, um, so used to the concept of the URV being stable.

Speaker:

That they then accepted that the real was stable being a 1 URV and It was

Speaker:

essentially this mind trick that actually Stopped the hyperinflation in Brazil

Speaker:

together with a few other things But but this ability to get people to have faith

Speaker:

in the currency again is what made it work so the third example from the podcast

Speaker:

was Just talking about, uh, quantitative easing, and in America with the Federal

Speaker:

Reserve, um, in the financial crisis, printing money, and not even printing

Speaker:

money, but, but actually just somebody in a computer, in a fairly nondescript

Speaker:

office, just sitting down at a computer and typing in, you know, a trillion as a

Speaker:

figure, And then, electronically, shifting that money to the major banks in the USA.

Speaker:

And, you know, a trillion dollars just invented out of nowhere by

Speaker:

just a guy sitting at a table.

Speaker:

And, um, you know, sort of the three stories just go to show how

Speaker:

much money relies on our faith and our acceptance of, of the system.

Speaker:

And while we believe in it, it will keep going, but, uh, I'm worried that

Speaker:

down the track we may not believe in it, so that's the purpose of this

Speaker:

podcast, um, and what I'm going to be doing here is looking at a book which

Speaker:

is called, uh, Superimperialism, The Economic Strategy of the American Empire.

Speaker:

This is by Michael Hudson and it's his third edition, 2021.

Speaker:

He wrote the original edition.

Speaker:

First edition, I think nearly 30 years ago, recently updated and, um, some

Speaker:

of you may remember I did an interview with Stephen Hale over modern monetary

Speaker:

theory and that was back, um, gee, probably a year or longer ago now and

Speaker:

we talked about modern monetary theory, but as an aside in that conversation,

Speaker:

I, I said to him, You know, the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollar seems to get an advantage as the world's default currency.

Speaker:

You know, is, do you see that as a significant, as a problem,

Speaker:

or was it going to change?

Speaker:

And, um, he was kind of no to all of those, uh, questions.

Speaker:

That, uh, he said, you know, the British, um, pound sterling was,

Speaker:

was in, uh, was the default currency for a long time, effectively after

Speaker:

Britain had ceased being a superpower.

Speaker:

It's sort of hard to shake.

Speaker:

A default currency and they last longer than they should and at this point he

Speaker:

couldn't see any reason why the US as a default currency would, would change.

Speaker:

So, um, so I've just sort of, uh, you know, I guess let's be honest, I'm

Speaker:

on a bit of a anti-US a bent at the moment, aren't I, in the last, you know,

Speaker:

year two, three and um, and anyway, this has attracted my attention so.

Speaker:

So, I'm just going to give you the shorthand story of what the

Speaker:

book says, and then I'm going to go into the detail of it.

Speaker:

Hopefully I can rattle off the shorthand story in five minutes, um, and it goes

Speaker:

something like this, that, um, prior to World War I, obviously America was

Speaker:

an emerging superpower, um, World War I, um, the traditional superpowers,

Speaker:

UK, France, Germany, of course.

Speaker:

Uh, knocked themselves silly, um, with, um, uh, the World War and financially, you

Speaker:

know, crippled themselves, spent money on munitions and, and bombing their resources

Speaker:

and just the destructive capacity of that on their economies, of course, is obvious.

Speaker:

Um, really, according to Michael Hudson, uh, the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

only really entered the war when it saw that, uh, its potential markets

Speaker:

were going to be in economic ruin and recognized it had to do something

Speaker:

about it, and in any event, entered the war, um, um, with the, uh, as an

Speaker:

associate rather than as a full ally.

Speaker:

And, in doing that, said, well we're going to be providing all of this, um,

Speaker:

armaments and loans and all the rest of it, and we expect all of that to

Speaker:

be repaid in full, because we're not claiming land as part of this, we're

Speaker:

not in this as a traditional, um, party to a war, we're not looking to acquire

Speaker:

land as a result, um, we're only in this because we have to be, and therefore,

Speaker:

You're going to have to stump up, uh, and repay us when this is all finished.

Speaker:

And, according to Michael Hudson, that was quite contrary to what normally

Speaker:

happens when allies get together in wars.

Speaker:

The, uh, their co contributions are normally all forgiven in the

Speaker:

wash, provided there's a victory.

Speaker:

So, what that left, um, was that, uh, the UK, France, uh, other European

Speaker:

allies and Germany, uh, Um, ended up with a massive debt to the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

and, uh, the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

A.

Speaker:

really should have forgiven those loans.

Speaker:

We'll get into the detail of that.

Speaker:

A bit like any commercial lender these days, if you've lent too much to a, um,

Speaker:

a borrower, um, it becomes your problem.

Speaker:

As much as the borrowers, and it's sometimes in your own self interest, um,

Speaker:

to allow people to wipe the slate clean and start again, and, and this is what,

Speaker:

uh, the problem was for, um, Western economies, was that they had this debt

Speaker:

that they owed the USA, and the USA had trade barriers, so people were not able

Speaker:

to produce, uh, items That could earn U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollars that would then enable them to pay off the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

debt.

Speaker:

I mean, they were already crippled by their wartime experience,

Speaker:

but, um, add to that the sort of trade barriers that the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

had put up and, um, sort of very much protectionist policies meant

Speaker:

that the Allies could not, uh, sell, um, easily into the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

and And acquire U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollars to pay off the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollar loans.

Speaker:

So, uh, that became a major reason for the Depression, which became a

Speaker:

major reason for the, uh, Germany deciding to have another crack at it,

Speaker:

and we ended up with World War II.

Speaker:

Uh, so, after World War II, you might remember again, the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

were late to the party, but, uh In any event, um, the US sort of

Speaker:

learnt, um, from the First World War, um, that they couldn't do

Speaker:

that again in exactly the same way.

Speaker:

So, what they ended up doing was creating the International Monetary

Speaker:

Fund, the IMF and the World Bank, and basically said to, um, the Allies,

Speaker:

um, You now have to allow us, um, full access to all of your markets.

Speaker:

So you, Great Britain, with all of these British colonies that were

Speaker:

previously, um, pound sterling colonies, that's, um, that's all open now to

Speaker:

American, um, access economically.

Speaker:

So, The USA was in an extremely dominant position compared to the other war torn

Speaker:

countries and at that point in history, it was very much in their, um, interest

Speaker:

to declare that, uh, the world open up and, and, you know, call it, well,

Speaker:

we want everyone to have free access to all markets, but it was the USA

Speaker:

that was really the ones in a position to take advantage of that overseas.

Speaker:

And they still had tariffs on their own stuff, and still, through the IMF and the

Speaker:

World Bank, would not allow loans that would allow, uh, uh, sort of third world

Speaker:

countries to create, um, businesses, um, products that would compete with America.

Speaker:

So, um, so essentially, uh, America, very dominant economically.

Speaker:

It forced the other countries to open up all markets so that America could enter

Speaker:

and, and essentially American businesses did and America at that point acquired

Speaker:

almost, uh, three quarters of all the gold in the world and, uh, the gold at that

Speaker:

point was sort of pegged to currencies so when people, um You know, a pound sterling

Speaker:

was worth a certain amount in gold, the US dollar was worth a certain amount in gold.

Speaker:

If you had that currency, you could demand this amount of

Speaker:

gold in return for the currency.

Speaker:

So, that's how, um, you know, currencies were operating post World War II.

Speaker:

Now, um, uh, as I said, America had three quarters of the world gold,

Speaker:

extremely strong, uh, economically as a world power, while the others were

Speaker:

trying to get back on their feet.

Speaker:

What happened then, of course, was that the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

decided to enter into wars in Korea and Vietnam.

Speaker:

And essentially, those wars were a spending spree that got

Speaker:

the USA into a lot of trouble.

Speaker:

So where it had been, uh, you know, a surplus country, it was, it was selling

Speaker:

more stuff and earning foreign currency.

Speaker:

Um, it flipped over.

Speaker:

They were spending so much on military stuff.

Speaker:

That was basically responsible for the deficit that the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

created, and the gold started leaving, uh, incredibly quickly and it then

Speaker:

reached the point where the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

could not, it didn't have enough gold to say, well, one U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollar is worth X amount of gold and you can come and collect the gold in

Speaker:

return for, uh, handing over the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollars because it was running out of gold and Nixon at that point said, and really

Speaker:

in the lead up to that, in the lead up to that position, post World War II, America

Speaker:

was so dominant that the US dollar was more or less taken as gold and it was the

Speaker:

economy that was dominant in the world.

Speaker:

Transactions were done in US dollars.

Speaker:

It was accepted in a lot of faith.

Speaker:

That a U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollar was as good as gold.

Speaker:

And, um, it developed that, that aura about it.

Speaker:

So, when the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

started running out of gold, uh, it was then that Nixon decided to take the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollar off the gold, uh, as a, sort of, de link it, if you like,

Speaker:

and say, no, it's, it's just a U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollar now, it doesn't get you.

Speaker:

An equivalent, uh, piece of gold in return.

Speaker:

And really, at that point, the world had a choice.

Speaker:

Where it really could have said, Hang on a minute, what do you

Speaker:

mean it's not worth gold anymore?

Speaker:

And why should we have this faith in this basic paper that you're producing?

Speaker:

Um But the world didn't, and America then, uh, was able to generate US

Speaker:

dollars without having to have an equivalent backup stock of gold.

Speaker:

Um, and the world continued.

Speaker:

So, of course, America didn't stop its military spending.

Speaker:

So, America were still engaged in, in spending more than it was earning.

Speaker:

And this, of course, caused outflows of American dollars into

Speaker:

the hands of other countries.

Speaker:

And the way it works in economics, and I'm still trying to get my head around

Speaker:

this, but take this one on faith, is that, um, The other countries have

Speaker:

to protect their currency in that they don't want it to be overvalued.

Speaker:

So, um, you know, in terms of being competitive in an export

Speaker:

market, you really don't want to overvalue your own currency.

Speaker:

You want it to be undervalued so that it's easier to sell stuff.

Speaker:

And, uh, what countries have found is that They can't hang on to these U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollars, um, because it causes a problem with the valuation of their own currency.

Speaker:

So, what they do is they end up, um, having to basically hand the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollars back to the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

government and get a bond in return.

Speaker:

So, they hand over a billion dollars, or let's, you know A

Speaker:

million dollars, uh, to the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

government who says thank you very much for returning our million dollars and

Speaker:

we promise in ten years time we'll give you, uh, that million dollars back plus,

Speaker:

uh, three percent or something like that.

Speaker:

So, so essentially these countries were earning U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollars but they had to put them somewhere and the only place to put them was In U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

Treasury bonds.

Speaker:

So, the dollars went out of America, uh, because America was

Speaker:

buying military equipment, etc.

Speaker:

The countries were receiving it and going, we can't hang on to this, it's

Speaker:

not good for our currency, we have to get rid of these American dollars,

Speaker:

let's send them back to America.

Speaker:

And they ended up there in U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

Treasury bonds.

Speaker:

Which then, the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

government could then Uh, lend out money to its own multinational companies.

Speaker:

So, it had cheap money.

Speaker:

I mean, it's just printing it itself, and it's lending it out,

Speaker:

uh, you know, two or three percent.

Speaker:

So, essentially, um, the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

was able to, to lend money then to its own multinational

Speaker:

companies, let's say three percent.

Speaker:

And those companies could then go out into the world and buy German

Speaker:

manufacturing companies, industrial companies, all sorts of companies

Speaker:

around the world and um, with cheap U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollars where they only had to pay 2 or 3 percent and they would then be

Speaker:

buying businesses that were earning 15 percent, like it's a no brainer.

Speaker:

And so, um, uh, you know, normally, um, countries would pay a price for printing

Speaker:

too much money, but that's not what happened to the USA, because it had been

Speaker:

this default currency, because of the faith that surrounded the US currency,

Speaker:

and still does, and, you know, if a banana republic did half of what the US

Speaker:

was doing in terms of printing money.

Speaker:

You'd be experiencing some incredible hyperinflation, but as a default currency

Speaker:

and with the other countries having to Recycle the US dollars back to US

Speaker:

Treasury We end up with this amazing situation where the US Essentially goes

Speaker:

around buying stuff on the planet with its own currency that it can Produce

Speaker:

at will and people are accepting it now What, of course, uh, is happening in

Speaker:

recent times, um, and you see, you know, this is where, uh, just briefly, you

Speaker:

know, other countries like Argentina, for example, uh, got into trouble

Speaker:

where they had loans from the IMF that they had to repay, but they're in U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

currency, not their own currency.

Speaker:

So as a country, if you're going to owe a debt, you want to owe it in your

Speaker:

own currency that you can print, and As I mentioned in the, um, episode

Speaker:

with Stephen Hale, you know, the problem of the European, the Euro,

Speaker:

is that you've got countries now that don't control their currency.

Speaker:

So someone like Greece, if it had its own currency, could have, could have

Speaker:

printed its own currency, so, allowed a, a devaluation to take place, which

Speaker:

would have allowed it to export.

Speaker:

And gradually get itself back onto its feet, but it's, you know, using the euro.

Speaker:

Controlled by Brussels.

Speaker:

Controlled by German banks.

Speaker:

Had no say over that.

Speaker:

So, it owed money in a currency that, uh, it couldn't control.

Speaker:

So, it's an enormous advantage for the USA to be able to just generate at will

Speaker:

the default currency that the world uses.

Speaker:

Now, um, uh Let's look at China.

Speaker:

So, China, of course, has, you know, been accumulating U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollars, uh, over the past, uh, decades, and, and was, you know, buying U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

Treasury bonds like everybody else, but, uh, China recognizes there's an

Speaker:

issue here, uh, at any moment the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

could simply say, well, you're an evil empire and we're not, you know,

Speaker:

the, the bonds to you are now just a Defunct and have gone, um, you

Speaker:

know, China would love to use the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollars and buy U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

companies in the same way that U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

companies were able to buy German businesses, for example.

Speaker:

But guess what?

Speaker:

USA won't let China buy U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

businesses like that.

Speaker:

So, uh, so there, the, the, the other thing that's, uh,

Speaker:

so what's China to do then?

Speaker:

Uh, China has great difficulty also in just, sort of just buying

Speaker:

businesses around the world.

Speaker:

Nobody's going to let China buy, you know, Google or something like that.

Speaker:

So what's it doing?

Speaker:

It's using its US dollars in a Belt and Road project where it is, it is creating

Speaker:

infrastructure projects that it can, you know, ports and other facilities that

Speaker:

it can hopefully So it's, it's spending its US dollars around the world instead

Speaker:

of cycling them back to the US Treasury.

Speaker:

Smart move by China.

Speaker:

That's what they should be doing.

Speaker:

The other thing is that the USA says, well, any transaction that involves

Speaker:

US dollars, even if it's a transaction between two other countries and

Speaker:

doesn't involve us, is a transaction that we can, we can regulate.

Speaker:

And so, um, uh, There's an incentive now for countries such as Russia,

Speaker:

Iran, China, Venezuela, Cuba, um, places like that to avoid using the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

currency and, uh, because they don't want to be holding U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

treasury bonds and, um, uh, And to de dollarise, and that's where those

Speaker:

countries are heading, where they are now looking as much as possible to

Speaker:

trade with each other in their own currencies, and totally avoiding the

Speaker:

US currency, and again, that's a smart move, that's what they should be doing.

Speaker:

So So, um So yeah, so that's where we're at in a nutshell, where according to

Speaker:

the Michael Hudson argument, the USA has been getting a free lunch and has

Speaker:

been benefiting by being this de facto world currency, but it's played its

Speaker:

hand too hard and You know, as part of this it's, you know, it's confiscated

Speaker:

Um, you know, Venezuelan gold and other things like that, which caused

Speaker:

European countries to demand their physical gold be returned to them.

Speaker:

And also, the other part that, uh, works in all of this is

Speaker:

the IMF and the World Bank.

Speaker:

So, uh, essentially, you know, these were created, uh, straight after the

Speaker:

Second World War, with America in supreme control and basically with a

Speaker:

veto power over whatever the IMF does.

Speaker:

And They have basically set up the IMF and the World Bank as institutions

Speaker:

of, you know, so called, sort of, opening up economies to free trade.

Speaker:

And what they do, of course, is they impose on countries that need loans

Speaker:

draconian neoliberal policies in return for the loans which are in US dollars.

Speaker:

So, For a poor country, uh, like Argentina that gets into trouble, they would say,

Speaker:

um, you're in trouble, here's a loan of US dollars, but before you get that loan,

Speaker:

you're going to have to do some structural changes, you, um, you are going to have to

Speaker:

stop a lot of the social security payments that you're making, you're going to have

Speaker:

to, um, push down labour and wages, You're going to have to deregulate your economy

Speaker:

to allow our foreign businesses to come in and you're going to, um, uh, allow

Speaker:

foreign businesses to come in and, um, and you're going to sell off some of your

Speaker:

key financial assets, so, um, if you've got, uh, you know, your water, electricity

Speaker:

and other services Uh, telecoms owned by the government, you're going to have

Speaker:

to sell them off and privatise them.

Speaker:

And, well guess what, um, that's invariably bad for a country and,

Speaker:

um, so in various ways things happen.

Speaker:

For example, often these loans have been made to cruel dictators.

Speaker:

And then when they get overthrown, the slightly leftish sort of replacement

Speaker:

government comes in and is saddled with, with these debts that, uh, that the,

Speaker:

uh, the military junta or whatever, um, might have agreed to beforehand.

Speaker:

Um, so, the other part of it is that, is that these countries are never,

Speaker:

you know, particularly let's, talking Latin America here, They're never

Speaker:

given the opportunity to industrialise.

Speaker:

They're told you're all about plantation crops or resources that can be

Speaker:

extracted that America can't produce.

Speaker:

But they're not given the opportunity to industrialise their economies.

Speaker:

The loans are for things that You know, plantation based and the like,

Speaker:

or just simple mining of resources.

Speaker:

So nothing that would allow the country to, um, uh, industrialize.

Speaker:

I mean, you need to protect these industries.

Speaker:

If you want to start a car industry in Argentina or elsewhere, you need

Speaker:

protection for, you know, a decade while that industry gets up and going.

Speaker:

And, you know, the IMF just does not allow protection and in fact forces an opening.

Speaker:

So these countries are, are, are locked into their primitive

Speaker:

economies by these draconian loans.

Speaker:

And I mean, people talk about China with the Belt and Road as being a

Speaker:

deals that are going to cruelly, you know, these countries are going to

Speaker:

pay for it in the end of the day.

Speaker:

It can't be any worse than what the IMF and the World Bank have been doing to

Speaker:

these countries on behalf of the West already, so And there's actual evidence

Speaker:

that the Belt and Road Initiatives of the Chinese have actually been far better

Speaker:

behaved than the IMF and the World Bank so So yeah, so we've got the IMF and

Speaker:

the World Bank going around the world saying to these Uh, countries, you're

Speaker:

in trouble, the only way you'll get a loan is if it is under these conditions.

Speaker:

Which then invariably, um, make the country's leaders unpopular

Speaker:

with the local, um, population.

Speaker:

And you know, you end up with more turmoil and governments being

Speaker:

overthrown and the rest of it.

Speaker:

And uh, so, so this has been going on.

Speaker:

Literally all over the planet and, uh, you know, even in Russia, I mean, when

Speaker:

the oligarchs, you know, when Boris Yeltsin opened up, uh, the economy,

Speaker:

I mean, the, uh, Russian stock market was the darling of the world there

Speaker:

from 94, 95, with lots of American businesses rushing in and buying.

Speaker:

Uh, Soviet infrastructure that has suddenly privatised.

Speaker:

So, um, uh, the key to China's success is China said, No, we're not taking, uh,

Speaker:

a loan from the IMF or the World Bank.

Speaker:

We're not accepting those conditions.

Speaker:

We are not letting American businesses come in here.

Speaker:

And buy our stuff on the cheap.

Speaker:

We are maintaining ownership of it, of the commons, by the government.

Speaker:

And that is what's driving America nuts.

Speaker:

It's not that China is running around the world promoting communism in

Speaker:

cells in other countries, is it?

Speaker:

Their gripe is that they're not allowed in, like they have been everywhere else.

Speaker:

And any country that has tried, e.

Speaker:

g.

Speaker:

Venezuela, has been smashed with sanctions.

Speaker:

China's too big.

Speaker:

That's the problem.

Speaker:

And as I explained in last week's episode, when we're looking at the Ukraine, um,

Speaker:

what was happening there was the classic IMF ploy, where they wanted, um, the

Speaker:

Ukrainian government to agree to These neoliberal policies, which, uh, which

Speaker:

were going to be terrible for the local population, including, um, uh, increasing

Speaker:

the cost of, um, sort of our power supply, I think it was, electricity, something

Speaker:

like that, um, which had been subsidised.

Speaker:

So, the government said, no, we're not going to accept it.

Speaker:

And they looked around, and Russia had been pressuring

Speaker:

them with an alternative deal.

Speaker:

The Russian Deal.

Speaker:

So, um, So that's what's been happening around the world with economies and

Speaker:

it's been a lot of IMF intervention with the World Bank constraining and

Speaker:

crippling economies, keeping them in, um, low value Um, economic states,

Speaker:

making it very difficult for them to industrialise, and meanwhile American

Speaker:

multinationals able to get cheap money from their government, who can print it,

Speaker:

go out buying businesses wherever they like, meanwhile other countries finding

Speaker:

it difficult to buy American businesses.

Speaker:

And, and that's where we're at, and this has been going on for a while now, and

Speaker:

at some point I see that China, Russia, Iran, other countries are going to de

Speaker:

dollarise even more, encourage other countries to join them, because they

Speaker:

just have no option, like the Ukraine.

Speaker:

Now, I don't know, if you're a, sort of a pessimist and you think that the world's

Speaker:

heading for some sort of Armageddon or something like that, then, um, Yeah, and

Speaker:

at times, I feel that way, and I think to myself, the trigger will be currency.

Speaker:

If, if there is Um, a really bad, a really bad future for this planet.

Speaker:

At some point, the currency is going to be part of that story.

Speaker:

I don't know how it's going to work out.

Speaker:

But you can see that, uh, it has inherent problems in it that are really, at

Speaker:

the moment, uh, surviving on faith.

Speaker:

And the fundamentals are such that that can't continue forever.

Speaker:

So, so there we go.

Speaker:

Um, now I'm just going to pause here and look at some detail.

Speaker:

So, I'm just going to grab some ideas from the various chapters in

Speaker:

this book and that will fill out, um, put some flesh on the bones of

Speaker:

the story that I've just told you.

Speaker:

So, um, from chapter one, uh, during World War I and its aftermath, deaths

Speaker:

among governments came to overshadow Private investments that had characterised

Speaker:

the pre war economic situation.

Speaker:

So, before World War I, claims on foreign assets were held

Speaker:

mainly by private investors.

Speaker:

Um, large government debts were common, but they were held principally by private

Speaker:

investors, not by other governments.

Speaker:

So private investors would lend money to governments.

Speaker:

Um, Governments borrowed to finance projects designed in

Speaker:

principle to increase national income and hence their tax revenue.

Speaker:

The way the war changed all this, it gave birth to massive claims by

Speaker:

governments on other governments.

Speaker:

That was a crucial feature of World War I.

Speaker:

Paramount among the post war claims were the, um, the debts by the Allies,

Speaker:

which, uh, in 1923 stood at 28 billion.

Speaker:

Which was overshadowed by Germany's reparations bill set at 60 billion.

Speaker:

So, of course, these obligations did not find any counterpart in productive

Speaker:

resources or expanding taxing capacity.

Speaker:

I mean, normally when countries borrow those sorts of money That sort of

Speaker:

amounts, they've created something that generates income or tax, but

Speaker:

not so in the case of World War I.

Speaker:

I think I mentioned earlier that Allies normally forgave the debts between

Speaker:

themselves after a victory, but he makes a point here that, um, most of the wars

Speaker:

fought during the century spanning the Napoleonic Wars and World War I were of

Speaker:

local and bilateral character, such as the Franco Prussian War, the Boer War.

Speaker:

The Spanish American War, the Russo Japanese War.

Speaker:

With the exception of the Crimean War, they did not involve large groups

Speaker:

of nations, so there were neither inter allied debts nor subsidies.

Speaker:

So World War I was therefore a conflagration of unprecedented scope.

Speaker:

So, just reading from page 73 here, he says that, um, A higher value for

Speaker:

sterling meant that a given amount of British pounds would exchange for a

Speaker:

greater number of US dollars, and thus pay off a larger value of US dollars.

Speaker:

U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollar debt.

Speaker:

So the, uh, the British were inclined to have a high value for sterling because it

Speaker:

meant that they could, um, pay off more U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

dollars.

Speaker:

But the high exchange rate for sterling, um, meant that British

Speaker:

exports were uncompetitive.

Speaker:

So it reduced their ability to earn.

Speaker:

Money, and other foreign exchange.

Speaker:

So, also, the British were promoting high interest rates in order to support

Speaker:

this high valuation on the sterling.

Speaker:

High interest, of course, deterred new domestic investment.

Speaker:

So, the attempt to solve this problem by making labour bear the

Speaker:

by keeping domestic wages down.

Speaker:

As one of the things the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

was saying to these countries is, Well, in order to pay us back, if

Speaker:

you can't earn the money, you're going to have to just spend less.

Speaker:

So, there was pressure to keep wages down.

Speaker:

And, so you had an overvalued pound, high interest rates,

Speaker:

pressure to keep wages down.

Speaker:

Uh, all of that adding up to a wave of strikes, culminating

Speaker:

in the general strike of 1926.

Speaker:

And the American economy itself was distorted, because they were

Speaker:

keeping interest rates low to prevent the US dollar from rising, because

Speaker:

they wanted a low US dollar in order to make it easier to export.

Speaker:

So, those low interest rates in the US led to a domestic credit bubble.

Speaker:

That culminated in the 1929 stock market crash.

Speaker:

Just turning back to Germany, uh, he makes a note here that like many third

Speaker:

world debtor countries today, Germany could not inflate its way out of debt

Speaker:

because the debt was denominated in US dollars or other foreign currency, which

Speaker:

the German central bank could not print.

Speaker:

Central banks can create a domestic currency, but not the dollars

Speaker:

and the other hard currencies necessary to pay foreign debts.

Speaker:

Likewise, they cannot increase domestic taxes to pay their foreign

Speaker:

currency debts, because taxes are levied in local currency.

Speaker:

If you're a country in trouble, and your debts are in the denomination of

Speaker:

another country, you're in trouble.

Speaker:

I'd previously had a fairly high opinion of, uh, President Roosevelt,

Speaker:

um, and the New Deal, and his, um, uh, his work during the war.

Speaker:

But, um, in this book Hudson makes the point that the previous president,

Speaker:

Hoover, recognised the problem of the amount of debt owed by the former allies

Speaker:

and how that was, that needed to be forgiven in some way by the US and he

Speaker:

really understood what was going on and he tried to convince Roosevelt.

Speaker:

Uh, in the transition that Roosevelt should adopt a policy of forgiving

Speaker:

the debt but, uh, Roosevelt, uh, disagreed with that, um, and he

Speaker:

was insistent that everybody had to pay their debts to the US.

Speaker:

So while we might, uh, praise Roosevelt for, uh, The New Deal, uh, he was

Speaker:

partly responsible for the requirement of it as a result of the Depression,

Speaker:

parts of which might have been avoided if he had forgiven the debts.

Speaker:

Just reading from page 326, where Hudson, uh, makes the point.

Speaker:

This is around about 1963, I believe, that, um, Common market economists

Speaker:

complained of America's growing investment in European industry.

Speaker:

and correlated this investment outflow with the size of the overall US payments

Speaker:

deficit to demonstrate that the United States was in effect obtaining a cost

Speaker:

free takeover of Europe's economy.

Speaker:

Private US investors were spending billions of dollars to buy highly

Speaker:

profitable European enterprises.

Speaker:

The European recipients of these funds exchanged their dollar proceeds with their

Speaker:

central banks to obtain local currency.

Speaker:

These central banks, in turn, were pressured by the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

Treasury to refrain from cashing in their dollars for U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

gold on the ground that it might disrupt world financial conditions.

Speaker:

They therefore bought U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

Treasury securities, whose yield was only a fraction of what U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

investors were extracting from private European companies they were buying out.

Speaker:

The result was a financial and commercial arbitrage.

Speaker:

The US economy gained control of highly profitable European companies in

Speaker:

exchange for paying low interest rates on the dollars that foreign central

Speaker:

banks recycled to the US Treasury.

Speaker:

In effect, Americans were buying control of Europe's leading

Speaker:

industries with funds provided by Europe's central banks themselves.

Speaker:

There seemed no effective limit on how far this free ride might go.

Speaker:

As long as the United States was not compelled to part with its monetary

Speaker:

gold in payment for the increase in its private sector net investment in Europe.

Speaker:

U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

Treasury bonds, which are essentially IOUs, were being

Speaker:

exchanged for higher paying direct ownership of European assets.

Speaker:

And, uh, just reading further, beginning of Chapter 15,

Speaker:

Who could tell how long its ability to buy up foreign goods and even

Speaker:

companies on credit could continue?

Speaker:

Until other countries actually drew the line and stopped

Speaker:

absorbing surplus dollars.

Speaker:

The Americans saw that only a world monetary breakdown could

Speaker:

bring the free ride to an end.

Speaker:

Uh, it goes on, The impotence of foreign governments to meaningfully retaliate,

Speaker:

short of breaking totally with the United States and its dollar standard.

Speaker:

Uh, was perceived early as April 1967.

Speaker:

Uh, two bank economists, Ralph Peterson from Bank of America, and,

Speaker:

um, John Deaver from Chase Manhattan.

Speaker:

Uh, Deaver wrote, Foreign central banks would be faced with a serious dilemma.

Speaker:

With their dollars no longer freely convertible into gold, They would

Speaker:

have to decide what to do with the dollars they own and how to deal with

Speaker:

the dollars that would be presented to them by their own commercial banks

Speaker:

for conversion into local currencies.

Speaker:

But this would be a most disagreeable choice.

Speaker:

On the one hand, if they permitted the dollar to depreciate, prices of U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

goods would drop relative to domestic produced goods.

Speaker:

Furthermore, it would make U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

exports more competitive in third markets.

Speaker:

This solution would be vigorously opposed by most exporters

Speaker:

and businessmen abroad, okay?

Speaker:

So if they had said, these dollars are now worthless, well if the dollar then

Speaker:

depreciated drastically, the US would have a huge advantage with exports.

Speaker:

It goes on, on the other hand, if foreign central banks continued to support the

Speaker:

dollar at its present rate, meaning pretending everything's still fine,

Speaker:

this would place them more unequivocally than ever on a dollar standard.

Speaker:

If it is made unmistakably clear that in the event of a crisis, the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

would simply terminate the privilege now given to foreign central banks

Speaker:

of buying gold freely, then the burden of decision making regarding

Speaker:

the defence of the dollar would be shifted even more than now from the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

to the European and other central banks.

Speaker:

So, this is in the lead up to de linking the gold, and they said,

Speaker:

that's essentially going to be a decision for European banks

Speaker:

as to how they deal with it.

Speaker:

And it's going to be ugly either way, and the US was just going to keep

Speaker:

doing what it was doing because its companies could buy foreign assets

Speaker:

cheaply as long as they're allowed to.

Speaker:

Uh, in the book he sort of makes a point that in all these negotiations,

Speaker:

negotiations over loans and whatnot between America and other countries,

Speaker:

uh, he's quite scathing and critical of, uh, the British for capitulating.

Speaker:

Um, and at different times, the only ones who really stood up to the U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

were the French, at different times.

Speaker:

Uh, buy the book to get all the detail on that.

Speaker:

And his last chapter just looks into the future, and what he says

Speaker:

is that, uh, the self defeating U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

trade sanctions against Russia and China, uh, he calls them self defeating

Speaker:

because Uh, the trade sanctions against Russia, for example, forced the Russians

Speaker:

to, to produce internally what they couldn't get from America and its allies.

Speaker:

So, uh, Russia and China, because of the threat of U.

Speaker:

S.

Speaker:

sanctions, um, basically grow, produce, build everything

Speaker:

that they need themselves.

Speaker:

Without being reliant on imports, which can be snatched away from them at any

Speaker:

time, so he calls them self defeating because it's caused Russia and China

Speaker:

to, to broaden their economies to cover what will be stopped via sanctions.

Speaker:

And he says that, um, It's driven these and other nations into a position where

Speaker:

their only defence is to do what Britain and the rest of Europe could not do in

Speaker:

1945, and that is create an alternative economic order with its own rules, and

Speaker:

replace the dollar by negotiating their own mutual currency swaps, using gold,

Speaker:

or using both gold and swaps together.

Speaker:

That's where we're heading, and the US is not going to like it.

Speaker:

And when you're looking at world affairs and conflicts between countries, keep

Speaker:

in mind these currency issues and the US dollar and how all that plays out and will

Speaker:

help explain a lot of what's going on.

Speaker:

So there you go.

Speaker:

I hope that made sense and next week, back with a normal panel where we

Speaker:

will, where we will be discussing religious discrimination bill and all

Speaker:

the other nuttery that's been going on.

Speaker:

Okay, cheers.

Speaker:

Dear listener, Not too long ago, you looked at your podcast app and saw that

Speaker:

a new episode of the Iron Fist and Velvet Glove podcast was available to download.

Speaker:

Did you silently think to yourself, Wait, a new podcast?

Speaker:

I like listening to those guys.

Speaker:

If so, then you qualify as a potential donor to the podcast.

Speaker:

Your donation will help cover some expenses, but more importantly

Speaker:

your donation tells the boys that they are on the right track

Speaker:

and to keep up the good work.

Speaker:

A dollar a show is all they ask.

Speaker:

Go to their website at ironfistvelvetglove.

Speaker:

com.

Speaker:

au and click on the donations link.

Chapters

Video

More from YouTube