With the British pulling back from Philadelphia, George Washington decides to strike near Monmouth Courthouse.

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Hello, and welcome to the political history of the United States.

Episode 4.51 Monmouth Courthouse the rejection of the Carlisle Commission meant more for the United States than simply an introspective look into their own legitimacy.

More immediately, it meant that the war was not over and that once again, George Washington would lead his men into battle.

They had ended the previous year with the defeat of Burgoyne in the north.

In the south, although Washington had not yet had a moment on par with Saratoga, neither had the British really pressed their advantage.

Washington's army had performed well the prior year and remained more or less intact.

Most importantly, it remained in the field ready to fight.

Now, as everybody prepared for the year's campaigns, the Americans had a new and powerful European ally in France.

General Clinton, having taken over from how in May, was pulling his army out of Philadelphia and pulling them back north to the relative safety of New York.

Of course, with the French entering into the war, abandoning Philadelphia became necessary, as Clinton found himself needing to figure out a way to part with half of his army to help defend other parts of the British Empire.

With that many men being pulled away from Clinton, holding both New York and Philadelphia became untenable.

With Clinton beginning the retreat from Philadelphia in the middle of June with some 3,000 loyalists in tow, Washington saw an opportunity.

It is important here to consider the pressures that existed on George Washington.

His number one overriding goal was to play things safe and ensure that the Continental army remained in the field.

The ability of the Americans to keep fighting the war was far more important than nearly any individual victory could prove to be.

So long as the army remained in the field, Washington was aware that the British would be forced to expend valuable resources to continue their war effort.

If not exactly a war of attrition, the goal of the Americans was largely just to outlast the British will to continue fighting.

Of course, none of this should be new information.

We have discussed this idea multiple times in the past.

Although Washington wanted to avoid a general engagement, was desperate for some kind of victory, today we think of George Washington as being, well, George Washington.

He is a nearly mythical figure in the United States.

And has been largely such a figure since the end of the revolution.

Yet here I think it is very important to remember that George Washington was, in fact, a mere human who was having to deal with very real political pressure.

Sure, he was expected to avoid a general engagement.

However, it was impossible for Washington not to notice the sudden rise of men like Horatio Gates.

He was likewise acutely aware of the Conway cabal of the prior year that was hoping for his replacement.

Unsurprisingly, Washington was eager to do something to help fortify his own position, something that would help reassure everybody in Congress that he was, in fact, the right man for the job.

Washington, through his spy network, was aware that the British were planning to evacuate Philadelphia, which took place on June 18th.

Clinton was not traveling lightly and had some 3,000 loyalists along for the overland march to New York.

This was in addition to 10,000 troops and a supply train of over 1,500 wagons.

If Washington saw Clinton's retreat as being an ample time for a strike, Clinton agreed with him.

Clinton was worried that Washington might take a shot and as a result, took a longer eastern route through New Jersey instead of taking the more direct path.

Although Washington was eager to score some points, he still understood that a general engagement was something to be avoided.

Instead, what he proposed was sending a few thousand troops out to attack Clinton's rear.

As he often did, Washington proposed the plan to a war council, where, as they often did, the proposal was promptly shot down.

Among the biggest opponents to this plan was Charles Lee, who was freshly back with the Americans after having been traded for shortly before.

Lee feared that such an attack by Washington would end up becoming that general engagement that Washington needed to avoid.

The feelings to avoid an attack, however, were not as universal as the council of war would lead one to.

In a letter that same night, Greene told Washington that despite signing onto the agreement, something more, though still short of a general engagement, was required.

That same night, the Marquis de Lafayette and Anthony Wayne would express similar feelings to the general.

Lafayette wrote to Washington that night, saying, I have signed the paper because I have been told that I should sign, and because almost all of the others who were of the same opinion as I have also signed.

Lafayette went further, laying out to Washington that he was not alone in believing that the 1,500 man detachment was a mistake.

It would be a lost opportunity should Washington decide not to act.

Washington, who was just itching to hit Clinton, needed very little convincing.

Putting aside the Council of War's decision, Washington accepted the advice of Greene, Lafayette and Wayne and decided that not attacking would be an opportunity lost.

Clinton himself had very real concerns.

He was aware that his baggage train was long invulnerable, something that had been pointed out to Washington by both Lafayette and Stuben.

Clinton's concern was that he was going to find himself getting ambushed in New Brunswick.

This location posed a unique danger as his men were going to be forced to cross the Raritan River.

The idea of getting stuck between Washington and the river sounded less than ideal, an idea that was made all the worse because Clinton was acting on intelligence that Horatio Gates in his army was moving south from New York.

Getting caught between potentially two armies with a river in the middle was a suicidal prospect.

Clinton had no plans to take such a risk, and in order to avoid having to cross the Raritan, he turned his army to the northeast in Allentown.

This path would make it possible to avoid that dangerous river crossing and for our story today was going to march Clinton right through the town of Monmouth.

Making matters worse for Clinton is that it was hot.

Like really hot.

The British, and especially the Germans, were suffering.

Their uniforms were not made from comfortable, breathable materials, plus they were carrying packs that were often in excess of 60 pounds.

The result of this was that along the way, many men fell out and died of heatstroke.

At a moment when Clinton needed to move quickly, the men were dragging for Washington, he had the ability to operate much more easily than Clinton.

The Americans, having home field advantage, were not required to lug around their baggage and therefore enjoyed far easier movement than did Clinton, despite also having to deal with the often oppressive heat.

Washington's first act was to send Anthony Wayne forward with some 1,000 men with the orders to not necessarily attack, but to make everybody in Clinton's army nervous.

On June 25, he ordered Lafayette out, along with some 4,000 troops to get good position on Clinton's rear and left flank, and in Washington's own words, caused them every degree of annoyance.

Washington himself kept the bulk of the continental army some five miles away from the British.

On June 27, the Americans, like the British, spent the day resting.

It is here that things get a little bit messy for the Continental Army.

As a near crisis in Battle command broke out.

Washington was planning to send just under half of the army, some 5,000 men, to attack Clinton's rear.

Per his custom, Washington offered command roles for the battle to his second in command, which in this case was Charles Lee.

Now, as we have already discussed, Lee wanted absolutely nothing at all to do with this battle.

He thought the entire thing was a mistake, and upon being offered the command of the American attack, he promptly turned it down.

With this unpleasant formality out of the way, Washington chose to hand command of the battle over to Lafayette, who was eager to get his hands dirty and happily accepted.

The problem is that now that Lafayette had the command, Lee got a touch of buyer's remorse.

Suddenly it occurred to him that Lafayette was marching out on a major assignment filled with opportunities for glory, opportunities that Lee had just passed up.

This abrupt about face caused a headache for Washington, as he had already given the command to Lafayette.

Washington, feeling pressured by protocol, felt he had little choice but to transfer the command from Lafayette back to Lee.

Washington did his best to play the role of the mediator and appease both men.

However, he seemingly understood the disappointment that Lafayette was sure to feel from this.

Ultimately, though, the Marquis made the entire ordeal far easier when he graciously agreed to the unwarranted demotion.

Writing to Washington on June 26, Lafayette responded to the news of Lee taking over by saying, it is not on account of any other motive than the impossibility of moving the troops and making such march immediately.

For in receiving your letter, I have given up the project of attacking the enemy and I only wished to join General Lee.

Although Lafayette was already somewhat in the thick of things, he agreed that upon the arrival of Lee, he would hand over control.

This brings us to an interesting point about General Lee.

Washington and Lee's relationship had cooled significantly by the time he was captured, and his return had done little to start repairing their relationship.

Historian Richard Middlekopf suggests that Lee may have actually provided the British with intelligence on the Americans during his time as a prisoner.

Middlecliffe notes that from the time of Lee's return, he remained quiet.

And really the only opinion that he led onto was the fact that he no longer believed that the American army could best Clinton's army.

As Middle Cuff states.

Alexander Hamilton summarized the situation up by referring to Lee as being childish.

Regardless of any information that Lee may or may have not provided the British, it was clear that he was doing little to ingratiate himself with the other officers, including George Washington.

The battle would come on the morning of June 28, when Lee reached Clinton's rear near the courthouse in Monmouth.

The plan had been for Lee to hit the British in the rear where Lord Cornwallis was in command of the rear guard, and use that long baggage train to create substantial separation between the rearguard and the remainder of the army.

Lee's objective, therefore, was a quick, decisive strike that would seal an American victory.

Before Clinton could dispatch the rest of his army back to help reinforce Cornwallis, the plan was doomed from nearly the very beginning.

The problem with this plan is that it required the Americans to attack quickly.

What the Continentals needed was for the majority of Clinton's army to have become so separated from the rear that they did not realize that they had a problem until it was too late to do anything about it.

Remember that the last thing that Washington wanted here was a general engagement.

Unfortunately, the British were able to quickly figure out that the Americans planned an attack, and Clinton, who was riding along with the rear of the column, was able to muster up some 10,000 men.

Washington, who had thus far enjoyed that home field advantage, now found himself in a bad spot.

As the main bulk of the American army was nowhere close to their surprise.

It was now the Americans who found themselves badly outnumbered.

At least this is what Charles Lee explained during his court martial after the fact back on the morning of June 28th.

After a bit of maneuvering from both sides, you ended up with the 5,000 men under Lee lined up with their left flank anchored by a brook called East Ravine.

The American right was closer to Monmouth itself.

The bulk of the American army was located to the west across a conveniently named brook called West Ravine.

There is also a third creek located between the west and the East Ravine, the aptly named Middle Ravine.

The British had 2,000 men under the command of Cornwallis, while the main body of the army had already moved to the north, having crossed East Ravine.

What exactly happened on the morning of the 28th is a confusing mess, as we are about to see.

Mistakes were made that morning and everybody was was very eager to cover up their mistakes by pointing the finger at whomever happened to be nearby.

The battle began by both sides firing artillery.

That much is established.

Historian Woody Holton explains that even under the most favorable of circumstances, firing artillery was a miserable endeavor.

It was a dangerous and extremely hot undertaking.

It required extreme physical exertion to load fire and then drag the now red hot cannon back into position and then do it all over again.

It was hot.

We have already talked about the British losing mint to heatstroke.

With a handful of casualties from enemy fire and many more now Falling from heatstroke, Lt.

Col.

Elizur Oswald ordered the Continental Artillery regiment to pull back to a nearby orchard with the hopes that the shade might help temper the worst of the sun's wrath.

It is here that the confusion really begins to seep in.

It seems that the men on the American left witnessed the artillery company pulling back.

This created the beginning of everybody pulling back.

As more and more men did pull back, the more exposed the American flanks became, forcing even more men to, you guessed it, pull back.

Anthony Wayne in the center tried to stop the complete collapse of the line.

However, with both his left and right flank falling apart soon, he too had little choice but to join the unplanned and largely uncoordinated retreat.

One of the common things that I have found while researching the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse is that even among historians, there is a fair share of blame being passed around.

Without question, there was a lot of confusion throughout Lee's min on the morning of the 28th.

Although the blame for what had occurred that morning largely falls onto the shoulders of General Lee.

I think it would be a good idea for us to step back and consider the challenges that he was facing during the battle.

Historian Robert Middle Cuff writes that among the American commanders, Anthony Wayne, Charles Scott, and William Maxwell all reported that they had never received any orders from Lee.

They were not sure where they were going, where they were supposed to be, and ultimately exactly what the plan was.

Middle Cuff points out, however, that rather than Lee being derelict in his duties, he likely did not know the answers to these questions either.

Lee did send out a French engineer to find a hill for the Americans to fall back to and reestablish a defense.

However, upon arrival, Lee quickly realized that the hill was not high enough and that they would remain dangerously exposed to the British if they decided to set up there.

As the retreat continued, it became something that inevitably fed back into itself.

Anthony Wayne wanted to attack and indeed had been requesting more troops from Lee.

However, the order to attack never came.

Eventually, despite his willingness to fight, Wayne recognized that the retreat was going on all around him, which in turn made his position untenable.

As more and more units pulled back, the more exposed the line became, causing other units to begin retreating themselves.

Rinse, lather, repeat.

Even now, it is not entirely clear what Lee was trying to do.

He testified that the plan had been to separate the baggage train and trap the rear guard.

However, the lack of orders issued from him gives us little insight on just what the plan was to accomplish that end.

Although Lee claimed to have received intelligence that he was about to be badly outnumbered, hence why a retreat was tactically necessary, none of the other American commanders believed that the retreat was necessary.

At this point.

It is not as though some great battle had been fought.

When the retreat began, all that was happening was some artillery, volleys and skirmishing.

The battle itself had not even really begun yet.

It is also impossible to ignore the fact that Li's order to retreat was not a strategic decision.

Rather, it was a reaction to the fact that a full retreat was now well underway.

Whether he liked it or not, Charles Lee did not need to give the order to retreat.

The retreat was on in spite of what his own wishes may have been.

The Battle of Monmouth Courthouse is in some sense the story of two separate battles fought in close proximity to each other, both in place and time.

Eventually, Lee was able to bring a halt to the retreat and bring at least some amount of order back to the men.

However, that was to be of little consolation when, at around 1pm George Washington, riding ahead of the army, caught up with Lee.

Washington, upset, proceeded to very publicly tear into Charles Lee for the retreating men.

It remains possibly the most legendary tongue lashing that Washington gave to anybody during the entire course of the war.

Here, though, we must also consider Washington's own responsibility and what had happened that morning.

George Washington's own orders had been vague, and instead of laying out a course of action, he left mere hints.

Washington had ordered Lee to engage the British on the morning of the 28th.

We know that much.

Washington had been giving out orders on the morning of the battle that the chief objective was simply to harass and annoy Clinton.

Yet, as historian John Fairling states in his biography of Washington in the aftermath of the battle, Washington presented himself as a general who was looking for a far larger engagement with the British.

Farreling likewise points out that Washington had moved into this battle largely ignorant of the conditions, having not bothered to reconnoiter the spot in advance.

Although it is impossible to know what anybody was thinking at the time, the failure to reconnoiter does seem to suggest that Washington may not have been fully anticipating a large scale engagement with the British and instead assumed that skirmishes were going to be the order of the day.

Historian Woody Holton, on The other hand places the blame more squarely on Washington for dismissing the idea that the British would have been able to reinforce the rear guard before the Americans had been able to escape.

Either way, the morning had ended with what appeared to be a seemingly humiliating loss for the Americans.

However, really not everything was as bad as it seemed here.

Yes, the Continentals had just been chased from the field by possibly nothing at all, but also the casualties were not high.

The American army was still fully intact and, as it would turn out, not ready to quit the field just yet.

That day, as Washington wrapped up his tirade of profanities, which may have included Washington referring to Lee as being a damned coward, he set to the task of trying to regain control.

Here, Washington would indeed shine quickly.

He was able to bring the retreat to a halt and reform his defensive lines.

With Lee's forces now combining with the rest of the Continental army, these new lines were formed in between west and Middle Ravine.

With the situation seemingly back under control and a defensive line in place, Washington raced back and brought the main bulk of his army forward, with Stirling commanding the left and Greene taking command of the American right.

Although the American position was established more through happenstance than anything else, it was a strong defensive position for the Americans.

The place that they had taken was elevated, providing them with the high ground over the approaching British.

There was a hill off to the American right, which Henry Knox was able to make quick use of in order to establish his artillery.

Directly in front of the American line was a swamp, and on its left was a heavily wooded area that was not exactly ideal for moving troops through.

The Continental army had not really meant to end up in that location.

It really had been a coincidence.

However, now the Continental army held a strong position as they prepared for a battle against the incoming British.

The Battle of Monmouth Courthouse is interesting largely in part because it had a duality to it.

If it was the Americans who had been run off again for no good reason that morning in humiliating fashion, it was now time for the British to throw themselves pointlessly up against a wall.

Although the battle would last much of the remainder of the afternoon, the British were never really able to do anything to dislodge the Americans.

Immediately upon first contact, the British rushed the American position and they were quickly cut down.

The Americans would spend their afternoon making a stand that the British, despite their best efforts, could never break through.

During the course of this battle in particular, there would come stories of women assisting in the battle and fighting right alongside the men.

These stories would often become combined and melded together and would become part of the story of the battle that day.

The battle lasted most of the rest of the day.

On the 28th, I'm not going to go through all of the details because really nothing much changed from how the situation was at the beginning.

Cornwallis kept sending surges at the American lines.

However, they were simply in too good of a position for those often lackluster charges to do anything to move the line.

When I said a moment ago that the British were essentially just throwing themselves into a brick wall for the rest of the day, I was absolutely serious.

After hours of fighting, it became obvious that the British had made virtually no progress.

Finally, at around 6pm the battle would come to an end with the British withdrawing from the field.

Although Washington did give an order for the Americans to advance and follow.

Everybody was exhausted and little came of it.

The day was done.

So what just happened here?

The Americans had begun the day by seemingly getting routed by absolutely nothing at all and then flying into a pell mell retreat.

Washington would chew out Charles Lee before reestablishing order and setting up new lines in what would turn out to be an ideal location.

And then the British spent the rest of the afternoon getting cut down as they found themselves powerless to break through the American position.

As the smoke cleared on the night of the 28th, the Americans were left with 69 dead and 161 wounded.

The British, for their trouble, were left with 65 dead and 170 wounded.

This is excluding the number of those who had simply died of heatstroke.

The Americans would allow the British to continue their retreat back towards New York without further engagement.

Within a week, Clinton and his army wore back to the relative safety of New York.

It is difficult on its face to figure out who won the Battle of Monmouth.

Both sides had suffered roughly an equal number of casualties.

The British had withdrawn from the field of battle.

However, Washington had failed to smash Clinton's rear guard.

The Americans had humiliated themselves during the morning and then fought valiantly during the afternoon as the British earned the opportunity to feel frustrated themselves.

At the end, the battle had been remarkably equal.

In these situations, nobody is going to accept either a loss or a draw.

Sure enough, both Clinton and Washington happily claimed their hard fought victory.

Really, though, at the end of the day, although the battle might have been a draw, it really was an American victory.

Clinton privately acknowledged that although he was still going to sell the thing as a win, he knew that the day had not gone his way.

At this point in the war, Washington desperately needed a win and well, this was close enough.

His army had not been destroyed and even had successfully held its ground against the British.

There was little more that the general really could ask for, and he was prepared to take the win wherever he could get it.

For General Lee, his war would also come to an end that day.

In an attempt to exonerate himself from what had happened that day, Lee demanded a court martial.

To the disappointment of Lee, that was not to be.

Lee was charged with disobeying orders, issuing an unnecessary order to retreat, and finally, of issuing insulting letters to Washington after the fact.

There was to be no vindication of Lee, as the court martial found him guilty on all three counts.

He was suspended for one year from the army, though in time, that would turn into a lifetime suspension.

John Farreling argues that Washington may have realized that he had been unfair to Charles Lee.

He points out that the location where Washington reestablished the defensive lines is where Lee was heading.

We can debate as to Lee's ability at that point to reestablish the lines in any way that Washington did.

However, it is worth noting that Lee had picked an obviously strategic fallback point.

Later in the day, Washington did attempt to give Lee command over the American rear and likewise acknowledged that the British cavalry had a lot to do with the American retreat.

However, it was too little, too late to salvage anything from that relationship.

Really, though there is a strong argument that this was not a relationship that Washington would have wanted to salvage anyway.

It is not as though he had been good friends with Charles Lee.

Although Washington did share some of the blame for what had happened on the morning of the 28th, it seems unlikely that he shed too many tears for Charles Lee when he was unceremoniously booted from the army.

All things considered, it was a good time for George Washington.

All the gains from the British from the previous year had been forfeited.

The Americans were once again in control of Philadelphia.

Now, here at Monmouth Courthouse, the army had acted bravely, clearly benefiting from their work with von Steuben during the winter at Valley Forge.

Although he had not smashed the British army, Washington had a solid enough claim to victory that nobody at all was going to call him on it.

Finally, albeit somewhat unintentionally, Washington had rid himself of a troublesome second in command in Charles Lee.

The Battle of Monmouth Courthouse would likewise mark something of a turning point in the war.

Although the French alliance had been agreed to by this point and the French had officially joined the war on June 17, other than a handful of French officers having come over, there had been little involvement from America's new ally.

That, however, is all about to change as in short order, the American Revolution will take on a new look next time the French navy arrives and begins working with their new American allies in what would turn out to be a shaky start to the new alliance.

Until then, I hope you all have a wonderful two weeks.

I hope that you are staying healthy and that you are staying safe, and I will see you back here next time.

As the French join the fight.