As Canada’s auto industry faces fresh uncertainty, an old story from New Brunswick suddenly feels very current. In this episode, host Brendan Sweeney and guest host Greg Keenan sit down with Dimitry Anastakis, a University of Toronto professor and the author of Dream Car, a book about the history of the New Brunswick-built Bricklin SV1. Dimitry details the fascinating yet tumultuous journey of the Bricklin in the 1970s, why it was a failure with important lessons, and how we can apply those lessons to the startup and sustainability of a Canadian car company today. Dimitry also reflects on the Trillium Network’s Shifting Gears report and shares his vision for what a uniquely Canadian car should look like.

00:00 Introduction and Previous Episode Recap

00:52 Introducing the Guest: Dimitry Anastakis

02:43 Dimitry's Background and Academic Journey

04:13 Writing ‘Dream Car’: More than a Simple Case Study

08:41 Why Dimitry Thinks a Canadian Car is Feasible

09:50 The Future of Canadian Car Manufacturing

15:44 The Challenge of Sustaining a Car Company

25:35 Parallels Between Bricklin and Tesla

30:26 Why Dimitry Was Less Pessimistic After Reading the Trillium Network’s Report

45:46 What Dimitry Thinks a Canadian Car Should Look Like

Read the Trillium Network Report

1. Shifting Gears: The Potential for a Canadian Car Company trilliummfg.ca/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/January-5-Shifting-Gears_TrilliumNetwork.pdf

Find Out More About Dimitry Anastakis

1. Dimitry Anastakis University of Toronto Profile history.utoronto.ca/people/directories/all-faculty/dimitry-anastakis
2. Dream Car: Malcolm Bricklin’s Fantastic SV1 and the End of Industrial Modernity utppublishing.com/doi/book/10.3138/9781487555825#generate-pdf
3. The North American Auto Industry since NAFTA utorontopress.com/9781487527372/the-north-american-auto-industry-since-nafta

Find Out More About Trillium

1. Trillium website: trilliummfg.ca
2. Trillium GIS: trilliumgis.ca
3. LinkedIn: linkedin.com/company/trilliummfg
4. X/Twitter: x.com/TrilliumMfg
5. Instagram: instagram.com/trilliummfg
6. Facebook: facebook.com/trilliummfg
7. Old ‘Making it in Ontario’ Episodes: https://soundcloud.com/making-it-in-ontario-past

About the Making it in Ontario Podcast

Making it in Ontario is your window into what's next in manufacturing. Ontario’s economy depends on manufacturing, but the latest research reveals concerning trends that could undermine the sector’s strength—if we don’t address them. Join us as we talk to CEOs and other leaders at the forefront of the sector about productivity, strategy, talent markets and career opportunities, and the role of manufacturing in a prosperous and sustainable future.

This podcast is an initiative of the Trillium Network for Advanced Manufacturing. It is produced by Storied Places Media.

Welcome to Making it in Ontario, your window into what's next in

2

Ontario's manufacturing sector from the

data driven researchers at the Trillium

3

Network for Advanced Manufacturing.

4

I'm Michelle Samson.

5

Brendan Sweeney: And I'm Brendan Sweeney.

6

Michelle Samson: All right, Brendan.

7

Well, we had a really great response to

our last episode on the, uh, potential

8

of a Canadian car company, didn't we?

9

Brendan Sweeney: I think we had an

absolutely exceptional response.

10

Within an hour or two of the episode

coming out, I'm getting texts from people

11

saying, this is great, it's informative,

it's entertaining, evidence-backed.

12

But it's also optimistic and

that was really kind of the

13

note we were trying to hit.

14

Michelle Samson: That is perfect.

15

And "optimistic" is a word that is used

by our guest in this episode as well.

16

Brendan Sweeney: Yeah.

17

Our guest is University of Toronto

professor and author of Dream Car,

18

which is a book about the Bricklin

Motorcar company, Dimitry Anastakis.

19

And there are not too many people who know

more about the history of the automotive

20

industry in Canada than Dimitry.

21

He sure flexes that

throughout this episode.

22

There is lots going on in this episode.

23

Michelle Samson: This is why I love

talking to academics because they can

24

go real deep on a topic and Dimitry

had so much to say about this one.

25

Just his depth of

knowledge was remarkable.

26

Brendan Sweeney: Depth of knowledge,

optimism, enthusiasm, creativity.

27

These are really good notes to hit during

what has been a really busy news cycle

28

for the automotive industry in Canada.

29

Michelle Samson: Has it?

30

Brendan Sweeney: Yeah, yeah.

31

Yeah, with the duties on 49,000

Chinese made vehicles coming off,

32

and with what we've been teased is

a federal auto policy or something

33

similar that will come out in February.

34

February is also when the

Toronto International Auto

35

Show is going to be held.

36

So maybe they'll team it up with that.

37

That's pure speculation, but

it would make a lot of sense.

38

We're gonna be in and around the

auto show doing some stuff, so

39

would be great to see people there.

40

In advance of the auto show.

41

I think you're going to hear from

us once more on this podcast talking

42

about the automotive industry.

43

So pay attention to Dimitri here.

44

He's got some great stuff to

say and stay tuned for one

45

more episode in two weeks time.

46

Dimitry, welcome to Making it in Ontario.

47

Nice to have you.

48

Dimitry Anastakis: Great to be here.

49

Thank you for having me.

50

Brendan Sweeney: So, Dimitry, tell us a

bit about yourself, your quote unquote,

51

as Greg likes to say, "auto" biography...

52

Dimitry Anastakis: Sure.

53

Well, my background in automotive

comes from my academic journey in

54

the sense that I did my PhD thesis

55

And originally when I was working on

the project, I thought it would be

56

a lot more of a kind of diplomatic

history, and it ended up being much more

57

economic and much more business-oriented

and much more in the industry.

58

And that was one of the things that I

realized in writing the Auto Pact thesis,

59

which became a book was that it wasn't

just a treaty between two countries.

60

The auto industry played a

fundamental role in reshaping

61

the North American auto industry.

62

And from that point forward a lot of

my writing has been about the auto

63

industry, that interrelationship

between Canada and the United States,

64

Canada within the North American

sector, but Canada globally as well.

65

So I've spent the last.

66

25 years really thinking about,

writing about the industry.

67

And I always say to my

students, I'm not a gearhead.

68

If your car breaks down on the side of

the road, I will not be able to help you.

69

But if you wanna know about

what the industry looked like in

70

the 1970s then you can call me.

71

Brendan Sweeney: So what we're

hoping to talk about today is a bit

72

about your work, and particularly

your most recent book, Dream Car.

73

And then talk about our kind of

recent report in the context of

74

broader conversations about a Canadian

car company or a Canadian car.

75

Did you know when you started the

book project for Dream Car, when you

76

published the book, that it would become

more and more timely and more and more

77

relevant every day from 2024 until now?

78

Dimitry Anastakis: No, none whatsoever.

79

I mean, it was really kind of a

labor of love in the sense that

80

I started that book in 2007.

81

And I've been working on it

kind of in the background with

82

other projects all that time.

83

And it took a long time to do the book.

84

But it came out of another book

that I had written, which was called

85

Autonomous State, which was about the

Canadian auto industry within the North

86

American and global context in the

87

And I'd written only like a paragraph or

two about the Bricklin as an example of

88

how the industry was being reshaped by

continental integration and that there

89

was this unusual case of a vehicle built

in New Brunswick, which was kind of like

90

an outlier, a footnote, a unusual story.

91

And the Bricklin itself

is kind of notorious.

92

It's infamous as being this vehicle

that gets built, there's only about

93

3000 of them that are made, that's

got a lot of state support to it.

94

The New Brunswick government of Richard

Hatfield puts in like $25 million.

95

And of course, it is seen as

a kind of tremendous flop.

96

The fact that they get going and they

build cars, but then they go bankrupt

97

and the government in New Brunswick

is on the hook for all this money.

98

So it's had in the public perception

a kind of image as a product and

99

a project that was not necessarily

ill-fated from the start, but one that

100

was a kind of quixotic venture to make

this unusual gull-wing plastic car.

101

And over the course of the time that I

was writing the book, you know, I'd done

102

some interviews with Malcolm Bricklin, I

was working on other projects, but I had

103

no idea that it would come to be seen,

uh, the project itself and the book, as

104

something that would reflect a lot of

the changes and developments that are

105

going on now, which weirdly enough it

is because it is this unusual case of

106

an effort that is a cross-border effort

of a car made in Canada, which a lot of

107

people don't realize, the Bricklin was,

they were all made in Canada, but they

108

were only intended to be sold into the

United States, which is another kind of

109

wrinkle on how things have evolved more

recently, and that there were no Bricklins

110

that were supposed to be sold in Canada.

111

It was a kind of a very

unusual arrangement.

112

Over the course of the years that I

was writing the book, originally I

113

kind of started off thinking about is

just a kind of classic business case

114

study that I could say, Hey, here's

a example of a Canadian car company.

115

I also talked about it and thought

about it as an example of failure.

116

And I thought, business historians and

economic historians are often, you know,

117

writing about success stories, and I

thought this was actually a failure that

118

you could learn a lot from in terms of

what was going on in the industry and

119

how things had evolved in the industry.

120

Bricklin was very unusual in the

sense that it was the only real

121

mass manufacturing car endeavor

and venture in the post-war period,

122

right from the forties all the way up

until Elon Musk gets into production

123

with the Roadster in the 2010s that

had actually gotten off the ground,

124

nobody had able been able to do it.

125

So, the fact that it

happened was a miracle.

126

But the fact that it happened in the early

127

economy was going through a period of

severe disruption, very much paralleling

128

today, was even more useful in terms of

using that vehicle as a vehicle to talk

129

about these broader issues like North

American integration, like the nature

130

of business in the auto industry, like

technological change, like disruptions

131

that were going on and new developments

in the sector that were really reshaping

132

the way people thought about cars.

133

And, you know, it, it partly came out

of my academic experience, but I'd

134

also, I'd worked in the government

as, you know, in the automotive

135

office in the provincial government.

136

So I had a different perspective as

well as being an academic in terms

137

of how I saw the auto industry and

how I saw the interplay between

138

the government and the auto sector,

at least in Ontario and in Canada.

139

And that was useful in terms of

framing how I thought about this

140

and the perspective of, you know,

the state's role in an auto sector,

141

and particularly in our auto sector.

142

And how it evolved.

143

Brendan Sweeney: What are some of the most

important takeaways from the book when it

144

comes to the notion of whether or not a

Canadian car company can be successful?

145

Dimitry Anastakis: Well, I think the

key takeaway was, you know, there

146

was this fundamental question, which

was, Could this have succeeded?

147

Should this have succeeded?

148

And why did it fail?

149

Because the Bricklin case is

really unusual in the sense that

150

they make it into production.

151

By 1975, they built 3000 cars.

152

And they're gearing up to

do the next year's model.

153

Uh, you know, this is a niche car.

154

It's a sports car with gull-wing

doors, plastic, and all that stuff.

155

But in the context of the 1970s there

was a lot of potential for this to work.

156

There was a huge market of baby

boomers who were buying sports cars.

157

Bricklin was a fantastic salesperson.

158

He was really able to kind of

promote the vehicle very well.

159

So he had a lot of public

relations success with the vehicle.

160

And there are lots of reasons

why it could have succeeded.

161

And there are a lot of

reasons why it failed.

162

And this was the kind of one thing

that I came to in the end, was that

163

making a car in Canada is doable.

164

It's absolutely a doable thing.

165

There's proof that this happened.

166

Bricklin has built 3000 vehicles.

167

About 1500 of them are still on the road.

168

There's a tangible artifact of

the success of putting a car

169

into production and selling them.

170

And, you know, Bricklin, to this

day and I'm still in touch with

171

Malcolm, will tell you we had

back orders for 45,000 vehicles.

172

Despite all the problems with quality

and distribution and manufacturing,

173

people still wanted the car.

174

People were cheering for the car.

175

People thought that the car could succeed.

176

The problem wasn't necessarily, and

there was significant problems on the

177

manufacturing side and the quality

side and the cost of the vehicle, the

178

problem was really that aspect that is

so fundamental to our industry, which is

179

the tremendous capital costs of making

sure that you can build a vehicle,

180

enough of them, on time, in a quality

manner, in a way that people will like,

181

and that you can distribute them and

keep selling them and keep it going.

182

And the capital costs for

Bricklin were tremendous.

183

And the one place he could get capital

from was the Government of New Brunswick.

184

He wasn't able to get a lot of support

from private entities, from banks.

185

He did have money from

banks, he had his own money.

186

He had been successful with Subaru,

Bricklin had brought Subaru to North

187

America, and in fact the Subaru company

that exists today is the Subaru company

188

that he had founded in 1968, and he used

some of the money and the collateral

189

from his Subaru days into the company.

190

But in the early 1970s, he's facing

a landscape where not a lot of people

191

want to take a risk on a new car

company because of the structural

192

challenges that are going on.

193

And New Brunswick is a bit of an

outlier in the sense that the Hatfield

194

government, was deeply committed to

trying to change the narrative of their

195

province and say, Hey, we're not just

hewers and wood and drawers of water.

196

There's more than just the

Irvings in our province.

197

We can do this kind of stuff.

198

And they did succeed in

doing this kind of stuff.

199

But in an era where the Japanese

are just starting to arrive.

200

It's still very much a D3-dominated

oligopoly where the car companies

201

are gigantic and they require these

massive amounts of capital and they

202

have these armies of, workers and

accountants and everybody to do this,

203

putting money towards a car company

is pretty risky at the best of times.

204

Putting more money towards this car

company was becoming very risky.

205

And ultimately what happened was that

the New Brunswick government, even though

206

they had put in $25 million, which was

actually a very small amount of money

207

to start a car company, to actually

make it into production, decided that it

208

wasn't worth the political risk for them

anymore because the costs were going up.

209

And Bricklin to this day would

say, Hey, we were on our way.

210

If we had an extra $10 million

or $15 million, we would've

211

worked at all the kinks.

212

We would've driven the cost down.

213

We would've been able to

produce even more effectively.

214

That's, you know, that's speculation.

215

He may have been able to do this.

216

But it's not that you can

just simply throw money at the

217

issue to solve the problem.

218

But you need to have that money in

the first place to even get to a point

219

where you can solve the problems.

220

And he didn't have the money.

221

So no matter what kind of innovative

techniques that he used to make this

222

car company get into production and

successfully make it into production.

223

And, you know, from my research and

my assessment of the Bricklin car

224

company, he did use a lot of pretty

innovative techniques that were echoed

225

by Elon Musk in the years to come.

226

One's an IC and one's an EV, but a lot

of the kind of model that Bricklin is

227

using is what Elon ends up using in

terms of getting off the ground and

228

starting the car company and moving

it into a kind of a viable entity.

229

So he would say, yeah, we could have

done this if we just had more money.

230

That's great if you've got the money

and you make it into production

231

and you are able to kind of

sell that first round of cars.

232

But what next?

233

I mean, eventually one single car

of a very particular niche is gonna

234

get you a specialty kind of level

of sales where you're gonna be able

235

to survive for a while, for sure.

236

And there's a few models out there.

237

You know, there are the Aston Martins

of the world and the McLarens of

238

the world, but Malcolm was trying

to do more mass manufacturing.

239

He wasn't trying to do just specialty.

240

He had visions of selling 30,000 cars

in '74 and 60,000 cars in '75, and even

241

more than that in the years to come.

242

That necessarily wasn't realistic.

243

But the fact is, and I will say this.

244

He did make it in production.

245

He made 3000 cars.

246

They were about to go into the next phase

of production for the next vehicle year.

247

And it may very well have worked.

248

The challenges though, are the ones

that are faced in any startup dynamic.

249

You need a ton of money.

250

You need to be able to

get into production.

251

You need to have an audience as much as

a market, because in the auto industry,

252

because it's so high profile, it's not

necessarily like the manufacturer of

253

planes or trains where you've got a kind

of a market there that you know you're

254

gonna have, you need to also have an

audience because there's so much of a

255

public perception aspect in the automobile

industry, which is different than others.

256

And I get asked this question all

the time about, could it have worked?

257

Should it have worked?

258

I often say, It did work.

259

It worked for the 18 months

that they were in production.

260

And it might have continued working

if there had been more political will

261

and a willingness to really back this.

262

Which really does speak to the

situation that we find ourselves in

263

today in a lot of ways about, you

know, how does that dynamic play out?

264

It's doable.

265

It certainly is doable.

266

But the particularities of a state-backed

auto company are a lot more fraught

267

than meets the eye in the first place.

268

Greg Keenan: One of the things that

strikes me about what you just said

269

is if you're gonna do this as a

group of companies with a government,

270

you need to do this by not focusing

so much energy on just getting it

271

up and running, but on step two.

272

Like I think about Blackberry and RIM.

273

One trick pony.

274

Dimitry Anastakis: Yeah.

275

Greg Keenan: They were never able to meld

music into the phone the way Apple did.

276

So, maybe the answer for a

Canadian car company, if it ever

277

comes to that, is look way beyond

you're gonna do at the beginning.

278

Dimitry Anastakis: Yeah, I mean,

that is a pathway, and I would

279

say this much, I mean, I would be

remiss to say we can't do this.

280

Because we can do this.

281

We do this.

282

I mean, there are lots of examples

of Canadian made vehicles.

283

We have the wherewithal, we

have the ability, we have the

284

personnel, we have the skills.

285

We build cars, we build pretty good

vehicles, all kinds of vehicles.

286

From EVs at BrightDrop, which we were

building, to minivans in Windsor, to

287

sports cars in Markham at Multimatic.

288

So there's a range of vehicles

that we have been able to

289

do and built lots of times.

290

Obviously foreign owned entities.

291

But there's lots of models there too of

state enterprise and private enterprise

292

on different sectors of the economy,

working together to build amazing

293

Canadian products and Canadian vehicles.

294

Whether it's C-series planes or

trains in Kingston and Thunder Bay.

295

You know, there's lots of great

examples, De Havilland and all

296

kinds of instances where the state

and private enterprise have come

297

together and created great stuff.

298

You could do it where you could have

a Crown Corporation, a JV, all kinds

299

of different types of collaborations

that would result in an entity that's

300

making something and making a vehicle.

301

We know we can make quality vehicles.

302

I mean, for many years the scuttlebutt

around was that Canadian made

303

vehicles were always better than their

equivalents from the United States

304

just because of the quality of the

workforce and all this other stuff.

305

So, there's no question

that we can do that.

306

It is that next step, Greg,

of where do you go from there?

307

If you have one vehicle,

what does it look like?

308

What is that target market?

309

And where do you get to the next step?

310

And one of the concerns I have, or one

of the kind of barriers I think to this

311

happening is that you can have an amazing

business plan and a model where you say,

312

let's get a private enterprise with state

capital and state support to do this.

313

And we've got, certainly, we've

got plants and infrastructure

314

and the personnel to do this.

315

And you do get to a kind of a

product there where you can say,

316

I've got an idea for a model.

317

Now you've gotta convince a private

entity to take that risk, which is

318

I think in some ways the biggest

challenge, if you wanna bring in

319

a private entity like a Magna.

320

So, you know, Magna's obviously and

this is something that was discussed

321

in the report, Magna's kind of the

perfect partner in the sense they are

322

the largest parts manufacturer in North

America, third largest in the world.

323

They already have a long track record

of assembly of vehicles in Europe.

324

The question for Magna

is this risk worth it?

325

Say Magna was gonna do what they do

all the time, which is to create a

326

spinoff firm or another subsidiary

firm, which was just Canada Vehicle Inc.

327

And that that much of the financial

risk was covered by, for instance,

328

taxpayers, and that there was even

a guaranteed product out there.

329

Say for instance the idea was that

the Canadian government would be

330

contracting to build a vehicle that

would be both dual use in terms

331

of military use and public use.

332

Like a G 63, like the Mercedes-Benz, which

is I always think of it as kind of like

333

the grandparent of all the big crazy SUVs.

334

We could certainly do something like

that, which would meet a lot of needs,

335

which would be a great way in the current

context of fulfilling demands around

336

defense procurement and defense spending

and having a vehicle that would fit the

337

kind of profile of what Canadians are seen

as in the world in terms of an audience

338

in a marketplace in Canada and abroad.

339

You know, I was joking earlier about,

you know, you want a vehicle that

340

would be kind of like the Canada

Goose of vehicles, which is a really

341

stylish, cool vehicle that is also

something that is really practical,

342

really speaks to the kind of northern

rugged idea of a Canadian vehicle.

343

And that would profile perfectly

well, and I think you'd have a good

344

market and a good audience for that.

345

So on its merits alone

as an idea, it's great.

346

But is Magna willing to take a risk to

put their name on something like that?

347

Maybe they are, maybe they're

willing to kind of say, Hey we are

348

a Canadian based firm and this is

something that we really want to do.

349

But if I'm sitting from the perspective

of the C-suite and I'm Magna, I don't

350

know if it's worth that risk because

of the high profile nature of the auto

351

industry, the difficulties of getting

to that second and third vehicle.

352

We know, you both know better than

most, how difficult it is to build a

353

car company from a one vehicle startup

and extend that range of vehicles out.

354

Elon is discovering how

difficult that is right now.

355

I mean, he's up to four vehicles, but he

has had no movement on any new product.

356

And as we all know, the Cybertruck, which

was the next category that he wanted

357

to get into, is a complete disaster.

358

So even in the most successful

places where this has happened,

359

it's really hard to do.

360

And we also know that there are

lots of examples in this new

361

landscape of one vehicle startups,

or one or two vehicle startups.

362

The Rivians and the Scouts

of the world are out there in

363

North America and elsewhere.

364

So it's not beyond the

realm of possibility.

365

It's not the startup, it's not

even the creation of the entity.

366

It's not even building that first vehicle.

367

It's the sustainability

of the auto industry.

368

And this is what keeps these people

awake every night is, I'm gonna

369

spend $2 billion on my next car.

370

What if it's a flop?

371

What if it's the next

Cybertruck or the next Edsel?

372

No matter if I've got three

other vehicles that work, that

373

one mistake is gonna kill me.

374

And that's the challenge.

375

And please don't get me wrong here, I

don't wanna be seen as the doomsayer here.

376

I wrote a book about a car company that

actually made it and got into production.

377

So I firmly believe that

it is absolutely doable.

378

And, you know, there are a few examples

of a one-off that continued on.

379

Land Rover and Range Rover are great

examples of that, that had the kind of

380

initial beginnings of a utility vehicle.

381

But we also know that in the 21st

century you know, you're only

382

as good as your last vehicle.

383

You're only as good as

your last kind of entry.

384

And one of the great challenges of

the automobile market is the fact

385

that Alfred Sloan in the 1920s made it

that planned obsolescence and styling

386

and a car for every purse and purpose

became the model of how people thought

387

automobility should function so that we

would have these constant new vehicles.

388

And that the industry is so tied into

notions of the future, which I also talk

389

about in the book, it's the first chapter,

is how the future and automobility are

390

so entwined, so that if you are stale

or you're not providing that next new

391

thing that consumers want, it becomes

pretty hard for you to stay in the game.

392

Which is why that there's this

relentless pulse in the auto industry

393

of the new model and the next

thing and the new technology, which

394

is such a challenge to maintain.

395

Greg Keenan: I was wondering, Brendan

and I were talking about this yesterday,

396

what was the last, most recent successful

Canadian car company, apart from

397

Bricklin's success in getting to market?

398

Was it McLaughlin?

399

Dimitry Anastakis: Yeah, McLaughlin.

400

Gray-Dort is still in

401

It's a company that nobody's

ever heard of that, I think they

402

get into a couple of thousand.

403

Russell Automotive is successful

404

shift automotive production.

405

They had their factory on

King Street in Toronto.

406

The building is still there.

407

But they shift automotive production

into armaments because of the war,

408

and they never get back into it.

409

But McLaughlin is probably the one

which obviously gets subsumed and

410

becomes General Motors of Canada.

411

There are a few, like,

the Quebec one, um...

412

Brendan Sweeney: Manic?

413

Dimitry Anastakis: Manic, which does

a few small batches, and is Canadian.

414

But these are not production cars.

415

They're building small

batches of vehicles.

416

But in terms of a kind of a production

model that gets into the mass market

417

really it's probably Bricklin and

then, you know, Bricklin itself

418

technically its ownership was American.

419

Bricklin and the banks in the United

States owned the whole company, but it

420

was the New Brunswick government with

Bricklin that owned the manufacturing

421

side in Canada, which is really,

that was the car company itself.

422

That's where all the money was.

423

Oh.

424

Hey, do you remember The Zen, which was

a EV startup in the early two thousands.

425

They kind of managed to get into a little

bit of production, and then the car didn't

426

meet safety requirements because it was

such a small, kind of little vehicle.

427

So they eventually went out of business.

428

But beyond that, there's not much.

429

And there's gonna be many people

who are going to email and complain

430

and say, Well, you missed this.

431

But actually, I don't think that

there's that many, that they're

432

out there that we are missing

433

Greg Keenan: Well, I'll rephrase

the question now that you've

434

answered it and say mass market.

435

Dimitry Anastakis: Mass market.

436

Yeah.

437

I mean, if you think about

Multimatic, Multimatic makes batches

438

of, I think, with the GT 40 they

make 200 of them or whatever.

439

It's a very small batch.

440

That's not mass market, but there's

a car company that's making vehicles

441

in Canada, basically the whole thing.

442

And obviously, you know, we

have a lot of these OEMs that

443

are making vehicles in Canada.

444

You know, BrightDrop

was only made in Canada.

445

There's lots of sole sourced vehicles

that are just made in Canada.

446

So it's not like we don't have

the ability to do it in terms of

447

the production side of things.

448

It's aspects of design, stuff like that.

449

But, you know, I would say this much.

450

The way that the industry is evolving,

it's actually getting easier to make

451

cars, a lot easier, especially with EVs.

452

And one of the really interesting

parallels between the Bricklin and

453

Tesla, which I draw specifically in

the book, is that the approach that

454

Bricklin was using really did kind

of anticipate what Elon was gonna do.

455

So Bricklin, when he was making his

car, all he was making was basically the

456

chassis, the body with plastic parts.

457

Everything else besides the frame

and the body panels were off

458

the shelf, including the engine.

459

He was getting his engines first

from AMC and then from Ford.

460

And he was just putting it right in.

461

The parallel is what Elon was doing with

that first iteration of car where he

462

was getting his engines, his batteries,

from Panasonic, and it was far less

463

technologically demanding than doing

an ICE engine right from the get go.

464

Which is a kind of technological

barrier that nobody can do except

465

for the established manufacturers.

466

I mean, one of the reasons that you

see companies like Scout and VinFast

467

and Rivian is because if they can

get their batteries from somebody

468

else, like a PowerCo, or a NextStar

or whatever, you can just buy those

469

batteries off the shelf, put them

right into your vehicle, and suddenly

470

the dynamics are completely different.

471

And, in a few years when EVs are much

more part of the landscape, nobody's gonna

472

care where you got your EV battery from.

473

And in this world where the number

of parts for an IC is 20 to 30,000,

474

the number of parts in an EV is 2

475

vehicles is much less complicated and

much less technologically difficult.

476

Obviously I'm simplifying things.

477

Clearly there's a lot of demands on the

technologies, but before the EV revolution

478

it's impossible for you to do a startup

without having an engine of your own.

479

And if you don't have an

engine, you don't have the car.

480

Once you're overcoming that barrier

where you can slide an engine, whatever

481

kind of EV battery it is in there,

you've really gotten over one of the

482

biggest humps in terms of getting

to manufacturing of a motor vehicle.

483

So the dynamics have made it in some

ways easier, even if the underlying

484

technology, the batteries are, you

know, that's an amazing level of

485

technology that only now we've reached

that ability to be able to do it.

486

Because when Bricklin was trying to put

487

this was an era of technological atrophy.

488

There had not been a lot

of advances in materials.

489

There hadn't been a lot of

advances in the engine technology.

490

There hadn't even been a lot of

advances yet in terms of production.

491

The Toyota production system was only

becoming part of the landscape of auto

492

manufacturing starting in the 1970s.

493

And it took General Motors and Ford

494

at NUMMI or other places so that

they could learn how to do that.

495

But by the time Elon shows up

496

barriers have lowered dramatically.

497

The production barriers have lowered

dramatically, so he can walk in, take

498

over that Fremont plant in California,

which had been a General Motors plant

499

that had been the joint venture between

GM and Toyota, and then had been Toyota's

500

plant and say, Hey, I'm gonna start up

let me have some old technology in terms

501

of the assembly line, and he's able to

get into manufacturing vehicles at a

502

pretty low barrier and a pretty low cost

because of the advances in technology.

503

And, not to get too far afield here,

but it's the same for him in space.

504

Because so much of that technological

development has reached a certain point

505

where it's now all part of our society,

and you can get your hands on some of

506

these technologies in a way that you

507

barriers are a lot less hard to overcome.

508

Which is one of the reasons that,

this idea of a Canadian vehicle

509

manufacturer and a Canadian owned

vehicle manufacturer is not at all

510

beyond the realm of possibility.

511

The barriers have lowered, but there are

other questions that are just as salient

512

as they were in 1970 h as they're today.

513

Brendan Sweeney: One of the things that

I just realized in our conversation about

514

something we put in the report about

515

Multimatic was still 50% owned by Magna.

516

So Magna has actually had a hand in making

a few vehicles in Canada and Markham,

517

and then in, and I think now they've

put the niche vehicles in Newmarket.

518

Dimitry Anastakis: Yep.

519

Sorry.

520

It's in Newmarket now

521

Brendan Sweeney: Yeah,

it might be in both.

522

They might kind of do it

across both locations.

523

But anyway Dimitry, you provided us with

some feedback on the report and thank

524

you for that and it was very helpful.

525

We didn't get all of the feedback into

the report in time for publication.

526

But I'd love to know, and I think our

listeners would really love to know

527

what did you think of the report?

528

What did you learn?

529

What surprised you?

530

And what did we miss?

531

Dimitry Anastakis: Well, I learned a lot.

532

And Dennis DesRosiers actually once

said this to me, he said, You could

533

know so much about this automotive

industry, and it's still just a

534

smidgen, because it's so expansive.

535

So, you know, I'm reading your report

and I've researched a lot, written

536

a lot about the auto industry, and

I found so many interesting bits

537

about what you'd been talking about.

538

And one of the things that struck me about

the report is that there is an underlying

539

optimism, an idealism, here that is very

valuable in terms of that this is doable.

540

Canadians have this kind of willingness

to cut down their own successes even

541

when their successes are real successes.

542

I mean, Greg, you just

mentioned Blackberry.

543

And, on the one hand, yes, it's seen as

a company that created the smartphone

544

market and dominated the smartphone market

and then lost the smartphone market.

545

You know, Bombardier is another

one of a company that does so well.

546

Nortel is another one.

547

Massey Ferguson in farm implements.

548

So these are all industrial technological

firms that had great success.

549

And then they go through the kind

of normal course that most firms

550

go through of success and decline.

551

Not everybody can stay on top forever.

552

And you know, it's even more unusual

when you think about these companies

553

like Toyota and General Motors that have

been in business for a century or more.

554

In the case of General Motors, as

555

So, even in success stories,

there's lots of failure.

556

Canadians have a tendency to just focus

on the end, the failure part, and not

557

on the incredible success and innovation

that they have been able to achieve.

558

Bombardier is probably one of theh

best examples of an incredible Canadian

559

success story that, when we think

about it, sometimes we forget of

560

just how amazing that story is, and

we focus on, Oh yeah, it fell apart.

561

We had to sell the C-series,

we had to sell the trains, the

562

company went down the tubes.

563

So, what struck me about the report

is that there is a recapturing of

564

that optimism and a willingness in

the report to say, We can do this.

565

There are different types of models

and collaborations that can do this.

566

And that's what struck me because

I thought, Hey, in the context of

567

a world where we're facing so much

uncertainty, so much disruption why not?

568

Why not Canadians to start taking

some chances again to start working

569

together, to start thinking in that

kind of way of how do we collaborate?

570

How do we think outside the box?

571

How do we work together in a way

that is a collective national

572

endeavor to try to accomplish

something that we know we can do.

573

It is certainly a really

incredibly difficult thing to

574

do, but the fact that the report.

575

deals with all these different aspects

of the context of how the industry has

576

evolved, the different examples of the

varieties of automotive and vehicle

577

production that Canadians have undertaken

in the past that can happen again.

578

And the models that you guys developed

in terms of what could happen and how

579

it could evolve was, uh, let me say I

was far less pessimistic after reading

580

your report than I was going in.

581

And you know, I'm someone, like I

said, and I keep repeating this,

582

who wrote a book about a car company

that did make it into production, but

583

recognizes that that book shows all the

challenges that even when you get into

584

production that you have to overcome.

585

So when I read the report I came away

thinking about that there is a realistic

586

path on how this could get done.

587

And, you know, I don't know if

Brendan, you and Greg are kind of

588

thinking about this as a game plan

that could be used or as a think piece.

589

But either way certainly is food for

thought for a lot of people who are

590

above our pay grade in terms of how do we

actually motivate all these stakeholders

591

to do something that certainly could

have incredibly positive and beneficial

592

implications for our industry, for our

country, for our economic wellbeing, and

593

ordinary Canadians' economic wellbeings.

594

Of course, having said that, I also

was struck by all those other questions

595

that we've already talked about.

596

What are those next steps?

597

Even if you get to that

point, how do you continue it?

598

How do you sustain it?

599

How do you make this thing work?

600

And, you know, I think that there

is another level of discussion

601

even beyond the report that

can happen and should happen.

602

And this is something that is

worthwhile in terms of talking about.

603

And I will say this, as a historian,

I wanna talk about two things that

604

I think are really important that

Canadians need to recognize and

605

understand as we deal with the kind of

rapidly shifting context and quickly

606

changing reality of our auto industry.

607

And one of the things that I often

point out when I'm giving talks about

608

how the auto industry has evolved is

609

had a pretty vibrant auto industry.

610

In fact, we had probably the

second largest auto manufacturing

611

industry in the world.

612

And virtually none of the vehicles we made

in that period went to the United States.

613

In fact, virtually none of the vehicles

614

until 1965 went to the United States.

615

We had a traditional branch plan economy.

616

And one of the things that we did

is that we were very adaptable,

617

very shrewd, very smart.

618

We took advantage of the landscape

that we faced, and we had export

619

markets outside of Canada.

620

So not only were we using a branch plant

model to manufacture vehicles in Canada

621

as best we could to build up a car

industry, to have lots of employment, to

622

develop all of those additional aspects

of the industry, like a parts industry,

623

like a tool and die industry, like

a distribution industry that are the

624

benefits that we get that people don't

often talk about as much as they should.

625

But we were doing this because much of our

production outside of Canada was going to

626

these British Commonwealth marketplaces

that we were utilizing the circumstances

627

that we faced to maximize our industry.

628

We are so in a mindset of the

629

now, where our industry is tied

so closely to the United States.

630

But in fact it was tied to the

United States in terms of being

631

a branch plan operation, but our

market wasn't in the United States.

632

In 1963, out of the 600,000 plus vehicles

that were manufactured in Canada in

633

1963, a grand total of 9,000 of them

went to the United States market.

634

Okay?

635

Then the Auto Pact happens because

636

markets in British Commonwealth and

other places were shrinking rapidly.

637

So we had to find a new marketplace.

638

And we did, we found the United States.

639

We integrated in terms of our

industries, which reflected realities

640

in the ground in terms of ownership,

in terms of a branch plan operation.

641

So in 1963, out of the 600,000 vehicles we

built, we sent 9,000 to the United States.

642

By 1973, 10 years later, with the Auto

Pact in full bloom, we built about 1.6

643

million vehicles.

644

Nearly a million of those

vehicles go to the United States.

645

So we went from zero vehicles going to

the United States for the first 65 years

646

of the industry, to 80% or 90% of our

vehicles going to the United States.

647

And you know, we're in a situation

now where we may have to find other

648

places in addition to the United

States to get our vehicles going.

649

And one of the key differences is, from

650

the 1980s onwards, we were tied to the

United States and everybody knew that.

651

And a lot of these other places in the

world had no real interest in making

652

connections to Canada because there were

kind of these already established spheres

653

of influence in terms of the sector.

654

Well, even if we had gone knocking

655

2000s, and even in the two thousands

said, Hey, we would really like

656

to make connections with you guys.

657

Let's create a free trade agreement

with Korea, which we've done.

658

Let's create a free trade agreement

with Europe, which we've done.

659

There wasn't as much of a kind of

a notion that Canada would be a

660

good and willing trading partner.

661

In the current context of the United

States and its behavior, a lot of

662

other countries are now recognizing

and realizing, Hey, maybe collaboration

663

with Canada is not a bad idea.

664

I mean, there was a report in the

newspaper today about the government

665

thinking about, you know, if we're

gonna build submarines and buy submarine

666

contracts with Korea or Germany, maybe

there might be some other aspect of that

667

that includes automotive production.

668

And in this context now, that is much

more realistic from those players'

669

perspectives from the Germans who are now

like, Yes, we all know that the Canadians

670

can't depend on the United States.

671

We can't depend on the United States.

672

Maybe there is more opportunity

now than there was before.

673

And that is a pretty significant

difference in terms of this transition

674

of going from no sales in the United

States to most of our sales in the

675

United States to now maybe going to a

place where, again, some of our sales

676

are not in the United States, but for

a key difference is we now have willing

677

partners outside of the United States.

678

Okay.

679

That's one thing.

680

The other thing is, and I think this

681

when Canada was in this difficult

situation, technology changes, markets

682

shrinking, the auto industry in Canada

is really at risk, and we are trying

683

to find a new arrangement, and we

do find a new arrangement with the

684

United States with the Auto Pact.

685

Two of the reasons that we're

successful is, at the time we had a

686

very nationalistic finance minister by

the name of Walter Gordon, who really

687

did hammer on the table in this era.

688

And that was an era where there was

increasing protectionism, higher

689

content requirements were being

imposed by countries like Brazil and

690

Mexico upon foreign manufacturers.

691

And Walter Gordon, when he was in the

negotiations with the United States

692

about what was gonna happen to the auto

industry in Canada, vis-a-vis the United

693

States, he talked very passionately

about developing the all Canadian car.

694

Whether it was realistic

then, there certainly was a

695

lot of discussion around it.

696

There were elements of the Canadian

UAW, the Auto Workers Union, that

697

was very much on board with that.

698

Walter Gordon himself was, Hey we'll

put together the kind of necessary

699

components to make this happen.

700

Very analogous to today, an

era of disruption, an era of

701

economic nationalism, an era when

governments are seeking ways to

702

build up industrial capacity.

703

An era where Canadian governments

are willing to spend the money and

704

establish the kinds of entities

that could do that kind of thing.

705

So, the parallels are quite

striking between then and today.

706

And I know from my research from going

through the archives in Washington and

707

in Texas and all these places, that there

was very much a concern by the United

708

States about how this would happen.

709

Now, the other side of the reason that

the Auto Pact emerges and that we're able

710

to integrate our auto industry in this

711

Americans who didn't want the Auto Pact.

712

They didn't like the Auto Pact.

713

Al Gore Sr.,

714

the father of who was the vice

president, was one of the most

715

vociferous critics of the Auto Pact.

716

He said, this is terrible.

717

You guys are gonna, you know,

sell us out to the Canadians.

718

But there were key players in the auto

industry who were very committed to this

719

idea of an integrated sector that could

take advantage of economies of scale

720

and efficiencies, and could provide a

model for cross border integration that

721

made not only the auto industry work

more effectively, but made Canada-US

722

relations function even better.

723

And, you know, I've written about this

before in books and articles where Henry

724

Ford the second is probably the most

important figure in ensuring that the

725

auto sector in Canada becomes a part

of this broader North American entity

726

because Henry Ford II recognizes it's

beneficial for the Ford Motor Company

727

of Canada as much as it is for the Ford

Motor Company of the United States, and

728

it's beneficial for the industry and

it's beneficial for the two countries

729

in terms of their economic wellbeing,

which means it's beneficial for ordinary

730

Americans as it is for ordinary Canadians.

731

So that whole line of reasoning, which

in my view is profoundly sound and

732

sensible, is out the window for reasons

that have nothing to do with sanity.

733

We know this.

734

We're going through this, we're

experiencing this every day in the

735

industry and in our Canada-US relations.

736

And one of the key reasons that Ford,

Henry Ford II, the Deuce, is like

737

that is because he'd been to war with

Canadians in the Second World War.

738

He grew up in the context

of a relationship that was

739

built on mutual respect.

740

Obviously there's often been problems

in the Canada-US relationship, but

741

most of the time, we're willing to

work that out and figure things out.

742

So you've got key players in the industry

who are willing to kind of stand up

743

and say, We wanna do this because we

know ultimately it's beneficial for us.

744

That is lacking in our

current context right now.

745

Those voices are much quieter.

746

Who knows if they are willing to stand

up in this CUSMA negotiation, which, we

747

hear that the manufacturers are all on

board with the idea of maintaining CUSMA,

748

maintaining the integrated industry.

749

But we also know that there is

an irrational actor in the White

750

House who is completely detached

from history, economics, morality,

751

and that makes everything at risk.

752

Which provides, in a weird way, an

opportunity for Canadians to rethink

753

the way that they're gonna do things.

754

The disruption of the industry that's

going on does provide opportunities for

755

us to rethink the way we're doing things,

and for us to engage in the kinds of ideas

756

that you have presented in your paper.

757

So, with every kind of immense challenge

and disruption, there are opportunities

758

that could result in something

that gets us to a new e evolution.

759

And the one thing that I have

learned as a historian of the

760

Canadian auto industry is that it's

an incredibly resilient industry.

761

That the circumstances on the ground

762

they are in 1930 and what they're in

763

with NAFTA and what they are in 2025.

764

But, Canadians and their governments

and their firms have done what they've

765

needed to do to adapt to the situation,

to make sure that the industry continues.

766

And despite what all these naysayers

have commented about our industry,

767

there's no question in my mind that

on a cost benefit basis, on a value

768

added basis, this industry has

provided a net benefit for Canada.

769

Without question.

770

And sorry for the rant guys, hey,

uh, you know, you got me going.

771

Brendan Sweeney: Very last question,

and this is brainstorming here, if

772

there was going to be a Canadian

car, what would it look like?

773

What would it do?

774

What would it be called?

775

Dimitry Anastakis: You know, I keep

going back to that idea of what speaks

776

to a Canadian brand outside of Canada

and inside of Canada is a rugged vehicle

777

that fits where you could sell it not

just to the general public, but you

778

could sell it to military, fire brigades

in the north, anything that kind of

779

really speaks to that idea of Canada

in a world of challenges, ruggedness,

780

a world of climate change, a world of

real disruption that, you know, we're

781

building something that is dependable,

that is reliable, that is not necessarily

782

bulletproof, I'm not getting into the

kind of dystopianness of the Cybertruck,

783

but I'm saying, you know, one that

looks like something that makes a lot of

784

sense in British Columbia, but is pretty

stylish in downtown Toronto as well.

785

And that people outside of

Canada would say, Oh, that makes

786

sense as a Canadian vehicle.

787

When you're traveling outside of Canada,

and, you know, when you think about

788

the brands and the identity of Canada

as a northern country, it's got a

789

profile that looks like a Saab, like a

Viggen, like a Volvo, like a kind of not

790

necessarily utilitarian, but something

that is really rugged and is at the same

791

time stylish, but strong, dependable.

792

I'm not gonna say the beaver, but

you know, the attributes of the

793

beaver are something that really

do speak to a kind of a vehicle.

794

And nobody's gonna call their car

a beaver, right, but I think that

795

would not only sell in Canada because

that market already exists pretty

796

strongly, and I think you'd have an

appeal to Canadians and you'd have

797

to start pretty high up and bring it

down in terms of a quality vehicle.

798

But I think that would be something

that would not only work as a kind

799

of, can we get into production?

800

Which we do do, the Stellantis plant in

Brampton was gonna be building Jeeps.

801

But it also speaks to that consumption

side and the audience side, and

802

the marketplace side and the image

side, you know, something like that.

803

And then you could go into

different iterations of that.

804

You could do a small sporty UV,

a kind of different vehicle.

805

So, I don't know if that

answers your question, Brandon.

806

Brendan Sweeney: It does.

807

It could come in plaid.

808

Greg Keenan: I've got a thought on

this, now that you talk about it.

809

When it gets where it's going, there's a

version of it that disgorges a Ski-Doo.

810

Dimitry Anastakis: That would be awesome.

811

Greg Keenan: Or in the

summertime, a Sea-Doo

812

Dimitry Anastakis: BRP makes three wheeled

vehicles, as you guys put in your report.

813

And I thought about this because, yeah, I

mean, there are companies in the country

814

that are adjacent, that they're close to

this, that it makes a lot of sense where

815

it pops out and the Sea-Doo appears, or

the Ski-Doo appears, or you certainly have

816

tracked tires or whatever the case may be.

817

So, certainly.

818

Brendan Sweeney: The BRP

four wheeled three wheeler.

819

Problem solved.

820

Comes in plaid.

821

Dimitry Anastakis: Why not?

822

Why not?

823

It's plaid, it's strong.

824

Brendan Sweeney: Yeah.

825

Dimitry, thank you so much for coming on.

826

This is great.

827

Lots for our listeners

to chew on and to unpack.

828

And again, I think this is a

really important contribution

829

to the conversation.

830

It's not the start of the conversation

and it's not the end of the conversation.

831

And really looking forward to continuing

832

Dimitry Anastakis: Thank you

very much for having me on.

833

I really appreciate the

opportunity to talk about this

834

stuff and, uh, yes, thank you.

835

Michelle Samson: New episodes

of this podcast are coming soon.

836

Follow us on your favorite podcast

platform to be notified when it drops.

837

Making it in Ontario is an

initiative of the Trillium Network

838

for Advanced Manufacturing.

839

It is produced by Storied Places Media.